Using GPT LLM MAMLMs as Your Rabbit—Your Pacer

GPT LLM MAMLMs are not oracles, subordinates, or colleagues. They are emulations of TISs—Typical Internet S***posters. If you are at all a good writer, the most they can be is “rabbits” that, in races and in training, mark and keep the pace that you want to meet and then better. Yes, with a lot of work you can nudge the TIS-emulators into desirable configurations. But that is a lot of work, done at the wrong and at a very unreliable abstraction layer. Better to say “I can do better than that drivel…” and write it yourself…

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And looking at this yet again. Still so excellent on the way to use ChatGPT and its couins

Overthinking Everything
How to say what you're good at
On discord recently, someone was asking for advice on how to write their annual performance review. This is a task I’ve done… never, actually, so obviously I’m extremely well qualified to weigh in and advise on it…
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David MacIver: How to say what you’re good at <https://drmaciver.substack.com/p/how-to-say-what-youre-good-at>: ‘Another form of autocompletion… [I find effective is this] very simple process:

  1. Dump your notes into Claude or ChatGPT and tell it what you want to write.

  2. Copy its output to a separate document.

  3. Stare at what it wrote for a bit.

  4. Let the hate flow through you.

  5. Delete whatever drivel it wrote and write something better, because you can definitely improve on that!

    1. It’s certainly possible that some of what it wrote will be OK, and you don’t actually have to delete all of it, but I really strongly encourage you not to edit what it wrote into something usable, but instead to write your own thing, borrowing as little or as much from it as you feel you need/want to.

At the end of this process, you should have something….

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As a workflow: dump notes into AI, and then look at the slop in disgust. Then delete and rewrite—perhaps paragraph by paragraph, perhaps all at once. the mush, then delete and rewrite—using the friction to surface your authentic articulation. If you are at all a good writer, you are then highly likely to find that you have something.

After all, ChatGPT or Claude will, at bottom, give you only AI slop. They cn give you nothing other than what a TIS—a Typical Internet S***poster—would write. This is how these models work: they learn from the mass of online text and spit out some interpolation driven by its compressed internal model of typical word patterns. There are ideas buried in the word-patterns it produces, yes. But they are buried.

Now GPT LLM boosters, at this point, begin talking frantically about RAG, RLHF, prompt engineering, data curation, feedback loops, careful data chunking and indexing, embedding optimization, hybrid search and reranking, supervised fine-tuning training from high-quality and human-curated examples, human reward modeling, proximal policy optimization, continuous feedback loops, custom base prompts, context injection, dynamic prompt templates, semantic chunking, metadata tagging, regular content updates, fine-tuning models on domain-specific data, and so on. Yes, these are ways to try to make the TIS that is the GPT LLM MALML behave better. As Andrej Karpathy once wrote:

Andrej Karpathy: <https://twitter.com/karpathy/status/1937902205765607626>: ‘+1 for “context engineering” over “prompt engineering”. People associate prompts with short task descriptions you’d give an LLM in your day-to-day use. When in every industrial-strength LLM app, context engineering is the delicate art and science of filling the context window with just the right information for the next step. Science because doing this right involves task descriptions and explanations, few shot examples, RAG, related (possibly multimodal) data, tools, state and history, compacting... Too little or of the wrong form and the LLM doesn’t have the right context for optimal performance. Too much or too irrelevant and the LLM costs might go up and performance might come down. Doing this well is highly non-trivial. And art because of the guiding intuition around LLM psychology of people spirits. On top of context engineering itself, an LLM app has to: - break up problems just right into control flows - pack the context windows just right - dispatch calls to LLMs of the right kind and capability - handle generation-verification UIUX flows - a lot more - guardrails, security, evals, parallelism, prefetching, ... So context engineering is just one small piece of an emerging thick layer of non-trivial software that coordinates individual LLM calls (and a lot more) into full LLM apps. The term “ChatGPT wrapper” is tired and really, really wrong.

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These are patches, not solutions. Relying on software to mimic a TIS nudged into producing something less sloppy is a trick that almost never works. If you write at all well, AI will not be better than just a very rough draft.

And step back. “Context engineering” is a lot of work. Unless you have a large number of documents or tasks that are parallel where you need to produce prose quickly at scale, and where you can nudge the TIS into a not-embarrassing configuration, you are doing the work, but at the wrong unreliable abstraction letter.

Better to avoid that “context engineering” work, for it is massive, and focus on saying what you need to say to persuade your ultimate readers.

And so the best course then is really to “let the hate flow through you. Delete whatever drivel it wrote and write something better, because you can definitely improve on that…”

Of course, if your writing is currently worse than that of the TIS—or if you have to write in a language in which you are not fluent—AI can really help. ChatGPT and Claude and company can then produce text that can be clearer and less embarrassing. For weak writers, AI does powerfully lift the floor. And I see this democratization of the power to write serviceable prose as a very good thing.

And if the words you write are not to persuade but to ticket-punch, to box-check, matters of boilerplate or ritual—things not to be seriously read but rather to fit into bureaucratic routine—the AI-slop generated from your notes may well be fine.

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More Lies About Trade Tariffs From the Chaos Monkeys

How can it be that imposing tariffs did not cause inflation or reduce affordability, but that removing tariffs will reduce inflation and increase affordability? It makes no sense. But it is not supposed to. The point is not to make a coherent argument, but to provide talking points that corrupt media can flash on screens to convince the uninformed to follow someone they portray as a leader doing something…

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The Trumpists want interest-rate cuts right now. The majority on the Federal Reserve’s FOMC is signalling that it will not deliver because it is worried about inflation above target, creeping up, and fueled by past tariffs with effects still working through the pipeline and unknown random chaotic future tariffs. The Trumpists’ response is incoherence: insisting tariffs don’t raise prices while arguing that removing them will lower prices, and so demanding immediate rate cuts starting in mid-December. Meanwhile, spin‑authoritarian tactics—media capture, exemptions, and rolling threats—block normal adjustment. Models that assume steady policy understate harm: the real‑world regime of chaos tariffs delivers lower GDP, fewer jobs, and higher prices by a multiple of what economists’ certainty-equivalent general-equilibrium models estimate. Plus there are the further corrosive effects a politics of dominance via enforced doublethink rather than argument based on, you know, actual facts.

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And so Jared Bernstein watches Trumpists tell yet more lies:

Jared Bernstein: White House: Tariffs don’t raise prices, but taking them away will lower prices <https://econjared.substack.com/p/white-house-tariffs-dont-raise-prices>: ‘And that’s actually just one part of their incoherence… [for] if tariffs aren’t pushing up inflation, then what is??… In fact, reducing tariffs is the admin’s best, quickest play to help with prices, in sharp contrast to other ideas they’ve surfaced, like 50-year mortgages or health savings accounts…. The admin desperately wants the Fed to cut interest rates, but their argument that tariffs are not responsible for the inflationary pressures that are worrying the Fed board pushes the wrong way…. If admin officials are right and tariffs are not the thing that’s been keeping inflation high and sticky, then the central bank would be remiss to dismiss inflation stuck above their target as something that’s now in the rearview mirror. (The fact that Trump never stops negotiating new tariffs also makes it harder for them to “look through” them.) This is why “tariffs are not the cause of higher inflation” and “the Fed should cut rates” is an incoherent combination of statements…

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I hate to break it to Jared, but making statements that add up to a consistent logical argument or picture of the world is not a goal of the Trumpists, or of Trump. The goal is not to persuade onlookers and interlocutors by logical argument. The goal is to flummox interlocutors, and thus to get onlookers to go along by demonstrating dominance. See “Gish Gallop”:

Wikipedia: Gish gallop <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gish_gallop>: ‘Named…after the creationist Duane Gish… the galloper confronts an opponent with a rapid series of specious arguments, half-truths, misrepresentations, and outright lies, making it impossible for the opponent to refute all of them within the format of the debate. Each point raised by the Gish galloper takes considerably longer to refute than to assert. The technique wastes an opponent’s time and may cast doubt on the opponent’s debating ability for an audience unfamiliar with the technique, especially if no independent fact-checking is involved, or if the audience has limited knowledge of the topics. The difference in effort between making claims and refuting them is known…informally “the bullshit asymmetry principle”…

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The right-wing Tax Foundation is trying to keep score:

Erica York & Alex Durante: Trump Tariffs: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War <https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/>: ‘The Trump tariffs amount to an average tax increase per US household of $1,200 in 2025 and $1,600 in 2026…. The average effective tariff rate, reflecting behavioral responses, rises to 12.5 percent—the highest average rate since 1941…. Historical evidence and recent studies show that tariffs are taxes that raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for US businesses and consumers, resulting in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output

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The Tax Foundation GE Model estimates that the fully phased-in effect of the tariffs is to reduce employment in the U.S. by 0.5%—700,000 lost full-time jobs. And, no, this is not a loss that other macroeconomic policy moves can neutralize. It does not estimate the effect on inflation or the price level.

I have one very large complaint about the Tax Foundation’s modeling strategy. It is grossly inadequate to the problem. They estimate planned, constant tariffs. We have unplanned, chaotic, constantly moving tariffs. Thus all of the normal adjustments that could be made to reduce and cushion the adverse impact cannot be made. And there are a host of other production- and employment-reducing steps that are now being taken in order for firms to buy insurance against future random chaos-monkey tariff moves on the part of Trump.

My personal guess is that the actual likely damage is perhaps five times larger, plus added additional risk-aversion general-equilibrium effects arising because foreign powers will not simply retaliate to imposed tariffs, but understand that every point of integration of their economies with the United States—whether viewing the U.S. as customer, supplier, or value-chain participant—is an extra point of potential attempts by Trump and his band of grifters to try to exert leverage.

But step back: The deeper point and argument is one that we have known since before Orwell: the point of doublethink is not to channel thought and analysis, but rather to demonstrate power.

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Thursday State of the SubStacks: Walking the Tightrope Over the Attention-Economy Abyss

As app‑first feeds and social ephemera threaten the email/blog/tip‑jar core, VC incentives collide with public reason, the brittle economics of “#discoverability” make themselves felt, and it turns out the hard part is the mechanics of the business finding the sweet spot…

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Is this thing a serious and sustainable platform business, individual business model, and hence public-reason community?

On the plate we have:

Anne Trubek: On SubStack (sigh) <https://notesfromasmallpress.substack.com/p/on-substack-sigh>: ‘I am not a fan of the… owners…. I expect this platform to become increasingly unfriendly to newsletter writers like me… not chasing Big Scale… [the] Notes (social media-esque) part of Substack. En*tification…. I have tried to leave… and have stalled out, several times, for varying reasons…. Many writers here… making… a substantial portion of [a living]…. is an extraordinary accomplishment and godsend that they have been able to be sustain themselves through newsletters which, like blogs, have been historically well-nigh impossible to profit from…

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vs.:

Hamish McKenzie: <https://substack.com/@hamish/note/c-171083114>: ‘Patreon is spending big bucks to lure some Substack writers over to its platform, and some are taking the deal to escape the social features that drive their growth here. (They stay on Instagram, though.) Meanwhile, Patreon is spending that money because it’s trying to spin up the network effects that Substack has by… building social features….

Things we do to help writers who don’t have an existing audience: - Provide a multimedia publishing system that is completely free to use. - Give writers distribution to email, web, and an app, for no cost whatsoever. - Offer an discovery system that includes Notes, recommendations, search, leaderboards, and categories that have the potential to bring you subscribers, completely free of charge. - Publish and provide (free) educational resources that help writers figure out how to best use Substack and make the most of this new model. -Attract writers with large existing audiences to the network so that other writers might convert some of those people into their own subscribers

We have a ton more work to do, and it will never be enough, but we explicitly design Substack to help a new generation of voices emerge. Doesn’t mean that every one will succeed. But here they have a greater shot at building a sustainable media presence and business than anywhere else on the internet…

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And:

a. natasha joukovsky: <https://substack.com/@joukovsky/note/c-173537147>: ‘I cannot understand—from a business perspective, mind you—why Substack seems to be prioritizing Notes ephemera over links to longform newsletters. The normal answer here—revenue-maximizing en*tification—simply doesn’t fit on a platform that makes its money through paid subscriptions. Substack’s incentives, as they so often tout, are seemingly aligned to writers’. Gotta wonder if ads are coming soon/what the play here is because the math isn’t mathing…

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With a key red flag now appearing to be SubStack Notes <https://substack.com/home> and its associated chonky swol twitter-like feed:

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And also on the plate is a note from Mills Baker about what the SubStack team is actually intending SubStack Notes, considered as a social-media feed, to be—a principal channel pushing discoverability:

Mills Baker: Rats from Rocks: ‘no plans for ads at all; there’s a dynamic balance issue with feed tuning that’ll sum to lurching ranking though:

  • if you want more paid subs, you need more posts served AND more users;

  • more users come from more engaging feed content (they visit more, stay longer, click on more posts, subscribe more)

  • we goal on paid subs, so we push posts to the max, but at some point pushing all posts will trade off against post driven subscriptions, weirdly!

  • eg if feed were all paywalled posts, people wouldn’t come on volume and subscriptions would decline; if it were no paywalled posts, or no posts at all, it would be pointless for us and writers and we’d make no money

it’s just a permanently messy tuning process with dynamic (and ultimately per user) targets…

As I understand it, the key to SubStack’s “Notes” algorithm is that it needs to be one that (i) does not maximize time-on-platform and leaves a bad taste afterwards in the mouths of those who engaged, but (ii) does maximize paid subscriptions to newsletters, and also (iii) leaves readers of “Notes” feeling informed, entertained, and having spent there time learning about interesting things to read.

The “how this works” and how you create this New Model Algorithm remains mysterious to me.

It is a social network, but not: SubStack has an app. Substack spends a lot of its team’s energy and time getting people to download and then use the app. The app is anchored by its feed. But SubStack is trying as hard as it can to hack the brains of those it attract in a different way. Mark Zuckerberg’s team tries to hack your brain so that you spend as much time as possible on-app, so your glued eyeballs can be sold to attention-seeking advertisers. The SubStack team is trying to optimize for the chain: download → view → discover → subscribe → pay. The desired end result for SubStack is a paid subscriber to somebody’s newsletter/ podcast. And there seeking that requires a substantially different feed than the eyeball-gluing maximize time in-app standard social-media feed.

But how, exactly?

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Just What Do Trump's "Trade Deals" Consist of? Nothing

Malaysia deals with a chaos-monkey superpower: empty appeasement coupled with steps at derisking via exit from coupled arrangements that create vulnerabilities…

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A “consultation” clause beats nothing when you face a hegemon acting on chaotic impulse. As PR optics steer the Potemkin “policy” of Donald Trumps, savvy partners sell photo‑ops—not allegiance. And they take steps to derisk and decouple as the way to buy what insurance they can against capricious and unmotivated attempts to exert power. Hold tight to this: Trump’s trade “deals” aren’t deals—they’re stage directions for an impulse‑driven executive. Malaysia read the script and wrote itself a “call us first” clause.

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Alan Beattie: The US can’t force Asian countries into its trade camp <https://www.ft.com/content/62e54b1e-1558-4692-b825-c4a6d08f8bc4>: ‘The US apparently gained… in… deals with Cambodia and Malaysia… [that were] unusually detailed by Trump’s standards — were the first of a planned string of deals with Asean nations… On the face of it… forc[ing them] to choose between the US and China…

But not really. First, it is not a binding “deal”:

There is no formal dispute settlement system with an independent panel, just the prospect of Trump acting as judge, jury and vengeful executioner…

Second, well:

Why did Malaysia sign?… [To avoid restrictions on] the electrical and electronic products… Malaysia sells… which help to make America its second-biggest national export market…

But what are the consequences for Malaysia of signing? None:

Zafrul Aziz, Malaysia’s trade minister, told me this week that the deal created a system of formal consultation rather than automatic alignment. “We are very clear that any actions taken under the agreement will be based on Malaysia’s interest and under Malaysian law,” Zafrul said. “There’s a consultation process, and if it’s not in our interest to follow the US we won’t….. If we don’t agree then we face the consequences and the US can put on tariffs or whatever, but at least this way we get to put our point of view. Otherwise they can do what they want without explaining the rationale…”…

So has Malaysia chosen to ally with the U.S. on trade issues vis-à-vis China? No:

The US offers an export market, but these days an increasingly fickle one…. China offers rare earths and green tech. Neither is dispensable.As Zafrul told me: “We signed this [US deal] on Sunday. On Monday, we signed an [Asean] agreement with China.”… Agile governments… resist being turned into economic satellites. It’s not a comfortable place to be, but… not a powerless one…

The most you can say about the “deal” is that it is a recognition by Malaysia that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Except that, under Trump, “the strong do what they can” does not cut it, for the meaning in Thoukydides’s Thoukydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war… is that the Athenians will do whatever is to their advantage. But in the case of the Trump administration, the Trump Administration will instead do something completely random, but its actions can be somewhat shaped by giving it the PR bonus of an apparent “win” of some kind.

Thus this looks to me like a marginal win for Malaysia: the U.S. has now committed itself to inform Malaysia before it does something random and destructive, and that gives Malaysia a chance to dredge up a way to offer Trump another PR-event boost in advance, rather than having to pay catch-up after some random action.

And, of course, this is a marginal loss for the United States. Or perhaps it is part of a pattern that will turn out, in aggregate, to be not a marginal but a substantial loss?

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: For a True Meritocracy

Hoisting this & separating it out so I can find it easily in the future: from 2021-12-28.. <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/against-meritocracy>.

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If you have a test or another activity to select who is “the best”, you had better make damned sure that the test or activity accurately measures or reflects what you really want done. In the limit, you optimize for test-takers—and people who have devoted all of their time to become expert test-takers have spent none of their time learning to do anything else. They are thus likely to be far from “the best” at what will be their real job.

How can you tell if you are falling into this trap? Divide your population up into groups. See how well the best test-takers are spread out among those groups, If there is no reason to think that those who will actually be best at the real job are anything other than uniformly distributed among the groups you have chosen, and yet if it turns out that those who score highest on the test are strongly concentrated—then it is highly likely that you are missing huge numbers of potential candidates, and wasting a huge amount of talent.

Rajiv Sethi ran across a very interesting paper on Finland that is on point here:

Rajiv Sethi: Notes on a Remarkable Finding from Finland <https://rajivsethi.substack.com/p/notes-on-a-remarkable-finding-from>: ‘Ursina Schaede and Ville Mankki…. A change in the manner in which… teachers were selected…. A first stage based largely on scores on a high school matriculation exam, followed by a second stage…. For a number of years, acceptance into the second stage was based on a quota, ensuring that at least 40 percent… were male…. The first post-quota cohort… graduated in 1994…. Students differentially exposed to the quota-constrained cohorts of teachers ended up with better educational attainment and labor force participation…. “Male quota teachers contributing positive qualities to the school environment that are not sufficiently captured by the selection criterion in absence of the quota.”… Important characteristics (unmeasured by scores) were not identical across male and female applicant pools. The quota was picking up individuals with these characteristics by proxy…

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Notes on a Remarkable Finding from Finland
I recently came across a paper by Ursina Schaede and Ville Mankki that contains a fascinating empirical finding with major implications for the way in which we think about meritocracy…
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Wednesday MAMLMs: Notes on Zuckerberg’s "PASI" Pivot: From Adtech Moats to "Superintelligence" Moonshot

Killing FAIR, chasing “Personal Artificial Super-Intelligence”: the fast‑second strategy is dead; “PASI” reframes AI as product platform, not plumbing'; Scale AI, TBD Lab, and nine‑figure hires signal control over capability. LeCun saw LLMs as super-steroid-boosted “Clever Hans”; Zuckerberg responded by sidelining dissidents and tripling down on LLMs anyway. And so Zuckerberg has ditched FAIR’s long‑horizon research, concentrating power, budget, and speed, and YOLO‑spending to escape supplier status under Apple and Google. Can PASI deliver products before capex crushes credibility?…

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FaceBook’s old MAMLM strategy before last spring had made a lot of sense to me:

MAMLMs—Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Models—promise to be of enormous value as natural‑language front-end interfaces to structured and unstructured databases.

Their value is obvious: they turn messy human intent into structured actions—summarizing 200‑page briefs, drafting RFPs with compliance constraints, translating domain jargon across teams, and even orchestrating software tools via text.

But they are hideously expensive to build and run at the frontier. Frontier costs bite hard. Training a top‑tier model still demands tens of thousands of GPUs, months of wall‑clock time, elite engineering talent, and multi‑million‑dollar electricity and opportunity costs; serving it adds a second bill in inference latency, memory bandwidth, and GPU-hours. Currently, value capture depends on architecture choices—distillation into smaller specialists, retrieval‑augmented generation to reduce hallucinations and compute, tool use to externalize calculation, batching and caching to amortize tokens—and on matching capability to context.

As we as a species explore this space, an awful lot of money will be wasted from the point-of-view of private business profitability, perhaps useful to society as a whole from the knowledge it generates from exploring the space of technology and business-model profitabilities, but definitely falling into the “engineers” category of what the Rothschilds of the 1800s thought was the most effective way to lose fortunes quickly. And this is supercharged by the current bubble-enthusiasm, likely as it is to produce your standard bubble-style overbuilding-and-shakeout at a potential scale of trillions of dollars.

Hence, for FaceBook, there is a single key priority: it is the defense of their current platform‑monopoly profits against disruptive entrants and architectures—through preemptive acquisitions, technical foreclosure, regulatory gaming, and other methods that rhyme with the historical playbooks of AT&T’s long‑distance choke points and Microsoft’s 1990s browser tie‑ins. Thus the clear strategy was to spend on “AI” enough and in ways that neutralized the possibility of disruption by protecting newly revealed attack surfaces, while staying ready to be a very fast second in deployment where truly useful capabilities for additional audience capture emerged.

There was one area, however, in which it did make sense for FaceBook to try to be first in development and deployment of MAMLMs: ad targeting. The platform’s business model hinged on extracting weak but numerous signals from messy, high‑dimensional user behavior—clicks, dwell time, social graph proximity, image content, and text sentiment—and turning them into real‑time predictions of purchase intent, lift, and conversion probability. Multimodal attention models could fuse a product photo, a caption, and the user’s recent interactions to make decisions. They could also do creative optimization by testing micro‑variants of copy and imagery, and run budget allocation across campaigns with rapid feedback loops. After Apple’s App Tracking Transparency disrupted cross‑app identifiers, first‑party, on‑platform inference grew even more valuable to reconstruct targeting cohorts without external trackers. For FaceBook, being first and strongest in ad-targeting MAMLMs promised a compound edge.

This is a long-winded way of saying that, to me, all the pieces of FaceBook’s old “AI” strategy semed to me to make sense: focus AI-spending on ad targeting; open-source LLaMA to deprive those wanting to make money by selling foundation-model services of their oxygen and their ability to accumulate a warchest to make a run at disruption, and otherwise stand ready to implement GPT LLM MAMLMs when valuable use-cases arose, while spreading the true R&D budget further around so that FaceBook would not get caught flat-footed when the next post-GPT MAMLM thing emerged.

And, of course, all of thus was reinforced by Chief Scientist Yan LeCun’s suspicion of GPT LLM “AI”. It was, in his estimation, better thought of as autocomplete and “Clever Hans” on super-steroids; rather than a road to AGI or beyond that to ASI. My belief is that Yan LeCun was and is correct here. GPT LLM MAMLM systems excel at next-token prediction in vast text corpora but lack grounded models of the world, persistent goals, and mechanisms for causal reasoning, for the same architecture that stitches together plausible sentences often has no way to validate their truth. LeCun’s own research agenda—energy-based models, joint training of perception, memory, and action, and world models that can predict consequences—aims at enabling agency and reasoning beyond pattern matching. Empirically, we’ve seen LLMs. even with bolted-on tools that mitigate weakness—retrieval augmentation, chain-of-thought, tool use, external memory, or hybrid neuro-symbolic pipelines—fail. They are scaffolds around a predictive core rather than evidence of emergent general intelligence.

If AGI implies autonomous goal-directed behavior with reliable generalization across modalities and environments, then LeCun’s caution is well taken: today’s GPTs are powerful communicators and reasoning simulators, but without grounded learning they remain brittle pattern machines. Very useful for literature-search and summarization, yes. Producing a leveling-up in that, properly prompted, they can get your prose to the level of the typical internet s***poster with relative ease. Extraordinarily useful as natural-language front-ends to properly curated datastores, structured and unstructured, most impressively as programming pilots, yes. But something to spend nine figures a year on, very doubtful.

That was FaceBook’s strategy. It seemed to me to be, well, wise.

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However, then, last spring, all of a sudden everything at FaceBook changed. Let me give the mic to the very sharp Paul Kedrosky:

Paul Kedrosky: Meta: Purging of Dissidents vs Open Rebellion <https://paulkedrosky.com/metas-purging-of-dissdents/>: ‘Part purging of LLM dissidents, part philosophical break…. Mark Zuckerberg has reoriented Meta’s AI efforts around “superintelligence,” led by Alexandr Wang of Scale AI.LeCun’s long-term research lab has been gutted and folded into product groups….LeCun… has consistently argued that LLMs are a clever trick, but a dead end on the path to higher levels of intelligence…. [Zuckerberg] has tripled down on LLMs both in terms of hiring and capex. LeCun’s view is that intelligence emerges from interacting with the physical world…. This marks the last vestige of major non-LLM research disappearing from inside the hyperscalers. It is also, and more importantly, the first open act of rebellion from a founding deep-learning figure against the LLM orthodoxy dominating Silicon Valley…

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Referencing:

Melissa Heikkilä & Hannah Murphy, Stephen Morris & George Hammond: Meta chief AI scientist Yann LeCun plans to exit and launch own start-up <https://www.ft.com/content/c586eb77-a16e-4363-ab0b-e877898b70de?emailId=dd4d1c03-8c5e-4163-8425-5996b93e2317&segmentId=ce31c7f5-c2de-09db-abdc-f2fd624da608>: ‘Turing Award winner seeks to depart as Mark Zuckerberg makes ‘superintelligence’ push…. Zuckerberg hired Alexandr Wang… [a] “superintelligence” team… paying $14.3bn to hire the 28-year-old…. Zuckerberg also personally handpicked an exclusive team, called TBD Lab, to propel development… luring staff from rivals such as OpenAI and Google with $100mn pay packages…. Zuckerberg has come under growing pressure from Wall Street to show that his multibillion-dollar investment in becoming an “AI leader” will pay off and boost revenue. Meta’s shares plunged 12.6 per cent — wiping out almost $240bn from its valuation — in late October after the chief executive signalled higher AI spending ahead, which could top $100bn next year…

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FaceBook’s AI vision had been that of its FAIR—Facebook Artificial Intelligence Research. It was created in 2013 to push long‑horizon, open research in areas like self‑supervised learning, computer vision, NLP, robotics, and tooling such as PyTorch, with labs across Menlo Park, New York, London, Paris, and more. Over time, FAIR’s role shifted as Meta prioritized productized generative AI; key leaders departed and work on models like LLaMAmoved under product teams, while FAIR refocused on longer‑term “advanced machine intelligence.”

The governance gamble is clear: less basic research, more integrated shipping. The pivot centralizes technical and budget authority under a small cadre, echoing historical chokepoint strategies to deter disruption. FaceBook’s talent strategy—nine‑figure packages and direct CEO recruiting—trades internal continuity for lateral influx. Roughly 600 research roles cut while rehiring into TBD suggests a barbell org: fewer theorists, more load‑bearing product/model owners. The TBD Lab “SWAT team” concentrates decision rights, reduces internal transaction costs, and shortens model iteration cycles. The $14.3bn Scale AI deal plus 49% stake created a ready‑made leadership and evaluation apparatus for model quality, accelerating the ramp without a full acquisition.

But when the technical paradigm shifts away from LLMs, FaceBook will have to pivot again without FAIR’s bench.

Strategically, ad-targeting remains the revenue flywheel. A stronger model stack can lift ad load and price while AI products deepen engagement. Even with aggressive build‑out, Meta’s cash generation means that the downside is valuation, not solvency. Near‑term revenue cushions come from ad load and pricing uplift driven by AI. The context, of course is insane ballooning sector capex: reports of multi‑year US $600bn AI infra plans underscore the wager on power, land, chips, and water becoming strategic inputs. FaceBook telegraphed “notably more than” $100bn in 2026‑style spend equivalents, triggering a sharp drawdown. Investors may balk at YOLO capital intensity absent clear product pull‑through, demanding product proofs, not just rhetoric about ASI glory.

But is all of this a good idea—for the future of humanity, for the health of the tech sector as a leading sector, for Mark Zuckerberg’s personal status, for the returns on investors in FaceBook?

The new buzzphrase now is “personal artificial superintelligence”: PASI. Medium‑term returns depend on consumer adoption of PASI, whatever that may be. We see the function of the buzzphrase in the wheeling of FaceBook as an organization in a new direction: Reframing “AI” as a consumer platform, not a back‑office utility. Aligning FaceBook’s moats protecting its platform-monopoly profits with context-rich devices like glasses and phones. Abandoning the prior “fast‑second” posture and accepting higher execution risk to avoid platform disruption by rivals. And speed and coordination trump open science.

The technology-use case bet may be that owning the user interface and on‑device context will matter more than being the best general model, echoing past social‑graph advantages.

Or it may not. It may be a more cynical move by Zuckerberg—that to maintain his status in Silicon Valley, FaceBook needs to be “the best” rather than a mere supplier driving the flow of the real big profits in phones and OSes to Apple and Google; that he will spend his investors’ money like water to make that so; and that part of making that so is promising top-AI talent that they will not be working on ad-targeting and customer-relations ChatBots but on nebulous “ASI”.

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The False Calm Before Steam: The Index H, Malthus, & the Long Slog, for Growth Was Very Real Before It Became Visible in Average Living Standards

The cliché says nothing happened before 1800. The data say capability rose steadily—only population swallowed the dividends. Replace vibes with an index: average income × √population. Suddenly, Rome, Han, and Bronze-Age workshop floors look like real steps, not “nothing.” If you think progress began with steam, you’re reading per capita and ignoring people. My index of the value of the stock of technological capability H tells a different story: slowly rising competence, finally outrunning the Devil of Malthus…

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This, eighteen years old, but in my feed via a referral to a link over on a link from one of the bad social-media websites. I remember it. It struck me back then, and it still strikes me now, as not too smart:

Steven Landsburg: <https://windowsontheory.org/2025/11/04/thoughts-by-a-non-economist-on-ai-and-economics/>: ‘Modern humans… emerged about 100,000 years ago. For the next 99,800 years or so, nothing happened. Well… wars, political intrigue, the invention of agriculture—but none of that stuff had much effect on the quality of people’s lives. Almost everyone lived… just above… subsistence level… Then—just a couple of hundred years ago, maybe 10 generations—people started getting richer. And richer and richer still… at the unprecedented rate of about three quarters of a percent per year...

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I remember Landsburg. Slate gave him a column for a long time—Michael Kinsley thinking he needed to spend more of Microsoft’s money on “provocative” right-wing s***posters. See: SlatePitch. The Slatepitch was never intellectual contrarianism; it was attention arbitrage. Dress up the obvious as “forbidden truth,” or varnish the indefensible as “counterintuitive genius,” and count the clicks while readers burn minutes they’ll never get back. The trick relies on a bait-and-switch: either posit a claim that violates common sense and then filibuster through rhetorical cleverness, or launder a truism as a brave revelation (“we need to admit X”). In both cases, the scarce resource—reader time—is squandered on provocation rather than illumination.

Dan Davies (2009) had a nice take on it back in the day <https://crookedtimber.org/2009/10/22/rules-for-contrarians-1-dont-whine-that-is-all/>:

Dan Davies (2009): Rules for Contrarians: 1. Don’t whine. That is all <https://crookedtimber.org/2009/10/22/rules-for-contrarians-1-dont-whine-that-is-all/>: ‘A contrarian piece properly [written]… make[s] a defensible argument which strongly resembles a controversial one…. Having done this intentionally, you don’t get to complain that people have “misinterpreted” your piece by taking you to be saying exactly what you carefully constructed the argument to look like you were saying…. A degree of diffidence is appropriate here, because the confusion is entirely and intentionally your fault…

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And that applies in spades to Landsburg’s: “modern humans first emerged about 100,000 years ago. For the next 99,800 years or so, nothing happened…”

There is, today, pushback:

Ben: <[twitter.com/BenShinde...](https://twitter.com/BenShindel/status/1985842682581926039)>: ‘Ppl underestimate the technological and cultural progress between 100k ya and the rise of cities 5k ya, and again… to the… Bronze Age… classical era, and so forth….

People living in the classical era in the Mediterranean or China could publish books, travel thousands of miles and return to their homes, debate philosophy, trade luxury goods, construct large buildings, and examine their own history scientifically!

Three thousand years before that, on the Euphrates, you could build a house in a city, write letters to your family living in a distant state, write down your forecasts to track your understanding of astrology, and innovate by growing different crops to see what would sell better.

Three thousand years before THAT, you probably were an itinerant herder/farmer who knew a few hundred people in your tribal community and tried to make more durable pottery.

One step further and… you hunted and gathered and died in small bands of a few dozen. These are HUGE steps. Each of them far greater in scope and importance than the inevitable Industrial Revolution. Sam Altman, do not trust an academic that leads with this false epigraph!…

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And:

Matthew Yglesias: <https://x.com/mattyglesias/status/1985846403218677979>: ‘Yeah “no growth in per capita income until the Industrial Revolution” reflects Malthusian population dynamics not a lack of technological progress—human capabilities grew steadily, which was reflected in population growth…

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I would say that there are six things in play here:

  1. The development and deployment of technologies of nature-manipulation…

  2. The development and deployment of technologies of human productive coöperation…

  3. The production of necessities and conveniences…

  4. The invention and production of luxuries…

  5. The invention and production of culture…

  6. The development and deployment of technologies of domination…

If we are willing to make some truly heroic assumptions, we can deal with (3) and how it is supported by (1) and (2) in a manner that is at least somewhat believable.

I, in fact, have the beginnings of a catechism for all this. It is at <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/brad-delongs-history-of-economic>!:

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Where do you start?

I start with a very crude global index of the value of the stock of human technology—useful ideas about manipulating nature and productively organizing humans—that have been discovered, developed, and then deployed-and-diffused throughout the world economy.


How do you construct this index?

I calculate it as the average worldwide level of income per capita, times the square root of population.


Why do you set the technology level proportional to the level of average output per capita?

That is just a normalization: it makes it easy to interpret—double the technology level, and you double the average income per capita level the world’s resources can support at a fixed population.


Why the square root of population?

The square-root recognizes that there is resource scarcity—hence generating income for more people is burdensome, and so the technology level is not simply average output per capita—but also that each mouth comes with two eyes, two arms, and a brain, so that labor is productive—hence total world product is not the technology level either. “Square-root” is a balance.


Would you die on the hill that it is square-root, rather than some other power between 0 (which gives average income per capita) or 1 (which gives total world product) multiplying population?

No. But do you have a better idea?


How about things like changing capital intensity as drivers of economic growth?

Even if Solow (1956, 1957) had not scotched that as a dominant factor, I believe that the capital intensity of the average human economy—its capital stock/annual output ratio—has been pretty close to three since shortly after the invention of agriculture. Differences in capital intensity do matter in comparing the relative prosperity levels of different societies at any point in time, but I do not see them as playing any significant role over the long term.


What do your guesses—I won’t call them numbers—then show, in terms of the annual average proportional growth rates of technology deployed-and-diffused, worldwide?

Roughly:

  • 2.1%/yr., at least, after 1870; the Modern Economic Growth era

  • 0.33%/yr. 1770 to 1870; the Industrial Revolution era

  • 0.17%/yr. 1500 to 1770; the Imperial-Commercial era

  • 0.056%/yr. 800 to 1500; the High Mediæval era

  • 0.007%/yr. 150 to 800; the Late-Antiquity Pause era

  • 0.060%/yr. -1000 to 150; the Axial-Iron age

  • 0.030%/yr. -3000 to -1000; the Literacy-Bronze age

  • 0.005%/yr. -8000 to -3000; the Early Agrarian era

  • 0.002%/yr. -8000 to -48000; the Out of Africa-Upper Paleolithic and Mesolithic eras

  • 0.009%/yr. -73000 to -48000; the post-bottleneck African-expansion era.

Basically, growth very slow for millennia—visible only in la longue durée—then growth visible over a human lifetime, barely, after 1500; growth substantial over a human lifetime after 1770; and then growth so that humanity’s technological prowess doubles every generation after 1870.


What do your guesses show, in terms of the levels of technology deployed-and-diffused, worldwide?

Roughly:

  • 2024: 27.1 Today

  • 1870: 1.0, Shift to the Modern Economic Growth age

  • 1770: 0.71 Industrial Revolution age

  • 1500: 0.46, Imperial-Commercial age

  • 800: 0.31, Mediæval age

  • 150: 0.29, Classical Antiquity

  • -1000: 0.147, Early Iron age

  • -3000: 0.081, Early Literacy-Bronze age

  • -8000: 0.062, End of Mesolithic era

  • -48000: 0.028, Out-of-Africa-Paleolithic era

  • -73000: 0.003, Population Bottleneck


What does this measure tell us about when the big, important quantitative change in the course of human economic growth came?

It tells us that the big leap upward in economic growth—the bit watershed boundary-crossing—comes in 1870, when the global rate of technological progress jumps up more or less discontinuously from an average proportional growth rate of 0.45% per year to a rate of at least 2.1% per year.


The proportional jump from 1870 to 2020 is larger than the proportional jump from -6000 to 1870. Surely the jump from 1 to more than 20 deserves some intermediate steps?

I am playing with:

  • 2035: Attention Info-Bio Tech Age

  • 2000: Globalized Value Chain Neoliberal Order Age

  • 1965: Mass Production New-Deal Order Age

  • 1930: Morbid-Systems Interregnum

  • 1905: Belle Époque Applied-Science Age

  • 1870: Steampower Pseudo-Classical Semi-Liberal Order Age

  • 1770: Imperial-Commercial Age

  • 1500: Renaissance Global-Contact Age

  • 800: Mediæval Age

  • 135: High Classical Antiquity

  • -1000: Iron Age

  • -3000: Bronze-Literacy Age

  • -8000: Neolithic Era

  • -48000: Out of Africa

  • -73000: Population Bottleneck

with each “mode of production” marking a rough doubling of the technology level. If you believe that “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist”, then the list above are what you would like to mark and reference: not any of this “asian-ancient-feudal-capitalist-socialist” stuff.


Do you really think that the technological-underpinning base and the corresponding superstructures of human society really stayed the same in any meaningful sense from 200 to 1500?

No. I take the point that back in the Before Times smaller quantitative changes in the level of productivity had larger qualitative effects on how societies were run—that smaller changes in the forces- and relations-of-production carried with them bigger effects on the superstructure, at least in the long run

If, before 1500 we move to dividing history up into “modes of production” by marking an age difference as a roughly √2-ing in our valuation of the stock of deployed-and-diffused “technology”:

  • 2035: Attention Info-Bio Tech Age

  • 2000: Globalized Value Chain Neoliberal Order Age

  • 1965: Mass Production New-Deal Order Age

  • 1930: Morbid-Systems Interregnum

  • 1905: Belle Époque Applied-Science Age

  • 1870: Steampower Pseudo-Classical Semi-Liberal Order Age

  • 1770: Imperial-Commercial Age

  • 1500: Renaissance Global-Contact Age

  • 800: Mediæval Age

  • 135: High Classical Antiquity

  • -1000: Iron Age

  • -3000: Bronze-Literacy Age

  • -8000: Neolithic Era

  • -48000: Out of Africa

  • -73000: Population Bottleneck

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Or, in convenient tabular form:

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But that still leaves us with (4), (5), (6): luxuries—which I define as things and processes you could not have possessed, utilized or experienced beforehand; cultural goods of all kinds; and then there are the negative bidders—those who do not make you offers of good things to induce coöperation, but rather make Don Vito Corleone-like offers that you cannot refuse.

And I have not yet proven smart enough to come up with even a semi-defensible way of producing even a rough quantitative guess of the value—or disvalue—of those three. But they are key to answering the original question.

No. It is not the case that nothing interesting happened.

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A Note: Reitter Translates Marx as He Was

Translation is intellectual engineering: accuracy and consistency are key: choose fidelity. Reading Marx without apocalyptic filters imposed because who he was does not suit present-day purposes…

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Ben Burgis attacks Paul Reitter’s new translation of Capital as clunky and misguided. But what “clunk” there is Marx’s own 1800s-era machinery, and Reitter’s sin is keeping it intact. If you want to think with Marx, you need his gears—not some modernized vibe chosen to mesh with present-day imaginings about political purposes.

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Procrastinating on the Day Job this AM, by going back to Ben Burgis’s hatchet job on the new Reitter translation of Marx’s Capital, vol. 1…

Burgis’s claim: “if this really does replace the 1976 Ben Fowkes translation (used in the Penguin edition) as the “standard” English-language Capital, Marx’s English-language readers will be vastly worse off”…

<https://benburgis.substack.com/p/in-defense-of-the-fowkes-translation>

Philosophy for the People w/Ben Burgis
In Defense of the Fowkes Translation of Marx’s Capital
Last fall, Princeton University Press published a new edition of Capital to nearly universal praise. In Open Letters Review, David Murphy calls it “marvelous.” In the New York Times, James Miller enthuses that…
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Why? Burgis’s complaints against Reitter are: “[(a)] the extra material isn’t all it’s cracked up to be… [(b)] this translation does a worse job than the Fowkes of capturing Marx’s intentions… [and ©] on a sentence-by-sentence level, much of the writing is just awful…”

  1. I reject the complaint that it is a bad thing that the Reitter translation has extensive notes—they are at the back, and unlike, say, Ernest Mandel’s interminable and mendacious introduction, do not get in the way of the reader. And they are very good and thoughtful.

  2. The “capturing Marx’s intentions” claim is that Fowkes got it right in translating the German fourth edition, and Reitter got it wrong in translating the German second edition. The German fourth edition is what Engels thought was the best form to put Marx’s (and his) ideas in, as he tried to publish texts to spark and support the social movement that was Second Socialist International communism (1889-1914). The German second edition is Marx’s last finished ms. There is also the French edition: later than the German second, approved by Marx, but with Marx’s complaints that French was not a language in which you could say what Marx wanted and needed to say. Perhaps the German text underlying the French edition would be ideal. But we do not have it.

  3. And so, in the end, after stripping off side-issues and absurdities, Burgis’s complaint against the “awful” writing “on a sentence-by-sentence level” is simply… weird. I cannot put it otherwise.

Burgis gives four examples in which he claims that “the quality of the writing has taken a nosedive”.

  • For one, Paul Reitter assures me in email that “hover” is a much better translation of the actual German than Fowkes’s “dangle”.

  • For a second, Burgis complains that the rhythm of a sentence is worse when Reitter writes “is a historical act” where Fowkes has “is the work of history”; I don’t see it.

  • For a third, Burgis objects to Reitter’s use of m-dashes and of “properties” rather than “qualities”, “wants or needs” rather than simply “needs”, “belly” rather than “stomach”, and “doesn’t matter here” rather than “makes no difference”; again, I simply do not see it.

But there is some meat in Burgis’s fourth example of “awful” writing:

Fowkes: The taste of porridge does not tell us who grew the oats, and the process we have presented does not reveal the conditions under which it takes place, whether it is happening under the slave-owner’s brutal lash or the anxious eye of the capitalist, whether Cincinnatus undertakes it in tilling his couple of acres, or a savage, when he lays low a wild beast with a stone.

versus:

Reitter: But how wheat tastes doesn’t tell us who grew it, and looking at the labor process in this way tells us just as little about the actual conditions in which it is carried out: whether it runs its course under the slave overseer’s brutal whip or the capitalist’s watchful eye, whether it is Cincinnatus who completes a labor process by tilling his couple of jugera or a savage who does that by slaying wild beasts with a stone.

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With Burgis commenting: “There is, I’m sorry, no excuse for that…”

No excuse for what?

And I think.

And I think I get it.

Paul Reitter makes Karl Marx a voice from the 1800s: an old text by a dead man, a man who likes to show off his learned classical education by name-checking Roman Republic-politician Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus (cos. suff. -460, dic. -458 & -438). And a man who then does more: dropping into Latin in the belief that the readers he wants will understand him when he talks about how L. Quinctius Cincinnatus plowed his iugera rather than his “couple of acres”.

And that is something the Burgis cannot cope with. But there is a problem: Marx is a voice from the 1800s. It is an old text by a dead man, talking about human society in a time now long gone. Marx did like to show off his learned classical education. He does like to name-check Roman Republic-politician Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus (cos. suff. -460, dic. -458 & -438). And he would rather drop into Latin to write iugera rather than acres.

Thus Burgis’s complaint is not against Reitter. It is against Marx. It is against Mar having been who he was. And against Marx for having written the book that he did. And for Reitter for having tried to translate it faithfully.

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But I do need to note, here, the side issues. I mean the:

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Is it "Life, Liberty, & Democracy", or Is It "Life, Liberty, & Property"?

Democracy’s failure modes in the age of the Shadow Docket. Trump gives new life and force to the fears of Friedrich von Hayek. Spite-dictated tariffs and funding whims now discipline America’s barons. That silence you hear? It’s power learning fear. We used to litigate before we confiscated; now we confiscate, then maybe litigate. Try unscrambling an egg after ten months of executive tantrum. Liberalism prizes dignity and citizenship, but without secure property, freedom collapses fast. Hayek saw the sequence; today’s Shadow Docket proves it…

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Liberalism’s hierarchy—human dignity, self-governance, then prosperity—works only if prosperity and property are secure enough to sustain speech and safety. Hayek’s uncomfortable worries are now empirical: with SNAP suspended and tariffs weaponized, freedom from want, fear, and even speech depends on market stability. The Shadow Docket has short-circuited process, letting executive whims disrupt organizations before courts adjudicate laws and equities. Democracy’s failure modes—majoritarian cruelty, minority vulnerability, personalized spite—are live. When property becomes contingent on presidential favor, America’s barons learn to be quiet. The question isn’t socialism versus markets; it’s whether any rule-of-lawframework survives executive confiscation by Shadow Docket.

Mike Brock wants a “classical liberalism” that centers democratic self-governance and treats economics as instrumental. But since January 2025, short-run judicial indulgence via the Shadow Docket has turned tariffs and appropriations into levers of personal dominance by whim. For-profit corporations, non-profit universities, and many others now face existential risk if they cross the executive’s mood, even if they have solid contractual rights to the money flows they had relied on. And so the barons of American society have discovered silence. The old rule-of-law sequence—authorize, regulate, enjoin, adjudicate—has become reverse-engineered into “act now, litigate later.” If the court reverses months on, the egg is already scrambled.

Thus we need to register, once again, Hayek’s reply to civic-first liberalism is sharp: without solid property and predictable markets, freedom from fear and want dissolves, and speech will follow. Yes, property-first liberalism requires an equitable distribution of property to avoid falling into different failures modes. But is quite clear right now what the most concerning failure mode is.

What should “liberalism” bw? Mike Brock has a view:

Mike Brock: The Two Materialisms: Why I’m a Liberal <https://www.notesfromthecircus.com/p/the-two-materialisms-why-im-a-liberal>: ‘Marxist historical materialism treats the economic base as determining the political and cultural superstructure. Change material relations of production, and consciousness follows. Liberation comes through economic transformation…. Liberalism during the Cold War…became a philosophy that treats economic prosperity as the ultimate good and a political framework as legitimate only insofar as it serves markets. [But] classical liberalism… was never materialist. It insisted spiritual values are primary and economic arrangements are instrumental means serving them. This is what distinguishes me from both socialists and neoliberals….

In] the philosophy underlying neoliberalism… economic growth and market freedom ultimate values… [and] onsumer choice becomes a primary form of freedom. Markets get privileged normative status—what emerges from market process is treated as having special legitimacy…. This isn’t crude “money is everything”—it’s more sophisticated than that. Instead, the argument goes: markets produce prosperity, prosperity enables flourishing….

Classical liberalism—Madison, Jefferson, the Progressive Era reformers, FDR—was never materialist…. Democratic self-governance [wa]s primary. Economic arrangements are instrumental means that should be debated and decided within that framework. The classical liberal hierarchy: 1. Human dignity and democratic citizenship (ultimate values). 2. Political framework enabling self-governance (necessary means). 3. Economic prosperity and property rights (instrumental to the first two)…. Get the framework right—constitutional constraints, democratic accountability, pluralism, rule of law—and people can deliberate about economic arrangements. Get it wrong and no economic system produces genuine liberty…. Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting was about political power, not economic efficiency…. Herbert Croly’s The Promise of American Life articulated this[:]… Democratic citizenship was the ultimate good; economic arrangements should be reformed to serve it. This wasn’t socialism (Croly explicitly rejected it) but the recovery of classical liberal concern with preventing power concentration from destroying self-governance…

Some arrangements still threaten the framework…. Concentration of wealth sufficient to capture democratic process (whether private capital or party bureaucracy). Concentration of state power sufficient to prevent democratic accountability. Economic systems requiring authoritarian enforcement to maintain. Treating economic relations as having normative force beyond democratic deliberation. These threaten the framework whether they emerge from markets or planning, private or public ownership. Both liberals and democratic socialists should oppose them—which is why we can be allies in framework defense even while disagreeing about optimal content…. The framework is non-negotiable. The content within it is subject to democratic debate and experimentation….

Franklin Roosevelt, speaking on Flag Day 1942… articulated what was ultimately at stake—not economic systems but human freedom itself: “The four freedoms of common humanity are as much elements of man’s needs as air and sunlight, bread and salt…”… Roosevelt… made… primary—freedom of speech and religion, freedom from want and fear. Material security (freedom from want) is essential, but it’s essential as the condition for freedom, not as a substitute for it. Economic arrangements should serve human freedom, not determine whether freedom is possible…

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What do I think? I think Friedrich von Hayek would have a good reply: Without a market economy with private property dominant, you cannot have freedom from fear, and soon will not have freedom of speech, and—as we see now with the suspension of SNAP—freedom from want requires prosperity, property rights, and equitable property distribution even with formal rights to life and liberty, and to democracy. Just look around you! Well-distributed property and prosperity is not secondary, but primary to human dignity meaning anything. And democracy has failure modes that keep it from being a sufficient guarantee, as all minorities know in their bones, and as majorities occasionally find out, when they discover that their elected leader is Plato’s Werewolf.

Look at Donald Trump: the corrupt Republican Supreme Court and the supine corrupt Republican House and Senate caucuses have, so far, given him the power to take the functional property of our large organizations and those who rely on them at whim, and out of spite. Laws that create money flows to organizations—good laws—are executed at his whim, and the organizations know that if they anger him they are in crisis. The globalized value-chain economy has created a world in which tariffs can destroy the profitability of almost all large- and medium-sized corporations, and corporations know that if Trump reacts to any of their words or deeds with spite, they too are in crisis.

And as a result it turns out that Donald Trump has astonishing power to enforce acquiescence and silence upon the barons of American society.

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Fascism in Action in America: Jennifer Moriarty & Daniel Biss Report from Chicago NorthShore

ICE in action in the MidWest: we are, right now, in big trouble. The only way out is through, via transparency and civic resistance…

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<https://danielbiss.substack.com/p/daniel-biss-talks-with-detained-ice>

Daniel Biss for Congress
Daniel Biss talks with detained ICE protestor Jennifer Moriarty
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ICE agents from Trump’s Secret State Police violently detained peaceful protesters in Evanston; Jennifer Moriarty recounts being grabbed, packed into an overfilled vehicle, and witnessing assaults. Agents in Evanston, Illinois, on Chicago’s NorthShore abducting landscapers, assaulting dissenters after a car crash, and stuffing three civilians into an overfilled vehicle; Jennifer was detained and “grabbed by the neck.”

An SUV made an erratic turn and braked abruptly, deliberately creating a crash with a young woman. Jennifer was grabbed by the neck and thrown down as she approached to film.“As soon as I walked up, an agent grabbed me by my neck and threw me back and threw me to the ground.” The assault occurred before she could even start recording, signaling intent to prevent evidence gathering. “I didn’t even get an opportunity to hit record when he grabbed me by the neck and threw me down.” Video shows a person pinned and punched repeatedly: “One person was pinned on the ground and just punched in the head again and again.”

The rationale for grabbing Jennifer? It appears to be nothing other than her visible dissent and intent to document.

God forbid they find their Heydrich. As long as they only have their Himmler, we have a chance.

The only way out is through, via transparency and civic resistance.

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Bubbles, Productive & Unproductive; Builders; & Bots: Why the AI Boom Isn’t One Story, But Rather the Vector Driving the AI Economy Is at Least 12-Dimensional

Six dimensions are entrepreneurial-technological-industrial aspects of bubble dynamics that are at least somewhat familiar from history; six dimensions are wild and new. The AI boom isn’t a single narrative; it’s a tangle of grifters, overbuilders, positive externalities, and coordination plays colliding with platform power and techno‑millenarianism as natural‑language access to data becomes a general‑purpose upgrade like literacy, but with sustainable business models that look more like commoditized plumbing…

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The AI surge looks to me half like a familiar “productive bubble” and half like something much more complicated and new and strange. The “productive bubble
terrain of grifters, wasteful overbuilding, socially valuable but privately unprofitable infrastructure construction, coordination cycles, a few rock‑solid business models, and financial-crisis risk is at least somewhat familiar. But then we also have

  • Platform near‑monopolists investing defensively at staggering scale;

  • Millenarian enthusiasts with their religious-cult agendas;

  • Natural‑language interfaces promise massive user surplus while commoditizing producers, as modes of human interaction with the infosphere are transformed utterly;

  • These transformations do not just produce new technologies of nature-manipulation and human coöperation, they also rewire the brain and restructure human thought in unpredictable ways;

  • Newer and stronger forms of attention extraction looming as the default monetization path.

  • The downstream consequences of what will be a revolution in the modes of human collective cognition

  • most durable value likely sits in small, task‑specific models tied to trusted data, and in moats built on workflow, reliability, and proprietary information. Even if many investors lose money, the infrastructure and capabilities will persist.

As an optimist, I see the likely equilibrium is user surplus rising fast—cheap, ubiquitous natural‑language access to data—while margins migrate to trusted data, integration, and uptime rather than model scarcity. I see policy choices around competition, energy, and data governance determining whether we get a broad productivity growth acceleration, or another round of attention enclosure.

But the future is one I cannot see.

The best cut at trying to set this out that I have seen this fall comes today, November 7, 2025, from Bill Janeway:

Bill Janeway: In Search of the AI Bubble’s Economic Fundamentals <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/will-ai-bubble-burst-trigger-financial-crisis-by-william-h-janeway-2025-11>: ‘A surge of investment in data centers and in the vast energy infrastructure… rising investment volumes fuel soaring valuations… new multibillion-dollar AI infrastructure projects. At the same time, a growing body of reports indicates that AI’s business applications are delivering disappointing returns, indicating that the hype may be running well ahead of reality…..

The history of modern capitalism has been defined by a succession of… “productive bubbles”… mobiliz[ing] vast quantities of capital to fund potentially transformational technologies whose returns could not be known in advance…. The companies that built the foundational infrastructure went bust. Speculative funding had enabled them to build years before trial-and-error experimentation yielded economically productive applications. Yet no one tore up the railroad tracks…. The infrastructure remained… to support the… “new economy’… after… delay and… with new players….

Brian Cantwell Smith…. “It’s not good that [ChatGPT] says things that are wrong, but what is really, irremediably bad is that it has no idea that there is a world about which it is mistaken.”… In business settings, tolerance for error is already low and approaches zero when the stakes are high…. What is the value-creating potential of LLMs? Their insatiable appetite for computing power and electricity, together with their dependence on costly oversight and error correction, makes profitability uncertain….

There are two distinct alternatives…. One lies in developing small language models—systems trained on carefully curated datasets for specific, well-defined tasks…. The other… is the consumer market, where AI providers compete for attention and advertising revenue… [and] value is often measured in entertainment and engagement, [so] anything goes…. given that Google’s and Apple’s browsers are free and already integrate AI assistants, it is unclear whether OpenAI can sustain a viable subscription or pay-per-token revenue model that justifies its massive investments…. [In] the Gartner Hype Cycle… a “trough of disillusionment” precedes the “plateau of productivity”…

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I think that this is very good as it goes. But I think that it is greatly oversimplified. I see at least twelve different balls being juggled in the air here, only six of which are found in typical “productive bubbles”. And thus the situation is so complex that I find myself largely at sea.

In a “standard” “productive bubble”, there are, typically, five aspects to worry about: grifters, wasteful overbuilders, privately-unprofitable overbuilding made societally useful via positive externlities, coördinated implementation cycles à la Andrei Shleifer, and productivity increases driving the emergence of new rock-solid business models:

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Value-Thing, Not Vibes: Defending Reitter’s Translation of Marx (& Brown's Introduction) Against Troglodyte Loyalists

What the point of an introduction is: to get you to the book. Brown’s concise roadmap versus Mandel’s interminable self-centered polemic. Clarity matters more than sectarian score-settling. And the point of a translation and an introduction is to translate and situate a book, not to create a new version of a 100%-correct religious totem for today. Preserve the working of Marx’s intellectual and analytical gears, restore his strangeness, and so sharpen the potential focuses of productive critique…

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Marx, Karl. [1867] 2024. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1. Trans. Paul Reitter, ed. Paul North, fore. Wendy Brown, after. William Clare Roberts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691190075/capital>.


Paul Reitter undertook the labor of giving us a new English translation of Karl Marx’s Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (if only of volume 1). I liked it.

I very much liked it.

This was, I think, worth doing. Previous translations aimed not so much as translating the book as a political-economic meme source that could spark a social movement, a social movement that would do for its day what Capital did back in western Europe over 1867-1914. What did Capital do in its own day back then? It became a holy totem for the apocalyptic cult that became the world religion that was the inevitable-revolution wing of the 1889-1914 social movement that was Second International Socialism.

By contrast, Reitter’s translation is from the perspective of trying to give a good translation of the book actually written by Karl Marx, nineteenth-century intellectual, alternately German-style neo-Hegelian philosopher, French-style revolutionary political activist, British-style classical economist, and apocalyptic prophet of one of the stranger versions of the New Jerusalem. Thus I was pleased with Paul Reitter’s taking on the task.

Now, however, a correspondent sends me to Ben Burgis of the Jacobin affinity. And Burgis now comes to slag it. In particular, he slags the introduction by Wendy Brown in a drive-by. God knows why he thinks this is a thing to do, or thinks this is a thing that will somehow burnish his reputation:

Ben Burgis: In Defense of the Fowkes Translation of Marx’s Capital <https://benburgis.substack.com/p/in-defense-of-the-fowkes-translation>: ‘The introduction to the Penguin edition was written by Ernest Mandel. The introduction to the Princeton edition was written by Wendy Brown. I don’t always agree with Mandel, but he’s a serious Marxist thinker. Brown is not. To say that isn’t to insult or dismiss Brown. She’s an interesting and often insightful theorist, and Marxism is definitely somewhere in the mix of her influences. But, she’s just not as focused on Marx as Mandel is, and it shows…

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That is all he says about Brown’s intro. It’s a drive-by. It’s unfair—to Brown and to Reitter. I see Brown’s introduction as useful and effective. And so I let myself get sucked into Twitter defending what Wendy Brown was trying to do and did in her introduction. Probably a mistake. But I did it. And so I am going to collect what I wrote, and extend it a little.

To begin, I see Reitter’s translation as quite successful:

  • It aims for precision, readability, and philosophic fidelity, and I think it succeeds.

  • The translation restores Marx’s neologisms and sharp conceptual vocabulary (e.g., “value‑thing,” “value‑objecthood”).

  • It thus makes it plain that the text is meant to sound strange, to, as Reitter says, underscore how “capitalism makes people’s relationships “extremely unnatural and incompatible with human flourishing”.

  • It modernizes cadence without sacrificing precision—and this is a great help adding clarity on chapters like “original accumulation” (instead of “primitive”).

  • It provides a lot of very useful notes.​⁠

Is it a better translation? Here we need to get into the weeds of George Steiner (1975) and figure out how a good translation balances fidelity and renewal, and what kind of fidelity, and what kind of renewal. And that is above my pay grade. Devin Goure thinks that Burgis’s energy comes precisely from the fact that he believes that translators should not translate the book that Marx wrote, that:

Devin Goure: <twitter.com/DevinGour…>: ‘much of the subtext… [is] about Western academics domesticating Marx… that we shouldn’t want non-Marxist academics [here] … attached to a…less plausible claim that we need to de-philosophize Marx… that working class people shouldn’t concern themselves with such details…. There’s an implicit turf war over the role of academic political theory/social theory in interpreting Marx going on… that 1) I don’t think helps anyone, certainly not the working class, and 2) that the author of the post is being evasive about…

He may be right.

Do note that Burgis’s strong negative judgment is exceptional. And do note that the general judgment is that Reitter is quite successful. His translation has drawn strong praise for philological rigor and readability, with major reviews noting the apparatus and conceptual fidelity. I do endorse Jim Miller’s praise of it and its:

Jim Miller: Karl Marx, Weirder than Ever <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/19/books/review/capital-volume-one-karl-marx.html>: ‘erudite critical apparatus… exacting translation… remarkable achievement… readers… [can] attend to the philosophical subtleties of Marx’s argument…

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But let me now focus on Wendy Brown’s intro. But let me put it here for those who want, for some reason, to become like me in knowing too much about the apocalyptic western Marxism cults of the 19xx years. I will pull it back above the paywall in a week or so: I am right now starting to experiment what to do with this SubStack, after all:

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Bidenomics: Truly Transitory Inflation, Remarkably Successful on Employment & Growth—But Unable to Break Through the Media Misinformation Machine

My attempt to set forth a balance sheet: Bidenomics was an extraordinary success. The economy healed fast; the story never did. A brief moderate transitory inflation. A long and strong jobs and structural reorientation boom. But the dominance of the misinformation machine: where Biden-Powell reattained full employment, voters heard “affordability crisis.” Policy competence overwhelmed on the political-electoral level by narrative failure, as growth, jobs, and reindustrialization couldn’t win. Facts lost to vibes…

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My view: On the economic prosperity ledger, Joe Biden fiscal policy and Jay Powell monetary policy in the aftermath of the COVID plague depression were close to perfect—extremely sensible given the balance of risks ex ante and still accomplishing a very good outcome ex post.

The rapid Biden-Powell-era reattainment of full employment—a striking contrast to what happened under Obama-Bernanke—was a tremendous policy victory for good. It was generated by an unusually forceful policy mix—vaccination scale-up, income support, and a deliberately generous fiscal stance—interacting with roughly $3 trillion in household excess savings to jump-start demand as health risks ebbed. The inflationary friction that followed was characteristic of a fast merge back onto the growth “highway,” the leaving rubber-on-the-road when you want to get up to speed quickly. Unfortunate, yes. But necessary if you are not to get rear-ended. And it was in no-wise 1970s-style stagflation. Priorities were near-lexicographic: get unemployment down quickly first, then address side effects second. But that was the right thing to do. And it happened:

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The failure over 2009-2016 of recovery to fill-in the gap in real GDP created by the lost half-decade of growth following the GFC created an “affordability crisis” for America as a whole, as prosperity fell far short of where Americans had before the GFC expected the economy to be. The COVID plague recession cast no such affordability-crisis shadow onto our present, precisely because of the growth-and-recovery success.

Plus there is more: it is not just a floor wax but also a dessert topping! Rapid recovery and expansionary fiscal pressure caused a successful wheel in the economy’s employment-productive structure toward a more prosperous future. The labor market quickly became stressed in a good way: churn, quits, and elevated vacancies were features of a healthy reallocation process as workers upgraded matches, low‑wage sectors repriced labor, and firms adapted to new demand and technology patterns. Anomalous Beveridge-curve behavior—vacancies falling without an unemployment spike—signalled improved matching efficiency and normalization rather than demand collapse, consistent with rapid return to full employment powered by strong household balance sheets and timely policy support. The payoff was huge: a tighter, more inclusive, better-allocated labor-productive structure, in contrast to the failure to move workers toward more productive occupations during the recovery from the GFC. In addition to pushing unemployment far down, it was a successful structural wheel of the economy toward a more efficient allocation of labor that fit with the societal learning that took place during the COVID plague depression.

Biden-Powell policies also were prudent insurance against a risk that loomed large ex ante, even though from an ex post standpoint it had rapidly evaporated: the risk of a return to full-fledged secular stagnation. After the GFC, the Obama-Bernanke macro policy reaction function misread the level of the neutral interest rate as r-star collapsed, and tolerated an output gap that ossified into hysteresis. Second, fiscal timidity in the form of a premature pivot-to-austerity and underpowered public investment left monetary policy overworked and trapped at the interest-rate zero lower ground. Meanwhile, financial regulation leaned against bubbles but not enough toward demand, with the Obama administration’s failure to use the mortgage-finance GSE’s to counteract the enormous and destructive prolonged structural depression in housing construction as a major failure.

I think the right way to read 2009–2016 is as a case study in how an advanced economy can stumble into a chronic saving‑investment imbalance: safe-asset demand surges, investment demand lags, and the equilibrium real rate goes subterranean. Summers’s secular stagnation framing—borrowed in spirit from Hansen, updated for global capital markets—was a useful diagnostic; Bernanke’s “global saving glut” lens highlighted the international transmission. Put them together and you get the policy imperative: in a world of very low real rates, governments must do the obvious Keynesian‑but‑also‑neoclassical thing—expand public investment, crowd in private activity via appropriate public risk-bearing (cough, housing GSE’s, cough), and rebuild the economy’s productive base. Call it the simple rule of thumb: when the price of public capital is roughly zero, failing to buy productive future output is not prudence; it is vandalism of the growth path. The lost half‑decade was not inevitable. It was a policy choice. Obama staffers protest that it was not their policy choice. But it was Obama who called for a federal spending freeze in his 2021 State of the Union, when the unemployment rate was still 9.7%.

Biden also began reindustrialization policy, in an act of congress-management wizardry that still leaves me awestruck and blinking my eyes. But, still, it was not at the appropriate scale—less fiscal-expansion money to household balance-sheets and more to reindustrialization subsidies would have been much better. The CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act are impressive achievements in the partisan-gridlock America today. But the scale remains mismatched to the challenge of decades-long deindustrialization and a geopolitics reshaping supply chains. I have views: more of the government as first-and-best customer, and less on simple subsidies.

But these cavils should not keep you from seeing that, as far as production, employment, and the fundamentals of growth are concerned, Bidenomics was really successful.

However, there was a cost: inflation:

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The cost of all this success was a short, transitory burst of moderate inflation, springing from the combination of rapid reopening, of expanding sectors having to offer wage premiums to attract workers in the context of sticky not-falling wages in contracting sectorss, nd of repeated supply-chain disruptions as plague intensity hopped around the world. The result was 7.6% CPI inflation from January 2021 to January 2022. However, it looked as though inflation was ebbing—was truly transitory and very short—when 2022 began. But then came the additional inflationary supply shock imposed on the world by the attack on Ukraine by Vladimir Putin, the dictator of Muscovy ‘Rus. The result was a further 4.4% increase in the price level in six months: an inflation rate of 8.8% in the January-July first half of 2022.

And then the burst of moderate inflation stopped cold. It was over after the middle of 2022.

Since June of 2022 CPI inflation has averaged 2.8% per year—only very slightly elevated over the Federal Reserve’s target, which on a CPI basis is about 2.5% per year, given the roughly 0.5%-point per year wedge between the CPI and the PCE. Yes, the first year and a half of Biden’ term did see two transitory bursts of moderate inflation: one produced by plague, reopening, and strong demand; and one produced by Putin’s invasion. But then it stopped, and during the last 2.5 years of Biden’s term, what Alan Greenspan called “effective price stability” was nearly achieved.

Do I see flaws in Biden administration policies relating to the economy? Yes I do. By far the major flaw was Biden’s failure to vaccinate not just the US but to pay to vaccinate the world in the first half of 2021—which gave the virus much more time to remain, well, virulent. The U.S could have done it: it had the financing capacity, the power to waive bottlenecks, the ability to coordinate procurement, and the logistics would have been an interesting but possible test of our military and other worldwide lift capacity. That failure to vaccinate the world was, I think, extremely short-sighted and extremely costly. It extended the pandemic’s economic and human toll and incubated variants that forced renewed restrictions, disrupted supply chains, and complicated recovery. In a world where interest rates were low and the social return extraordinarily high, the optimal policy was maximal global vaccination; we chose less, and paid for it. The benefits to the U.S. from less blowback from virulent variants incubated elsewhere would have far exceeded the costs of making and administering the mRNA products.

And I also see a lesser flaw: failing to do enough explaining and vaccine-giving to Americans throughout 2021. There was insufficient domestic persuasion and vaccine delivery to make early summer 2021 feel safe for the young, middle‑aged, and healthy elderly. With highly effective shots blanketing the country, the right stance could have been: risks become small and manageable, so July 4 could have marked a civic reopening, a declaration of independence from plague year constraints. Instead, muddled communications—starting with shifting mask guidance, continuing with inadequate celebration of vaccination’s protective power—let uncertainty dominate, slowing normalization even where the data supported it. ​⁠July 4, 2021 could have been a day to declare independence from the virus, and return life to near-normal. It was not. And the American people suffered from that.

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Whenever I give this argument that I have just presented, I get substantial pushback: Brad, say people, Donald Trump is now president. The voters judged Bidenomics, and judged it as substantially unsuccessful. Indeed, voters worldwide judged the handling of the plague and the reopening as sufficiently unsuccessful to harshly punish every single rich0-country ruling party in the 2024 elections, the first time this has ever happened:

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Indeed they did. But I trace must of this punishment to a misinformation gap. As I said just after the 2024 election <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/a-very-peculiar-kind-of-triumph-of>, I was very impressed by Dean Baker’s surfacing of the Reuters/Ipsos misinformation poll:

Dean Baker: I hate to put a lot of highly paid pundits out of business, but look at this f**king graph:

Image

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If the point here is not obvious, if we can’t get people to know the most basic facts about the economy and the other issues they consider most important, how do we think we will get them to hear our great messages? Obviously, the causation goes both ways, Trumpers don’t want to hear that unemployment is near a half-century low and crime is down, but that doesn’t change the problem. If we don’t have a way to get them to hear basic facts about the issues that concern them most, how would do we expect them to hear our plans for dealing with them?

<[twitter.com/DeanBaker...](https://twitter.com/DeanBaker13/status/1854752514090189261/)

Fact: those with justified true beliefs about the state of issues like crime, inflation, immigration, and the state of the stock market overwhelmingly supported Harris. So did Trump voters believe lies because Trump told them to, or were they Trump voters because they believed lies? And how do Americans who want a better politics and a better future dismantle the misinformatin system and, as Viscount Sherbrooke after the 1867 extension of the voting franchise in Britain: “we—or, rather, you—must educate our masters” on how to go about understanding the world, and how to go about deciding who to believe?

Let me outline the difference between potential voters who knew or guessed true things and false things:

  • Those who had not been misinformed by the Fox-Facebook system and who knew violent crime was not at or near all-time highs were more pro-Harris by a 91%-point margin.

  • Those who knew that southern border-crossings were more pro-Harris by a 76%-point margin.

  • Those who knew that inflation was down were more pro-Harris by 72%-points.

  • Those who correctly knew that the stock market was at an an all-time high were more pro-Harris by a 29%-point margin.

So I reject the characterization that achieving prosperity at the cost of a transitory episode of moderate inflation was a decisive mistake by Biden along the prudent political governance dimension. I characterize 2024 as reflecting a worldwide failure to break the misinformation system—the global misinformation system that rose to prominence and power in 2016 with its “accomplishments” if that is the word, of BREXIT and Trump I; that has maintained its structure and influence since; that those of us in the Sisyphus Brigade have failed to dismantle; and that has turned public -eason and self-governance into a sinister and destructive clown show.

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Gatekeepers Opening the Doors to Chaos: How Thune, Johnson, & Roberts Have Manufactured Trump’s Power to Break Things

Not popularity—permission: Trump’s power is conferred by élites who take down guardrails and normalize distributed chaos, with institutional passivity becoming a machinery of wreckage. Trump doesn’t wield power alone; it’s lent to him by party barons and a deferential Court. The result is a durable capacity to break things without building anything…

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Josh Marshall on the 2025 election:

Josh Marshall: A Few Day-After-the-Election Thoughts <https://public.hey.com/p/qK6R86USmK6c6Hc8UyKALUHm>: ‘As the results were coming in last night, Trump hopped on Truth Social and declared that none of it was his fault. Republicans were getting hammered, he insisted, because 1) he wasn’t on the ballot and 2) the shutdown. Not my fault is typical Trump. But… Donald Trump won’t ever be on the ballot again…. And he seems to be conceding that the shutdown is a disaster for Republicans….

The biggest impact of last night’s result may be to collapse D.C.’s collective denial about the sheer scale of Donald Trump’s unpopularity…. He does have a lot of power. He can break things. A lot of things. Here and abroad…. The political class has read Trump’s power, perversely, as popularity…. But that’s not how it works…. A number of morning-after reviews I’ve seen say… Democrats… still hadn’t addressed… [whether] it [is] a future of Spanbergers or Mamdanis…. That doesn’t seem quite right…. Find candidates suited to their constituencies and focus on cost of living issues and opposition to Donald Trump’s autocracy. Full stop. It’s not more complicated than that…

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My thoughts: With respect to the question of Trump’s power: Trump has power only because Thune, Johnson, and Roberts give him power. Authority in American politics is rarely self-executing; it is conferred, shielded, and normalized by gatekeepers who choose accommodation over constraint. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, House Speaker Mike Johnson, and to an appalling degree Chief Justice John Roberts have repeatedly treated Trump’s demands as binding party discipline—whether by structuring impeachment defenses, stalling bipartisan immigration frameworks, or aligning the House calendar to electoral strategy—thereby transforming personal leverage into institutional muscle. It is true that Roberts has not endorsed every Trump claim. But his key rulings on presidential immunity, administrative deconstruction, and deference to claims of executive prerogative have greatly widened the zone in which a willing political movement can act.

Why? They do not have to do so.

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What To Do with the Trump-Scrubbing Sanewashers?

Not weak tea, but no tea at all: attempts to scrub chaos into “strategy” in Trumpworld are really not helpful…

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Think of things like this like a CDOS attack on your brain—making you stupider by making you think about some parallel universe that does not exist, and that does not gain you information by contemplating it in a “what if…” mode.

The very sharp Bill Emmott is the most recent person I have seen who really ought to know better, but who succumbs.

Here it is:

Bill Emmott: Trying to discern a strategy from Trump’s global adventuring <https://billemmott.substack.com/p/trying-to-discern-a-strategy-from>: ‘Trump has no intention of retreating from global affairs… regal tour of Malaysia… resum[ing] testing of nuclear weapons… frantic efforts to prove that the “historic” ceasefire… between Israel and Hamas is still holding…. The true question for America’s long-time but now disenchanted allies in Europe and Asia concerns what Trump’s foreign policy goals really are. If he is not an isolationist, then what is he?… The outcome of his bilateral negotiations… [on] his Asian trip… suggested… a strategy… [focused on] the competition for global influence between America and China.

Admittedly, some of the headlines were for his domestic audience… that his bullying… [has brought] supposed “wins” for America[. But these] are likely to prove either illusory or exaggerated….

However, several other announcements look more novel and more meaningful…. The agreement to make joint investments in shipbuilding, both in the US and in Japan and South Korea, could represent a strategic acknowledgement that allies have value…. Trump’s short meeting with Xi represented… that… China… has as much negotiating leverage as America… declared a kind of a truce in their trade war…. Actions… America is taking in Latin America… alongside Trump’s Asian diplomacy… seems to… [show a] Trump is keen to prevent China from becoming too influential in that continent….

If this really turns out to be a long-term strategy for the Trump administration, and if Trump really understands that confronting China and Russia just through trade threats and now nuclear tests is not productive, then perhaps old allies in Europe and Asia can take heart. Perhaps… he and his team may be coming to realise that having allies makes America stronger…. It would be premature to draw a firm conclusion about that, but the past week’s diplomacy provides some reason for hope

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Suggested… admittedly… could… kind of a truce… seems… perhaps… perhaps… premature to draw a firm conclusion… some reason for hope…

This is not weak tea: this is no tea at all:

  • For Emmott to say that there is any sense that the Trump team believes that the U.S. is stronger with allies than with without, and that it is in any sense has some strategic concept that the U.S. is in a race for global influence with China—how does that fit Trump’s hissy fit with Canada over a commercial pointing out that Ronald Reagan was a free trader?

  • For Emmott to see small moves toward maybe making joint investments with Japan and Korea in shipbuilding as in any sense neutralizing the random chaotic damage Trump’s stochastic tariffs are inflicting on manufacturing production value chains outside of China—well, words really do fail me.

  • And for Emmott to see Bessent’s commitment of $40 billion to an Argentina (an Argentina that is not making the policy changes it needs for that $40 billion to have real effect) as seeming to show that Trump is keen to prevent China from becoming too influential in Latin America—well, that simply leaves me scratching my head. How does that seem to show that? Was China going to spend its money supporting an overvalued and out-of-equilibrium peso had Bessent not stepped in? And how does that get you influence, anyway?

I do see this over and over again.

I should not have to say: Somebody got to Trump so he obsesses about how important it is to do good things for his friend Milei in Argentina. Somebody got to Bessent and convinced him that it would be a political disaster for Milei if the peso were to collapse before the current election. Possibly Bessent really cares that some of his friends had money in Argentina they wanted to pull out at a high valuation—everyone else in the Trump administration is corrupt as f***, so why not Bessent too? The Treasury’s experts pointing out that money spent defending an incredible exchange rate peg is money wasted unless policies change to make the peg credible—they were told to sit down and shut up. And so you have a policy. It has next to nothing to do with a struggle for influence in Latin America between China and the U.S,

I should not have to say: Somebody got to Trump and convinced him—correctly—that building ships needed to be done in Japan and Korea. How they managed to do this is a mystery. But it is a one-off: it has nothing to do with any recognition that any manufacturing superpower capable to going toe-to-toe with China over the next generation has to have production- and value-chains that reach far outside the United States, spanning two if not three oceans.

I should not have to say: A Trump who was genuinely interested in making the later “20..” years an American- rather than a Chinese-dominated epoch would be able to remember for more than a week that we are stronger the closer are our ties and alliances with Canada and Mexico.

And yet, because Bill Emmott and a legion of other people who know better write things like this, I do.

One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy.


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Looking at Today's Democratic Party

Make more, share better: it has to combine supply-side dynamism to fair distribution. But is there any reason to think that that prestidigitational construction and maintenance of such an incredibly broad political coalition is not an impossible lift?…

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Ezra Klein writes:

Ezra Klein: <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/02/opinion/democrats-liberalism-elections-crick.html>: ‘The Democratic Party does not need to choose to be one thing. It needs to choose to be more things…. People tell me about issues where the Democratic Party departed from them. But they first describe a… Democratic Party, [that] they [have] c[o]me to believe, does not like them…. Social media has thrown everyone involved…into the same algorithmic Thunderdome…. We always know what our most online peers are thinking. They… set the culture…. And there is nothing that most of us fear as much as being out of step with our peers….

Today, political tolerance is harder for many of us than religious tolerance. Finding ways to turn our disagreements into exchange, into something fruitful rather than something destructive, seems almost fanciful. But there is real political opportunity…

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And Henry Farrell glosses:

Henry Farrell: Liberalism Transforms Plurality from Weakness to Strength <https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/liberalism-transforms-plurality-from>: ‘At least it does when it works right…. [But] the Democratic party has become a much more unwelcoming place for people who are out of step with an online consensus that favors a particular kind of online purity. What we want instead is liberality…. [Ezra Klein] seems to me to be to be recognizably right…. The fundamental message of Ezra’s piece is not that the Democratic party needs to become a moderate party. It is that it needs to become a party that is welcoming to moderates, as to others who don’t completely share its beliefs, if it is to succeed….

Figuring out ways to manage… differences inside the party… may [also] help it to build stronger and more enduring coalitions among citizens too. They… are more likely to be attracted by a party that is more interested in bringing people in, than in telling them what they ought to do or who they need to be. The lesson… is not that managing pluralism is easy…. It is that building tolerance and figuring out how to work through the inevitable messiness and conflict, can not only create common purpose internally, but attract others to your cause…

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Indeed, 75 years ago Dean Acheson, ex-Secretary of State under Harry S Truman, wrote:

Dean Acheson: A Democrat Looks at His Party <https://archive.org/details/democratlooksath00ache>: ‘The [Democratic] party’s earliest efforts were to bring the many into control of government through the extension of the franchise and through frequent elections…. [Now the] many… are not necessarily more right, or wiser, or more devoted to the public good than a few people. But… they have many interests, many points of view, many purposes to accomplish, and a party which represents them will have their many interests….

The dichotomy [between Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans and Democrats] has not been between a party of property and a party of proletarians, sans-culottes, or descamisados. It has been between a party which centers on the interests deriving from property in its most important form and a party of many interests…. The economic base and the principal interest of the Republican party is business…. Here lies the significant difference between the parties, the single-interest party against the many-interest party….

For all the apparent contradiction in the fact that the Southern racist belongs to the same political party as the New York supporter of the F[air ]E[mployment ]P[ractices ]C[ommission], the inner logic which holds them together is that each speaks for the dispossessed, whether in his rural or urban form…

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What is my reaction to all of this?

First, Acheson is long out of date and obsolete. The Republicans of seventy-five years ago were indeed the party of business, enterprise, entrepreneurship, and wealth—the party of millionaires and of those who aspired to become such, of “temporarily embarrassed millionaires” in John Steinbeck’s phrase. In the long mid‑century arc from the McKinley‑Coolidge synthesis through Eisenhower, their median coalition priorities were predictable, and made sense as promotors of growth, albeit maldistributed growth, in a world where capital was scarce, organized labor rising, and the commanding heights of the economy were steel, autos, and oil—industries whose owners sought quiet, predictable returns rather than disruptive redistribution. But the political economy has since shifted: the locus of rent extraction, the sectoral composition of wealth, and the technologies of information, finance, and platform power have reconfigured the right’s coalition and agenda. Thus to treat the present Republican Party as the same one Acheson faced is to commit a historian’s category error: the rhetoric may rhyme, but the material base—and so the program—does not.

Seventy-five years ago, the Republican core talked as if economic growth, technological change, and Schumpeterian creative-destruction were indeed the point: the disruptions were the price of admission to Abundance, and Abundance was the telos. Entrepreneurs would churn, incumbents would be dethroned, factor reallocation would do its work, and—even though there were big losers in the short run—a political economy of patience would yield a long-run positive-sum harvest: higher productivity and broader consumption possibilities. Dynamism was a civic virtue. The state’s role was to heat up the furnace so that the competitive process could run as hot as possible, That was the catechism: trust the process of innovation and market selection because the business of America was business.

But today’s party is much less animated by the restless energies of enterprise than by the defensive custodianship of property—material holdings, yes, but also status and symbolic hierarchies. The expected upside from market-driven change has, for the Republican core, shrunk relative to the perceived downside risks. The coalition has pivoted from Schumpeterian embrace of creative destruction to protection of incumbencies. In the late nineteenth century, this took the form of tariff fortifications and gold-standard orthodoxy; in the interwar and late-twentieth episodes, it appeared as regulatory veto points and cultural retrenchment designed to slow redistribution of rents and recognition. The thread is one of a party reoriented toward guarding what is already owned rather than widening the frontier of abundance. Growth-friendly openness has fallen for a politics of scarcity, in which loss-aversion governs both economic policy and cultural stance.

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On the Faux-Puzzlement of Dan Davies

The Global Financial Crisis scarred global economies for a decade; COVID did not. The difference was cash, certainty, and a lender of last resort. Bagehot wrote the manual in 1873; Keynes added the addendum in 1936. Economists misplaced both. As Don Kohn said at the time, in dealing with a financial crisis: “Go fast, go hard, go soon”—and fix moral hazard later. Policy knew this once; it should again…

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Share DeLong’s Grasping Reality: Economy in the 2000s & Before

The Great Financial Crisis was not a destructive hurricane that laid waste to the fundamentals of wealth. It was, rather, a head injury to the economy’s coordination system. The muscles that drove the engine of wealth were still there, but useless for a long time. For when uncertainty about interbank obligations spiked, the system froze—and only a deus ex machina could restore certainty. That deus had a name—lender of last resort—but the profession second-guessed it. And still has not reinternalized it, as Dan Davies writes today:

Dan Davies: are we having fear yet? <https://backofmind.substack.com/p/are-we-having-fear-yet>: ‘The Great Financial Crisis [of 2008]…. The overall economic system… [afterwards] was no longer able to perform a vital function of balancing present consumption and investment for the future…. Economics ought to regard this as more of a puzzle than it does [that] the financial crisis, which caused practically zero physical destruction of productive capability, left scarring and after-effects for more than a decade, while the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed millions and left lots of buildings unusable, was all reversed within a couple of years, with a fairly trivial inflation by past standards as the worst economic consequence…

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For, of course, he then gives the answer:

Dan Davies: are we having fear yet? <https://backofmind.substack.com/p/are-we-having-fear-yet>: ‘The actual reason… the Global[1] Financial Crisis had such bad long-term effects and the pandemic didn’t is that one… was accompanied by a deluge of public sector money and private sector loan forbearance… precisely because the previous experience had been so bad; flooding the zone with cash made sure that it wasn’t overwhelmed with the flashing red lights of “BORROWER CAN’T MEET CASH CALL”. It would be nice to know that this is now the standard operating practice for similar crises. But I don’t think we do know that, and this is worrying…

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But the thing is: This was not a lesson that should have had to have been re-learned after 2008.

Why not? Because it was a lesson that had already been well-learned long before, by 1873, when Walter Bagehot published his Lombard Street. The message was settled and clear. In a financial crisis, to deal with it, you need a central back to:

  • lend freely,

  • at a penalty rate,

  • on collateral that is good in normal times.

So why did economics as a profession not know this 150 year-old wisdom? And why has it still not internalized it properly? That is a hard question to which I—still—do not have a very good answer. But let me endorse Dan Davies’s Call to Action. And let me set out some disorganized and largely repetitive musings.

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Yes: AI Is a Bubble. But It Is a Bubble-Plus. & That Makes a Substantial Difference

Bubble-double-plus: how the AI boom props up the economy with debt, data centers, faith, and valuations without rational expectations of durable and monetizable productivity growth…

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The number of people uneasy about the flywheel between the macroeconomy, the stock market, and the ongoing AI bubble is growing. Here is Tracy Alloway:

Tracy Alloway: Here’s what Tracy is thinking about <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-10-29/some-thoughts-on-today-s-fed-decision>: ‘Just how central is the stock market to the overall economy? If wealthy people are driving spending and the assets at the heart of that wealth keep hitting new highs, then it would make sense that equity markets become an increasingly critical support for jobs and economic growth…. As stocks have notched new records, we’re seeing new products and strategies designed to help the wealthy tap into those gains…. People using box spread strategies to create a sort of synthetic loan at a lower rate than they might get from a bank… effectively borrowing against their portfolios…. Stelrix… pitches itself as the first credit card that enables users to automatically borrow against their stock portfolio…. The target market for this card — which apparently is “crafted in proprietary glass by the same minds behind the Black Amex Centurion” — seems pretty obvious…. The money’s not just getting spent as stocks go up, it’s getting multiplied

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Yes: the AI-bubble is pushing up investment spending directly via construction of data centers, and indirectly via valuation effects on consumption. And then the multipliers kick in. If not for sky-high optimism about AI, the economy would now be in recession with high probability. This sky-high optimism has pushed stocks up to remarkably high valuation ratios rivaling those of the very end of the 1990s:

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And this in spite of long-term bond rates that are quite low in historical perspective—inconsistent with any sort of strong expected future productivity boom that might generate income to validate such high valuation ratios. Low bond rates even when there is a furious AI bubble-driven data-center capital investment boom—they are certainly registering the presence of a global savings glut, if not of full-blown secular stagnation:

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As best as I can see, this sky-high optimism about stocks is not warranted.

And here is the very sharp Gillian Tett is right now sounding the alarm about the shift in AI data-center funding to debt and to circular vendor financing. When the people who are giving you the money do not trust that your speculative enterprise, that is a bad sign. And when you can only get customers by lending them the money to buy your products—that is a very bad sign too. Gillian Tett:

Gillian Tett: AI has a cargo cult problem <https://www.ft.com/content/f2025ac7-a71f-464f-a3a6-1e39c98612c7>: ‘Spending vast sums and inflating an investment bubble is no guarantee of unleashing technological magic: Is it just a Ponzi scheme? That is the question that currently haunts American tech — and wider markets — as the valuation of artificial intelligence-linked groups soars to evermore eye-popping heights…. Ten lossmaking AI start-ups — such as OpenAI, Anthropic and Elon Musk’s xAI — now command a collective valuation of close to $1tn, while venture capital has poured $161bn into AI overall this year…. Fw of these entities expect to turn a profit anytime soon — and these valuations are being boosted by variants of cross-cutting vendor financing, like recent deals between OpenAI, Nvidia, Oracle, AMD and Broadcom… [in] a pattern of circular flows that echo some of the hairball of interconnections that emerged between banks and insurance companies via credit derivatives before 2008… [which] resulted in unseen concentrations of risk — and subsequent contagion when the bubble burst…. And… even tech luminaries, like Jeff Bezos, admit there is excessive exuberance…

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But, right now, it is a bad sign only for those invested in the technology’s long-term superprofitability and in making money by building and running data centers. For while it is to some degree a Ponzi scheme, it is not “just” a Ponzi scheme. And that makes a big difference: that means that it will probably go on for quite a while, and that when there is the ultimate shakeout the tech world will look very different and very weird because of all the money poured into data centers, software development, and business-model experimentation.

Back up. These days I like to say that the AI bubble is eight things. It is:

  1. one part: reasonable expectation of providing and financially capturing true end-user value,

  2. two parts: millennarian religious hype on the part of those hoping for the Rapture of the Nerds,

  3. three parts perhaps-reasonable expectation of improved advertising targeting for user good and user ill,

  4. four parts: grifters seeking easy investor marks moving over from crypto,

  5. five parts: platform near-monopolists fearing the loss of their profit flows to a Christensenian disruption from the Next New Big Thing,

  6. six parts:

    • speculative possible enormous increases in utilizer surplus from the ability to add natural-language interfaces to every interaction with structured and unstructured databases,

    • or decreases in human flourishing as natural-language interfaces serve as a stalking-horse for yet another round of hacking users’ attention, and not for their benefit,

    • but in either case not a likely source of Google-Facebook-Apple-style platform monopoly profits,

  7. seven parts: the downstream consequences for human society and culture flowing from enormous increases in human data-analysis capabilities driven by the unbelievably large scope of huge data, enormous dimension, highly flexible-function classification tools coming online now and soon, and last:

  8. eight parts: the downstream consequences for human society and culture flowing from MAMLM-mediated—Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Model-mediated—human interaction with the infosphere.

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Of these, only (1) and (3) are likely sources of superprofit for investors.

(6), (7), and (8) are transformative, potentially, for human society and culture, but not likely sources of superprofits from investors in providing AI-services or AI-support right now. (5) is a defensive move: not an attempt to boost the profits of platform monopolists, but to spend a share of those profits—a large and growing share—defending them against Clayton Christensenian disruption. (2) and (4) are culturally important, and are driving much of investor interest on the belief that with so much excitement about this pile of manure there must be a pony in there somewhere. But focusing on them is not likely to lead to good investment decisions.

Yes, the grifters moving over from crypto are definitely trying to run a Ponzi scheme: if the person trying to sell you something has just spent a decade selling BitCoin, DogeCoin, and Web3 use cases coming real soon now, you should probably block them and add them to your spam list.

And anyone saying either of these two things: (i) soon everyone will be under threat from a malevolent digital god that will soon control all of our minds through flattery, misdirection, threats, and sexual seduction, the negative millennarians; or (ii) they are on the cusp of building a benevolent digital god. Shake your head and walk away. And if they then turn to “give me money! lots of money!”—well, then run.

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What I Said at: The State of the National Labor Market for Recent College Graduates

UC System-Wide Academic Congress on the Labor Market Destinations of Recent College Graduates: The UC Systemwide Academic Congress is Oct. 28–29, 2025, focused on recent grads’ labor outcomes, with panels on national and California trends, AI’s impact on entry-level work, employer insights, and UC alumni pathways. It’s open to UC staff and faculty and held virtually on Tuesday, Oct. 28 (12–4:30 p.m. PT) and Wednesday, Oct. 29 (8:30–11:45 a.m. PT). UC’s new Lightcast-powered dashboard mapping alumni employment and skills, showing top destinations like Google, Amazon, Kaiser, and UC itself, and highlighting employer demand for communication, research, writing, and leadership…

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<https://www.ucop.edu/systemwide-academic-congress/agenda/index.html>

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Rates of Hiring, Firing, & Quitting

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What I said: At the moment, the unemployment rate in the United States, the all-worker average is 4%: for every 24 people who say “yes, I have a job”, there is one who says “I have not a job even though I have been recently looking for work”. For recent college graduates, however, right now the unemployment rate is 4.8%. Given a 4.0 percent all-worker average, we would have expected the recent college graduate unemployment rate to be something like 3.3% or so.

Note: This is jobs rather than wages. Age and experience adjusted, wages remain much higher for college-educated workers than for non-college-educated workers.

One way to think about it is this:

  • The average unemployment rate for all college graduates currently is 2.7%, two-thirds of the all-worker average.

  • The average young-worker unemployment rate is currently 7.4%, almost twice the all-worker average.

  • Typically, recent college graduates, those age 22 to 27, have an unemployment rate about ¼ of the way from the college-graduate to the young-worker average.

  • In terms of finding and keeping jobs, young college graduates benefit from the college-worker advantage, but suffer from the young-worker cost. However, the college-worker benefit tends to rule.

  • But right now it isn’t ruling. For the first time ever, the young graduate unemployment rate is halfway between the college-worker and the young-worker rates, and higher than the national average unemployment rate.

As Paul Krugman wrote last week:

Paul Krugman: Bad Times for College Graduates <https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/bad-times-for-college-graduates/>: ‘[Now] is not the worst job market college graduates have ever seen. It is, however, the worst such market compared with workers in general that we’ve ever seen, by a large margin. [But] nobody knows for sure why this is happening…

In addition, the labor market level of hiring right now is perhaps depressed by a quarter below what we would expect for a balanced economy at the current unemployment rate of 4%. While unemployment is by no means high in historical perspective, finding a job is about as hard as it has been in 2012-2013, which were not good years for job seekers. Finding a job right now is almost as bad as in a substantial depression.

We thus have two things going on: We have a sluggish hiring system, for reasons we do not understand. We have the a loss of a piece of young college-graduate privilege in matching jobs to workers, vis-à-vis the national average. Recent college graduates are now no longer like college graduates in general than like young workers in general, as far as finding and keeping jobs is concerned.

We do not have any terribly good nailed-down explanations for why this is so. There are intriguing signs, however, well laid out earlier by David Autor and Erik Brynnjolfson, that it may be because employers are thinking:

  • Radically new technologies for college graduate knowledge work are coming down the pike.

  • Employers do not want to make large investments in hiring new workers and staff until things become clear

  • Especially because they overhired immediately after the plague

Plus: because there is now a huge amount of uncertainty in future economic policy: every day brings a new tweet from the president imposing a sudden new high tariff on some narrow slice of industry or on some particular country—in the most recent case because he got mad at the provincial premier of Ontario.

That’s one piece of what’s going on.

Let me shift gears and step back. If we step back, we see that, at least according to standard measurements, since 1870, we’ve had about 2% per year productivity growth year in America. This, however, has been extremely uneven. Every generation, in about four-fifths of the economy, we have 1% per year productivity growth. Things get better in terms of people are more productive and wages rise. Thus for the bulk of the economy there is incremental and understandable and largely undisruptive growth.

But for about one-fifth of the economy, we get 5% per year productivity growth: a quintupling of productivity over a generation.

And so, for the economy as a whole, productivity growth averages out to 2% per year.

However, over the course of each generation, about one-fifth of the economy is completely and totally transformed in how it works and what people do. It is a shifting but overlapping sector of the economy, this part currently subject to disruptive Schumpeterian creative-destruction. Being caught up in this industrial whirlwind is very good if you can take advantage of the possibilities opened by the rapidly changing technology of the particular economic subsector iin which you are. This is, however, very bad for you if, in your occupation, try to do the same thing in the same way that your parents—or, god forbid, your grandparents did. The value of what you are doing collapses. You still do the same thing in the same way. But because there are other and different ways of doing the thing, the amount of money you can collect collapses.

Right now, for the first time, it looks like, with the advent of Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Model technologies, that college graduates are now in the bullseye. Not only is there something happening to make them lose much of their privilege relative to the rest of the labor market, but we also have very good reason to expect that the jobs of highly educated and well-prepared knowledge workers are going to be transformed substantially over the next generation.

I find myself thinking of a Berkeley student who graduated in 2007, with a political economy degree, someone who I did not think of as a STEM person at all. Graduating in 2007, he faced 2008 and 2009. Miraculously, he kept his job, while a lot of other young hires did not. He kept his job because he had one special qualification: He knew how to make Excel get up and dance. And because he knew how to make Excel get up and dance, he was worth keeping around.

With live in the age of the coming of chatbots and other MAMLM technologies, plus all kinds of other potentially wonderful things. But this raises a question: What are the things that we should be training our students at the University of California to do, so that they can then be the people who know how to make the things their employers want done, using the information systems their employers use, get up and dance?

I have a lot of views on this, but I am out of time.

So let me turn the mic over back first to our host and then to Harry Holzer.


And I also said: If I might jump in with two comments. First, what Eric says [about sharp declines in hiring in the most MAMLM-exposed subsegments of he labor market is definitely true. But at the moment, it’s not the case that AI is making certain people in certain subgroups much more productive, and hence you don’t need as many of them. It is the case that a lot of businesses expect that this will be so over the next three or four years.

Te people I talk to say, “Yes, we’re having a lot of teething pains, but things are definitely going this way, and we need to think when we hiring now of what our labor force ought to look like in three or four years.

Second, if I could pick up on David’s report from the Facebook comment that what they need is not more people who know and are familiar with programming languages particular, but rather with higher level skills. The question for us is: what are the higher level skills they need? I’m reminded of a line that my brother uses. He has had a very successful career on Wall Street. He says that the thing he took in college that was most valuable, in a pre-professional sense, was a nine-person seminar in medieval witchcraft he took from historian Stephen Ozment in his junior year. Each week in that seminar they were confronted with a document about medieval witchcraft. In that document people have written things down that are, from our perspective, total lies. How were they constrained in what they wrote? Why did they feel they have to write these lies? And how do you then try to get through this document to at least guess at what the truth of what was really going on? This was, he says, remarkably good preparation for listening to quarterly earnings calls from throughout his career.

And let me leave that there.


And I also said: I would like to throw half of that question back over the wall back to you sociologists. The obvious thing that you would want to do now, if you think that because of AI you may well want a workforce that’s significantly smaller in five years, that you would fire you experienced engineers and hire a bunch of young people who are teched up in the newest programming languages, have lots of fluid intelligence, and so forth, and who are really, really cheap.

Remember what technological change did to AT&T’s workforce throughout its history. AT&T had 200,000 women in the late 1920s who were plugging cables into switchboards. And now it has zero, with the automatic switches mostly coming in in the 1940s and 1950s. That was one of the few jobs that women were allowed to have back in the 1920s. It was a huge deal that women could no longer get a job at AT&T working as a switchboard operator,

But today’s Silicon Valley firms are not firing. They are, rather, not hiring much. I think the reasons are largely sociological. They are trying to keep their employees imagining that they are in a long-term gift-exchange relationship with a benevolent entity that is a corporation, rather than objects that are of zero concern to their employer.

That is half of it, I think.

As for the other half: I think Harry has very informed views as to the things affecting the labor force and the causes of the current semi-freezing of hiring. I think David is right about monetary policy playing a large role in generating employment weakness. But I am also very much attracted to the uncertainty hypothesis. At the best-paid level of the white -ollar labor force, hiring a worker is a lot more like buying an expensive machine that will last for a long time rather than buying, say, a laptop that will be obsolete in three years. You’re making a 15-year commitment. In times of high uncertainty, the option value of waiting to see what happens until uncertainty is resolved before you make that commitment is very, very high. And so firms are waiting. But uncertainty is not dissipating. Rather, the chaos quotient is growing.


And I also said: I am being a bad panelist. We’re hogging too much of the time here. But yesterday I ran into the former engineering dean here at Berkeley, Shankar Sastry, who said that it was computer science that was being most disrupted from the coming of MAMLMs. Simply put, in their courses, the scores on homeworks are now 20 points higher than they were three years ago, and the scores on exams are all 20 points lower.

I interpret this as the people on the frontline teaching the courses are still focused too much on trying to persuade people to not use AI as they do their problem sets so they actually build the skills. I interpret this as their not being focused enough at the fact that the abstraction layer on which you ought to be teaching computer science is changing, and is changing rapidly. Back in the real old days, computer science courses would start with the quantum-mechanical orbital structure of the phosphorus atom, and what happens to the extra electron when you take a phosphorus atom and shove it into the middle of a silicon crystal. Today, that is almost nowhere in the computer science curriculum, even though it is absolutely fundamental. It is at an abstraction layer at which very few people work: a few wizards at the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, and a few others.

Thus I think provosts and such need to be looking hard at engineering schools and their computer science departments and asking: what is the right abstraction layer at which to teach to your students? They are not going to be working in the computer industry of five years ago. They are going to be working in the computer industry of 15 years from now. So provosts and such need to hold their engineering deans’ feet to the fire!


And I also said: Just to pick up on a point that David made about Richard Freeman’s The Over-Educated American. Back when i was a freshman, Richard Freeman came to the Ec 10 class and gave his “over-educated American” lecture. He told us that we were there in college to enrich our lives. He told us that if we thought we were in college in order to get a higher-paying job, we should go drop out, take the money that we had invented we were earmarked to pay for college, and invest it in the stock market. He told us that it would be by far a better way to make money than going to college.

That is not true now. If you can get your BA, and if it shows you actually buckled down and learn something in college, he college-high school wage premium is 80% here in America today. If you want a market yelling for something, saying “we don’t have enough of these people” you have one. The market is yelling for more four-year BA graduates.

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UCOP: We invite you to attend the UC Systemwide Academic Congress on the Labor Market Destinations of Recent College Graduates, October 28 – 29, 2025 <https://link.ucop.edu/series/uc-systemwide-academic-congress-on-the-labor-market-destinations-of-recent-college-graduates/>. We’re bringing together distinguished economists from across the country, leading researchers within the UC system, influential public figures, and industry experts to discuss emerging national and statewide labor market trends, the impacts of AI on entry-level employment, and how UC data can be used to inform academic planning and support student success. This event is open to all UC staff and faculty members.


12:00 p.m. – 12:10 p.m. Opening Remarks: Katherine Newman, Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs, UC Office of the President

12:10 p.m. – 1:30 p.m. Session 1: National Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: David Autor, Erik Brynjolfsson, Bradford DeLong, Harry Holzer, Moderator: Katherine Newman, Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs, UC Office of the President

1:45 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. Session 2: California Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: Sarah Bohn, Juan Barrios, Peter McCrory, Jesse Rothstein, Moderator: Su Jin Jez, CEO, California Competes

3:15 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. Session 3: Employer Insights on UC Alumni in the Workforce: Jim Kaplan, Scott McGregor, Ameet Shukla, Ben Thomas, Moderator: Lori Kletzer, Professor of Economics and Former Campus Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, UC Santa Cruz

8:30 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. Session 4: UC Alumni Pathways and Labor Market Data: Pamela Brown, Chris Furgiuele,

9:00 a.m. – 10:15 a.m. Session 5: Ongoing Labor Market Challenges: Panel of faculty members including computer science, engineering to discuss labor market challenges – such as industry layoffs and impact of AI – and how they are adapting academic planning and programs, courses, and/or certifications: Marios Papaefthymiou, John D. Skrentny, Mary Walshok, Moderator: Richard Arum, P

10:30 a.m. – 11:45 a.m. Session 6: UC Career Centers: Preparing UC Students for a Transforming Workforce: Sean Gil, Andrea Hanson, Carina Salazar, Moderator: Pamela Brown,

11:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. Closing Remarks

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Competition, Civility, & the #Discourse: Designing Institutions for Humans with Mixed Motivational Orientations

Against panic about “feminization”: how pipeline, tasks, and norms actually shift work. And for modes, not morals: human organizations need challenge, support, and triage—without the gender war frame. And context-switching is a needed skill: institutions should train to challenge to call forth extra effort without dismissal, for cooperation without saccharine evasion, and for candor without performative aggression…

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The extremely sharp Chad Orzel is 100% on here:

Chad Orzel: Gender Preferences in Motivation <https://chadorzel.substack.com/p/kids-are-kids-and-gender-preferences>: ‘The other big thing making the rounds of the #discourse is this article about “feminization” from Helen Andrews. This is solidly in the deeply frustrating class of articles that have a bit of a valid point at their core, but wrap it up in enough culture-war shitposting to totally poison the topic. Megan McArdle, both in the WaPo and on the new Central Air podcast, and Matt Yglesias make a decent attempt at saying something sensible on the topic, but Andrews is so comically hyperbolic that it’s difficult to engage with…

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He is right. The fight over “feminization” mistakes a design problem for a civilizational crisis. Build spaces that reward both hard challenge and collaborative care—then teach people to switch modes fast. Differences in average personality types between genders do exist; but within-gender variance swamps between. Moreover, panic doesn’t help except for those who want to be s***posters. Optimize institutions for complementary strengths, and separate content from tone to keep candor without harassment.

Chad’s selection from Megan:

Megan McArdle: <MY POLICY: NO LINK>: ‘Acknowledge the reality of male-female differences and remember that those differences are manageable…. Traits are… just more or less useful depending on the degree and the context. Extreme risk aversion is a splendid quality in a bank regulator, and a crippling handicap in an entrepreneur. It’s good that employers became more attuned to the feelings of their employees…. We don’t need to protect institutional integrity from the insufficiencies of women so much as craft institutions that maximize the complementary strengths of both men and women—while also minimizing our respective weaknesses…

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My selection from Matt:

Matt Yglesias: Women’s professional rise is good, actually <https://www.slowboring.com/p/womens-professional-rise-is-good>: ‘Helen Andrews is spreading panic, not telling forbidden truths…. Andrews… claims that these workplace shifts… [are] “a potential threat to civilization”… in an aggressive, almost willfully anti-persuasive tone… designed to attract… woke scolds, so that Andrews’s fellow conservatives can complain that the left is in denial about basic facts of human biology….

But this is a serious topic that deserves better than sloppy partisan demagoguery…. Andrews opens… recounting… Larry Summers’s defenestration… for speculating that gender parity in hard sciences would never be achieved due to sex differences in interests and capabilities…. Summers was treated shabbily…. However, she herself is completely blind to the implication that women have come to dominate in… fields… [that] play into… [their] strengths…. Gender gaps in specific facets of personality are not really all that large, but the gender gaps in aggregate personality are pretty big.… Like what happens with faces…. People… reliably identify male versus female… but if you zoom in on just a nose or just eyes or just a chin, it’s much harder to tell…. There’s plenty of room for overlap on individual features. But there isn’t a lot of overlap in the overall gestalt…. I personally find the rise of more agreeable office culture to be a little annoying in some respects, but I’m glad about the decline of in-office screaming.

Beyond the basic analytic unseriousness, though, Andrews’s argument lacks the courage of her convictions. She tells us that the existence of female professors, journalists, lawyers, and judges is an existential threat to civilization, then claims she has no desire to take any opportunities away from anyone—she just wants to curb the bad employment-discrimination policies…. But there’s just no reason to believe women’s prominence in these roles has anything to do with H.R. or Title VII…. The heft of Andrews’s piece comes from the prospect of widespread de-feminization, which would require massive cultural change and the rebirth of an incredibly oppressive and constraining set of social norms. And neither she nor her allies are willing to actually make the case for it, because it would be horrifying…

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And Chad has his take on motivation-via-competition:

Chad Orzel: Gender Preferences in Motivation <https://chadorzel.substack.com/p/kids-are-kids-and-gender-preferences>: ‘With respect to motivation through competition… I’ll more or less stand by my summary take from [2022]:… There are some people who are powerfully motivated by… competition and striving… and others who are not. I don’t think that [those]… who speak positively of being pushed hard… are confused or deluded—I take them at their word… I’ve felt the same way at times…. And on the flip side, I find a lot of attempts to motivate people in ways that are meant to be communal and cooperative to be de-motivating… [and] check out…. So, I react negatively to the idea of de-emphasizing competition and peak performance as a goal because that… [is] saying that an entire personality type is illegitimate….

Personality types are somewhat correlated with gender… which ties into the organizational structure thing… [but] both ways of motivation are valid. We need… spaces… communal and collaborative and spaces where open and direct competition is the norm… [and] for people to self-organize into the appropriate one for them without denouncing the other as a Threat to Civilization. Unfortunately, Andrews’s piece and much of the resulting #discourse is very much Not Helping…

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What do I think? I have many thoughts. Briefly, Chad is right. But, also, it is very very important—and very difficult—to teach people that they need to context-switch. And it is also very very important—and very difficult—to teach people that a challenge and a demand that they excel and go beyond their previous personal best is often intended to be helpful, and that a demand that they accommodate and validate the thoughts and feelings of others is rarely a dismissal of the value of their individual contributions.

I did figure out something back around 1990. I figured out there were three modes I could pick for how to try to engage whenever I found myself as a lead interlocutor with the presenter at an academic seminar:

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: Reading Practices for Tomorrow’s Infotech World

Originally 2023-07-28. Hoisted & separated out so I will easily be able to find it in the future. From <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/briefly-noted-for-2023-07-28-fr>…

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Books vs. ‘Bots: Will we still be able to take black marks off of a page into our eyes, and use them to spin-up a sub-Turing instantiation of the author’s mind to run on our wetware? Or: Machiavelli, Sokrates, & the attention-smashing internet. Reading is an ancient cognitive technology; the internet is disassembly. Who wins? Will we still be deep- and active-enough readers to conjure living interlocutors from dead text?

Sokrates distrusted and scorned the written word; Machiavelli feasted on it nightly to satiation. In a world of generative everything, which habit survives?

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Reading Practices for Tomorrow’s Infotech World:

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Today’s food for thought:

Josh Bernoff: Why books work: A rebuttal to Andy Matuschak: ‘Think about what non-fiction books are made out of. They include overarching principles. Matuschak and I agree, if those are any good, people retain them. There are the arguments that support those principles. Sometimes people retain those arguments, sometimes they don’t. But you don’t have to see the framing to understand how the building stays up. I’d argue that retaining the arguments is less important. There are subsidiary ideas. A good book has lots of those. And a reader is going to recall those subsidiary ideas only to the extent that they are relevant for her. If there are 15 subsidiary ideas and three are relevant for you, those three may be sufficient. If a book is really useful, you may retain more. There are also, in any given book, hundreds of bits of knowledge. There are facts, statistics, diagrams, and, crucially, stories. There are long case-study stories and short “for example” stories. When the author chooses these bits and delivers them well, the reader retains them…. [So] write directly to the reader, using the words I and you…. Tell stories…. Ask rhetorical questions…. Include graphics…. Vary presentation…. Introduce and sum up…

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And:

Elizabeth Minkel: Why Generative AI Won’t Disrupt Books: ‘Every new technology from the internet to virtual reality has tried to upend book culture. There’s a reason they’ve all failed—and always will…. One reason books haven’t been particularly disruptable might be that many of the people looking to “fix” things couldn’t actually articulate what was broken…. The “10X MORE engaging” crowd has come in waves… promised a vast, untapped market full of people just waiting for technology to make books more “fun” and delivered pronouncements with a grifting sort of energy…. Interactive books could have sound effects or music…. NFTs could let readers “own” a character. AI could allow readers to endlessly generate their own books… eschew… “static stories” entirely and put themselves directly into a fictional world…. Right now, plain old reading still works for huge numbers of people, many of whom pick up books because they want to escape and not be the main character for a while…. “In the meantime, tech bros will still find VCs to wine and dine and spend more money on bullshit,” [Maris] Kreizman predicts. But for the rest of us? We’ll just keep on reading…

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As I say: A good reader takes the black marks on the pages of a book, spins up a sub-Turing instantiation of the mind of the author from those black marks, runs that instantiation on a sandboxed partition in their own wetware, and then argues with that instantiation.

The end result of this process? Niccolo Machiavelli puts it very well in his “Letter to Vettori”:

And as the evening comes on, I return to my house and go into my study. At the door I take off my clothes of the day, covered with mud and mire, and I put on my regal and courtly garments; and decently reclothed, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them lovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for. There I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions; and they in their humanity reply to me. And for the space of four hours I feel no boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death does not frighten me. I deliver myself entirely to them…

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Machiavelli is, as people call it these days, an “active reader”: someone who when reading a book induces in themself a kind of multiple personality order that allows them to derive all—or nearly all—of the benefits of active dialogue with another mind from mere black marks on a page. In so doing, Machiavelli short-circuits Socrates’s objection, in Phædrus, to books. In Socrates’s story, the God Theuth [Thoth, ] shows King Thamus his invention of writing, and Thamus responds that it will:

create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality...

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And Socrates analogizes writing to:

unfortunately… painting… creations… [that] have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence…. When they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves…

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Thus Socrates’s very strong preference for interactive oral dialogue over written text as a way of pursuing philosophy—living and dynamic form of discourse that could adapt to the needs and abilities of each interlocutor, and that could stimulate the soul to discover the truth. Socrates’s critique of writing was, of course, ironic, since we only know his thoughts and arguments through the books written by Plato. Plato accepted (or originated? Plato’s character “Socrates” has a fraught relationship to the real Socrates) by dialogues, myths, allegories, metaphors, and so on. It was only Aristotle who went all-in on books, trusting that they would find the right kind of, or enough of the right kind of readers.

Bernoff is strongly on Machiavelli’s side, but in his Writing Without Bullshit and elsewhere he recognizes that most (all?) readers need a good deal of help to start the spin-up of the sub-Turing instantiation:

Write directly to the reader, using the words I and you…. Tell stories…. Ask rhetorical questions…. Include graphics…. Vary presentation…. Introduce and sum up…

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Motivated and curious readers can and do read like Machiavelli.

But one problem is that people these days are reading less and especially reading less in the way of long form extended arguments. Thus detailed multi hour engagement via a book with another mind (or with the self-created illusion of another mind) is becoming much less common, and that will make us much less good at it. This is a problem for books.

Minkel does not believe this is a problem. She argues that, historically, books have resisted disruption by technology because they offer this distinctive mode of engagement—this spin-up of a sub-Turing instantiation—that appeals to many.

But in the modern world of the internet and ChatBots, will we lose our ability to so-easily submit to the power of words to create immersive and imaginative worlds that readers can explore at their own pace and in their own way?

Quite possibly.

Modern technologies may well destroy, via their parcelization of our attention and thus our building-up of our reading neuronal patterns, much of our collective ability to make the use of books that we have made of them for the past 2500 years.

It will be interesting to see what happens.

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The State of Trump's Trade War: Short- & Long-Run Consequences of Optics vs. Economics

Symbolism wins, technocracy bends: the public sees “tough,” firms get exemptions, and growth pays the tab. And then cycle repeats: unilateral tools plus attention incentives make escalation cheap and endless. And so in the long run China writes the rules of world trade and hogs the surplus from the globalized value-chain economy, while the U.S. suffers under the harrow of a BREXIT-like headwind to productivity growth…

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Trump’s trade war runs on optics alone, not economics. Loud tariffs with quiet unwinding. That mix stabilizes the short run. But it likely seeds a decade of productivity drag. Foreign leaders have learned the script: flatter publicly, accommodate privately, and move on, while derisking from the United States. The result is political theater. But the real supply‑side costs to U.S. growth are likely to be substantial. And the real wealth and power benefits to China as the global-trade hegemon orchestrator and defender of multilateralism on its terms are likely to be substantial as well.

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To start with, recognize that Richard Baldwin is right here:

Richard Baldwin: How Does the Trade War End? <https://rbaldwin.substack.com/p/how-does-the-trade-war-end> <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-does-trade-war-end-richard-baldwin-mifye/>: ‘Trump’s approach to trade war is not economic; it is emotional…. To restore a sense of national strength, to assuage deep-rooted grievances and to end the sense of victimhood held by the President and America’s middle class…. But is that it? Are there no traditional goals?The President’s trade agenda also mentions more traditional goals like boosting manufacturing and raising middle class real incomes. But the actual conduct of trade policy suggests these are not driving the show. They are decorative, not directive…. Reindustrialisation is not a priority…. Boosting real wages is ornamental…. The true objective… [is not… economic transformation, but emotional restoration. A muscular performance of American dominance, of the humiliation of foreign leaders by getting them to kowtow to the President and accept his capriciousness, of retribution for perceived slights, and of the projection of unchallenged American power…. Trump’s trade war isn’t about fixing the economy. It’s about making MAGA America feel like it’s winning again.Importantly, the oddity of this goal is precisely what makes US trade policy so resilient politically. Almost any event can be spun as a win. A viral clip of the British PM picking up papers that President Trump dropped is an American triumph in this trade war…

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And this means that there is a path toward, not sanity, but rather much less damage to the productivity of the globalized value-chain economy in the short run than we all thought back last spring:

Richard Baldwin: How Does the Trade War End? <https://rbaldwin.substack.com/p/how-does-the-trade-war-end> <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-does-trade-war-end-richard-baldwin-mifye/>: ‘The US will likely continue bullying smaller trade partners because it can, and because its President loves that sort of thing. But… Trump is likely to keep most US tariffs at 10%… because, rhetorically, America has already won…. A climbdown spun into a chest-thump. And foreign governments, for their part, will have no interest in bursting this magical thinking bubble….

Foreign leaders have, by now, taken Trump’s measure. They understand that beneath the chaos lies a predictable logic…. Flattery and performative adulation is what works…. As Financial Times journalist Ben Hall put it: “optics are everything…. Trump can be persuaded to retreat or cooperate as long as the retreat looks like conquest… [with] quiet accommodations beneath a façade of mutual respect…. [All] can walk away declaring success according to their own playbooks…

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But for foreign countries to do this their leaders need to be willing to (a) offer the public kowtow to the dominance of Trump, (b) be able to actually make credible threats of imposing real pain in some dimension that Trump or the Trumpists care about—for example, turning off the power in Ohio—and © not having too many vulnerabilities themselves that Trump, lashing out because he is angry or just because he wants a headline, can push on some 4 AM on Truth Social.

As Richard says, the political-economy dynamic is fascinating. It generates a large degree of short-run stability. The parties most visible to the public and the ones most embedded in the policy apparatus pursue different, complementary goals. On the one hand, a president can claim a symbolic win—announcing “tough” measures and declaring victory—at relatively modest tariff levels that are high enough to satisfy performative politics but low enough to avoid major macroeconomic disruption. On the other hand, the Commerce and Treasury technocracy—nudged by exporters needing foreign market access and importers dependent on global supply chains—quietly works to reopen channels, craft exemptions, and recalibrate enforcement so that, in substance, trade flows revert toward the status quo ante. This asymmetry matters a lot: large rhetorical moves are cheap to manufacture, while large substantive reversals are costly; so the system equilibrates with loud symbolism paired to incremental, bureaucratic unwinding. In effect, the public hears about toughness; the firms get continuity; and nearly the “pre‑April” regime’s practical essence returns under a new banner.

This is why, in the near term, such conflicts don’t escalate: optics do the heavy lifting while policy plumbing cushions the economy.

I wish I could say that that is the end of the story, and that Trump’s Trade Tariffs are:

but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing…

But there is a medium run, and a long run.

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& People Were Worried About Biden Having Lost a Mental-Cognitive Step

Donald Trump has no anchor tying him to reality...

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Yes. Donald Trump does not remember that he was in office in 2020, and that Joe Biden had not yet appointed Merrick Garland, Lisa Monaco, and Jack Smith. So they could not have in any way rigged the 2020 election. He also does not remember that he—rather than Joe Biden—appointed Christopher Wray to be FBI Director <https://x.com/kyledcheney/status/1981910324455571644>:

Donald J. Trump: ‘Just in: Documents show conclusively that Christopher Wray, Deranged Jack Smith, Merrick Garland, Lisa Monaco, and other crooked lowlifes from the failed Biden Administration, signed off on Operation Arctic Frost. They spied on Senators and Congressmen/women, and even taped their calls. They cheated and rigged the 2020 Presidential Election. These Radical Left Lunatics should be prosecuted for their illegal and highly unethical behavior!…

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And Republicans simply do not care. And are completely uncurious about who is running the country.

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If reading this gets you Value Above Replacement, then become a free subscriber to this newsletter. And forward it! And if your VAR from this newsletter is in the three digits or more each year, please become a paid subscriber! I am trying to make you readers—and myself—smarter. Please tell me if I succeed, or how I fail…

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