How Many Magics to Human Prosperity & Progress?

Call off the cults and the funerals. “AI”’s real advance is high‑dimensional prediction that generalizes without interpretable laws. That’s operational power, not Turing-Class cognition. Noah Smith says: Think of three magics: literate historical memory made knowledge accumulative; hypothesis-and-experiment science made it generalizable; AI makes it operational at scale via learning‑and‑search replacing inadequate low-dimensional cookie‑cutter models with extremely high-dimension extremely big-data extremely flexible-function prediction. But is that “Third Magic” really of the same scale as the first two? I would view things somewhat differently: I would add eyes-thumbs-brains-tools, language, and societal coördination via scaled-up gift exchange to writing and science as decisive magics. And I would say that at the moment “AI” is as likely to be a wishful mnemonic as a genuine Sixth Magic. Chatbots are useful, but they’re pass‑the‑story engines: blurry‑JPEG‑of‑the‑web plus rotoscoping, not minds. The hype machines—Downer, Boomer, Doomer—confuse cultural technology with cognition and policy with prophecy. The Downer critique underrates genuine capabilities; the Boomer gospel overstates sparks‑of‑AGI. The Doomer rapture is theology in tech drag. The economic story is a bubble build‑out: GPUs gush profit; most applications burn cash. Economically, chips win, most deployments don’t; fear of disruption fuels spending by platform monopolists remembering the fates of IBM and WIntel. Use AI where feedback is tight and stakes local; demand theory or rigorous trials where failure is catastrophic; measure, pre‑register, and watch the stages of the roll-out carefully to gauge what all this will really mean for us…

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Noah Smith reposts <https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/the-third-magic-23f>

Noahpinion
The Third Magic
I’m traveling again, so today we’ll have another repost. I’m reposting all of my New Year’s essays from the past few years, so here’s the one from 2023…
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, with further thoughts, his “Third Magic” essay <https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/the-third-magic> from year-end 2022, which at the time I said was smarter than anything I had read on the internet in 2022.

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Here’s why I said that, and what I said back then:


This by Noah Smith May Well Be Better than Anything I Read in All 2022:

But I would say not “three magics” but five—and maybe six:

Noah Smith: The Third Magic <https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/the-third-magic>: ‘A meditation on history, science, and AI: More profound and fundamental meta-innovations… these are ways of learning about the world: The first magic history… knowledge… recorded in language…. Animals make tools, but they don’t collectively remember…. History… is what allows tinkering to stick…. Our second magic trick… was science… figuring out… principles about how the world works…. Controlled experiments…. It’s pretty incredible that the world actually works that way. If… in the year 1500… [you] told… [someome] one kooky hobbyist rolling little balls down ramps could be right about how the physical world works, when the cumulated experience of millions of human beings around him was wrong… they would have thought you were crazy. They did think that was crazy. And yet, it… worked…. But… complex phenomena have so far defied the approach…. Language, cognition, society, economics, complex ecologies these things so far don’t have any equivalent of Newton’s Laws, and it’s not clear they ever will….

The Third Magic…. Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures”… [a] split between… parsimonious models… [and] predictive accuracy…. Control…. Generalize… without finding any simple “law” to intermediate…. Halevy… Norvig, and… Pereira… “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data”…. “Represent all the data with a nonparametric model… with very large data sources, the data holds a lot of detail…. Trust… language…. See how far you can go by tying together the words that are already there…. Now go out and gather some data, and see what it can do”…. Underlying regularities that are difficult to summarize but which are still possible to generalize…. Black-box prediction…. We’re always in danger of overfitting and edge cases…. The “third magic” may be more like actual magic than the previous two…. But even wild, occasionally-uncontrollable power is real power….

[In] a number of subfields of economics… [circumstances] resist the natural experiment approach…. Might we apply AI tools?… Khachiyan et al. argues… “yes”…. Being able to predict the economic growth of a few city blocks 10 years into the future with even 30% or 40% accuracy…. And this is just a first-pass attempt…

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What do I think? I think five or maybe six magics:

  • The first magic is at the individual level: eyes, hands, and brains that allow us, but just to use and make but to plan for tool-use, and so the East African Plains Ape gains fangs, claws, fur, levers, and much else.

  • The second magic is at the small group-collective level: ears and mouths that allow us to talk using language, and so the band of fifty of so East African Plains Apes becomes an anthology intelligence: what one knows, soon all know.

  • Then comes the third magic, which is Noah’s first: the artificial memory and communication device that is writing, and all of a sudden it is not just the band of fifty that is an anthology intelligence, but potentially all humanity in the present and the past.

  • The fourth magic is a magic of coordination: How do you get us all in harness, pulling in the same direction, but each doing our (relatively specialized) part? The fourth magic is gift-exchange, that in its hypertrophied form turns into the market economy. Doing favors for one another, in a social context in which there must br approximate balance, is what allows us to, collectively, not just know things but do things.

  • After that comes, as Noah correctly notes, the fifth magic of science: the experimental method, and the exaltation of ideas not because they solidify the band or help some élite run a force-and-fraud exploitation-and-domination game, but because the ideas are true and are a univeral remote control—they enable us to understand and hence control the universe.

Those five magics have brought us where we are today.

Now how likely is it that we are now at the cusp of a sixth magic? It would be: Predictive accuracy, generalization, and control without any simple intermediating laws, abstractions, or encapsulations that vastly exceeds any individual human grasp, or even the grasp of all humans working together.

Perhaps. But I need to explain what is going on. Predictive accuracy, generalization, and control based simply on the fact that we have a huge amount of data, plus enough computer power to allow us to conduct extremely high-dimensional analysis using extremely flexible functional forms. Thus we can classify situations very finely by looking at what the situations’ nearby neighbors—for the right meaning of “nearby” which we can now figure out—are?

On the one hand, I feel that this must be true—I find it very hard to imagine what our brains, or, say, a dogs’ brains, are doing in wetware other than this. On the other hand, our computers are still a lot less sophisticated than our brains. It is unclear if Moore’s Law will get us to computers of sufficient complexity. It is unclear if we can do as good a job of programming our computers as evolution has done at programming us. And, of course, we already have the real ASI—the Anthology Super-Intelligence that is all of us humans thinking together. Adding-in the new capabilities of silicon to our current ASI makes it vastly more capable. But is it enough to qualify as a genuine Sixth Magic? Perhaps. But, at least as I see it, magics one through five—eyes, hands, brains, and tools; ears, mouths, and language; writing; coördination at scale via gift-exchange amped up by money; and science—were all genuinely world-changing in a way that this latest is not yet proven to be.

However, it is now nearly three years later along this ride. What have we learned, and how do things now look different?

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READING: Henry Luce (1941): The American Century

Luce’s manifesto and the world order that it… signposted…

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Henry Luce’s “The American Century” is an editorial artifact. It come from a hinge moment: February 17, 1941—ten months before Pearl Harbor. Back then the United States formally neutral, materially belligerent, and psychologically divided.

It is a piece both programmatic and polemical: a manifesto by a publisher who believed the emergent American scale of industry, technology, finance, media, prosperity, good order, and above all liberty imposed obligations along with opportunities. Read it as an intervention in policy. Read it also as an aspirational framing of a century that Henry Luce thought the United States could shape, for good, via the drive of its productive capacity and the contagiousness of its culture.

I think the right way to approach Luce is to ask three questions:

  • What problem did he think he was solving? What tools did he believe America had at hand to solve it?

  • And how well did Luce’s setting forth the “American Century” as an agenda map onto what actually happened from 1941 to the present?

The problem, for Luce, was not only Hitler and totalitarianism. It was the broader sickness of interwar capitalism:

  • a planet with a technological capacity to produce abundance;

  • a social-distribution system that kept millions hungry;

  • a world full of states able to mobilize for war;

  • and institutions unable to deliver peace.

Luce diagnoses American malaise—nervousness, gloom, apathy—as a failure of intellectual and moral clarity, a refusal to name what the United States was already doing (in the war short of war) and what it ought to do (commit to an outward-facing liberal order). His rhetorical move is to declare the question of “whether” moot—America is already in the war—and to focus on “how” to win and “for what” to win.

That pivot from ontology to teleology—less “are we?” and more “what are our aims?”—is the kernel of the essay.

On tools, Luce points to concrete levers: freedom of the seas, world trade on American scale, technical assistance and human-capital exports, an explicit Samaritanism—feeding the hungry alongside arming democracies—and the projection of “Freedom under Law” as a normative brand. He does not imagine a world parliament. He does imagine a world environment hospitable to American growth, secured by American influence. In his triad—industrial capacity, moral aspiration, and cultural prestige—he anticipates the toolkit that later becomes the Bretton Woods system plus the Marshall Plan plus the Hollywood-jazz-consumer-goods soft power gradient.

If you want a single sentence from Luce that prefigures the postwar order, it is his insistence that America is “responsible… for the world-environment in which she lives.” That is the embryo of the liberal internationalist claim: your domestic prosperity depends on shaping global rules.

Now, how well did the map match the territory? The institutional sequence from 1944 onward—IMF, World Bank, GATT; NATO; the UN system; the Marshall Plan; OEEC to OECD—was a remarkably faithful implementation of Luce’s instincts, albeit designed by Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson-White rather than an editorial board. American scale and credibility financed reconstruction, underwrote convertibility, and incentivized export-led growth. The post-1947 prosperity cycle—Europe’s “economic miracle,” Japan’s high-speed growth, then the Four Tigers—leveraged American demand, technology diffusion, and rules.

The “American Century” in that sense happened.

Between 1950 and 1990 the global economic frontier was anchored on American productivity and policy. To borrow a favorite metric: by 1973, the advanced capitalist world had cut the share of its population in poverty to historical lows while tripling real output per worker relative to 1939. That is not solely an American achievement—but the order that enabled it was America-centered.

Why read Luce today? Because he ties moral aims to material instruments. Freedom and justice are not slogans but outputs of institutions, flows, and logistics—ships, planes, rules, and grain. The “Good Samaritan” line is not charity; it is also stabilization policy. And he insists that leadership is a responsibility, not a prerogative. Senior partnership is earned by underwriting common goods, accepting constraints, and listening. When America does that—at Bretton Woods, in postwar reconstruction, in the liberalization of trade conditioned by domestic cushioning—it is indeed a “powerhouse” of ideals. When it does not, prestige decays faster than hard power can compensate.

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  • Luce, Henry. 1941. “The American Century.” LIFE Magazine, February 17.

Luce American Century 1941
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The American Century

We Americans are unhappy. We are not happy about America. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. We are nervous – or gloomy – or apathetic.

As we look out at the rest of the world we are confused; we don’t know what to do. “Aid to Britain short of war” is typical of halfway hopes and halfway measures.

As we look toward the future – our own future and the future of other nations – we are filled with foreboding. The future doesn’t seem to hold anything for us except conflict, disruption, war.

There is a striking contrast between our state of mind and that of the British people. On Sept. 3, 1939, the first day of the war in England, Winston Churchill had this to say: “Outside the storms of war may blow and the land may be lashed with the fury of its gales, but in our hearts this Sunday morning there is Peace.”

Since Mr. Churchill spoke those words the German Luftwaffe has made havoc of British cities, driven the population underground, frightened children from their sleep, and imposed upon everyone a nervous strain as great as any that people have ever endured. Readers of LIFE have seen this havoc unfolded week by week.

Yet close observers agree that when Mr. Churchill spoke of peace in the hearts of the British people he was not indulging in idle oratory. The British people are profoundly calm. There seems to be a complete absence of nervousness. It seems as if all the neuroses of modern life had vanished from England.

In the beginning the British Government made elaborate preparations for an increase in mental breakdowns. But these have actually declined. There have been fewer than a dozen breakdowns reported in London since the air raids began.

The British are calm in their spirit not because they have nothing to worry about but because they are fighting for their lives. They have made that decision. And they have no further choice. All their mistakes of the past 20 years, all the stupidities and failures that they have shared with the rest of the democratic world, are now of the past. They can forget them because they are faced with a supreme task – defending, yard by yard, their island home.

With us it is different. We do not have to face any attack tomorrow or the next day. Yet we are faced with something almost as difficult. We are faced with great decisions.

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We know how lucky we are compared to all the rest of mankind. At least two-thirds of us are just plain rich compared to all the rest of the human family – rich in food, rich in clothes, rich in entertainment and amusement, rich in leisure, rich.

And yet we also know that the sickness of the world is also our sickness. We, too, have miserably failed to solve the problems of our epoch. And nowhere in the world have man’s failures been so little excusable as in the United States of America. Nowhere has the contrast been so great between the reasonable hopes of our age and the actual facts of failure and frustration. And so now all our failures and mistakes hover like birds of ill omen over the White House, over the Capitol dome and over this printed page. Naturally, we have no peace.

But, even beyond this necessity for living with our own misdeeds, there is another reason why there is no peace in our hearts. It is that we have not been honest with ourselves.

In this whole matter of War and Peace especially, we have been at various times and in various ways false to ourselves, false to each other, false to the facts of history and false to the future.

In this self-deceit our political leaders of all shades of opinion are deeply implicated. Yet we cannot shove the blame off on them. If our leaders have deceived us it is mainly because we ourselves have insisted on being deceived. Their deceitfulness has resulted from our own moral and intellectual confusion. In this confusion, our educators and churchmen and scientists are deeply implicated.

Journalists, too, of course, are implicated. But if Americans are confused it is not for lack of accurate and pertinent information. The American people are by far the best informed people in the history of the world.

The trouble is not with the facts. The trouble is that clear and honest inferences have not been drawn from the facts. The day-to-day present is clear. The issues of tomorrow are befogged.

There is one fundamental issue which faces America as it faces no other nation. It is an issue peculiar to America and peculiar to America in the 20th Century – now. It is deeper even than the immediate issue of War. If America meets it correctly, then, despite hosts of dangers and difficulties, we can look forward and move forward to a future worthy of men, with peace in our hearts.

If we dodge the issue, we shall flounder for ten or 20 or 30 bitter years in a chartless and meaningless series of disasters.

The purpose of this article is to state that issue, and its solution, as candidly and as completely as possible. But first of all let us be completely candid about where we are and how we got there.

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America Is in the War

…But are we in it?

Where are we? We are in the war. All this talk about whether this or that might or might not get us into the war is wasted effort. We are, for a fact, in the war.

If there’s one place we Americans did not want to be, it was in the war. We didn’t want much to be in any kind of war but, if there was one kind of war we most of all didn’t want to be in, it was a European war. Yet, we’re in a war, as vicious and bad a war as ever struck this planet, and, along with being worldwide, a European war. Of course, we are not technically at war, we are not painfully at war, and we may never have to experience the full hell that war can be. Nevertheless the simple statement stands: we are in the war. The irony is that Hitler knows it – and most Americans don’t. It may or may not be an advantage to continue diplomatic relations with Germany. But the fact that a German embassy still flourishes in Washington beautifully illustrates the whole mass of deceits and self-deceits in which we have been living.

Perhaps the best way to show ourselves that we are in the war is to consider how we can get out of it. Practically, there’s only one way to get out of it and that is by a German victory over England. If England should surrender soon, Germany and America would not start fighting the next day. So we would be out of the war. For a while. Except that Japan might then attack the South Seas and the Philippines. We could abandon the Philippines, abandon Australia and New Zealand, withdraw to Hawaii. And wait. We would be out of the war. We say we don’t want to be in the war. We also say we want England to win. We want Hitler stopped – more than we want to stay out of the war. So, at the moment, we’re in.

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We Got in Via Defense

…But what are we defending?

Now that we are in this war, how did we get in? We got in on the basis of defense. Even that very word, defense, has been full of deceit and self-deceit. To the average American the plain meaning of the word defense is defense of the American territory. Is our national policy today limited to the defense of the American homeland by whatever means may seem wise? It is not. We are not in a war to defend American territory. We are in a war to defend and even to promote, encourage and incite so-called democratic principles throughout the world. The average American begins to realize now that that’s the kind of war he’s in. And he’s halfway for it. But he wonders how he ever got there, since a year ago he had not the slightest intention of getting into any such thing. Well, he can see now how he got there. He got there via “defense.”

Behind the doubts in the American mind there were and are two different picture-patterns. One of them stressing the appalling consequences of the fall of England leads us to a war of intervention. As a plain matter of the defense of American territory is that picture necessarily true? It is not necessarily true. For the other picture is roughly this: while it would be much better for us if Hitler were severely checked, nevertheless regardless of what happens in Europe it would be entirely possible for us to organize a defense of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere so that this country could not be successfully attacked. You are familiar with that picture. Is it true or false? No man is qualified to state categorically that it is false. If the entire rest of the world came under the organized domination of evil tyrants, it is quite possible to imagine that this country could make itself such a tough nut to crack that not all the tyrants in the world would care to come against us. And of course there would always be a better than even chance that, like the great Queen Elizabeth, we could play one tyrant off against another. Or, like an infinitely mightier Switzerland, we could live discreetly and dangerously in the midst of enemies. No man can say that that picture of America as an impregnable armed camp is false. No man can honestly say that as a pure matter of defense – defense of our homeland – it is necessary to get into or be in this war.

The question before us then is not primarily one of necessity and survival. It is a question of choice and calculation. The true questions are: Do we want to be in this war? Do we prefer to be in it? And, if so, for what?

We Object to Being in It

…Our fears have a special cause

We are in this war. We can see how we got into it in terms of defense. Now why do we object so strongly to being in it?

There are lots of reasons. First, there is the profound and almost universal aversion to all war – to killing and being killed. But the reason which needs closest inspection, since it is one peculiar to this war and never felt about any previous war, is the fear that if we get into this war, it will be the end of our constitutional democracy. We are all acquainted with the fearful forecast – that some form of dictatorship is required to fight a modern war, that we will certainly go bankrupt, that in the process of war and its aftermath our economy will be largely socialized, that the politicians now in office will seize complete power and never yield it up, and that what with the whole trend toward collectivism, we shall end up in such a total national socialism that any faint semblances of our constitutional American democracy will be totally unrecognizable.

We start into this war with huge Government debt, a vast bureaucracy and a whole generation of young people trained to look to the Government as the source of all life. The Party in power is the one which for long years has been most sympathetic to all manner of socialist doctrines and collectivist trends. The President of the United States has continually reached for more and more power, and he owes his continuation in office today largely to the coming of the war. Thus, the fear that the United States will be driven to a national socialism, as a result of cataclysmic circumstances and contrary to the free will of the American people, is an entirely justifiable fear.

But We Will Win It

…The big question is how

So there’s the mess – to date. Much more could be said in amplification, in qualification, and in argument. But, however elaborately they might be stated, the sum of the facts about our present position brings us to this point – that the paramount question of this immediate moment is not whether we get into war but how do we win it?

If we are in a war, then it is no little advantage to be aware of the fact. And once we admit to ourselves we are in a war, there is no shadow of doubt that we Americans will be determined to win it – cost what it may in life or treasure. Whether or not we declare war, whether or not we send expeditionary forces abroad, whether or not we go bankrupt in the process – all these tremendous considerations are matters of strategy and management and are secondary to the overwhelming importance of winning the war.

What Are We Fighting for?

…And why we need to know

Having now, with candor, examined our position, it is time to consider, to better purpose than would have been possible before, the larger issue which confronts us. Stated most simply, and in general terms, that issue is: What are we fighting for?

Each of us stands ready to give our life, our wealth, and all our hope of personal happiness, to make sure that America shall not lose any war she is engaged in. But we would like to know what war we are trying to win – and what we are supposed to win when we win it.

This questioning reflects our truest instincts as Americans. But more than that. Our urgent desire to give this war its proper name has a desperate practical importance. If we know what we are fighting for, then we can drive confidently toward a victorious conclusion and, what’s more, have at least an even chance of establishing a workable Peace.

Furthermore – and this is an extraordinary and profoundly historical fact which deserves to be examined in detail – America and only America can effectively state the war aims of this war.

Almost every expert will agree that Britain cannot win complete victory – cannot even, in the common saying, “stop Hitler” – without American help. Therefore, even if Britain should from time to time announce war aims, the American people are continually in the position of effectively approving or not approving those aims. On the contrary, if America were to announce war aims, Great Britain would almost certainly accept them. And the entire world including Adolf Hitler would accept them as the gauge of this battle.

Americans have a feeling that in any collaboration with Great Britain we are somehow playing Britain’s game and not our own. Whatever sense there may have been in this notion in the past, today it is an ignorant and foolish conception of the situation. In any sort of partnership with the British Empire, Great Britain is perfectly willing that the United States of America should assume the role of senior partner. This has been true for a long time. Among serious Englishmen, the chief complaint against America (and incidentally their best alibi for themselves) has really amounted to this – that America has refused to rise to the opportunities of leadership in the world.

Consider this recent statement of the London Economist:

If any permanent closer association of Britain and the United States is achieved, an island people of less than 50 millions cannot expect to be the senior partner. . . . The center of gravity and the ultimate decision must increasingly lie in America. We cannot resent this historical development. We may rather feel proud that the cycle of dependence, enmity and independence is coming full circle into a new interdependence.

We Americans no longer have the alibi that we cannot have things the way we want them so far as Great Britain is concerned. With due regard for the varying problems of the members of the British Commonwealth, what we want will be okay with them.

This holds true even for that inspiring proposal called Union Now – a proposal, made by an American, that Britain and the United States should create a new and larger federal union of peoples. That may not be the right approach to our problem. But no thoughtful American has done his duty by the United States of America until he has read and pondered Clarence Streit’s book presenting that proposal.

The big, important point to be made here is simply that the complete opportunity of leadership is ours. Like most great creative opportunities, it is an opportunity enveloped in stupendous difficulties and dangers. If we don’t want it, if we refuse to take it, the responsibility of refusal is also ours, and ours alone.

Admittedly, the future of the world cannot be settled all in one piece. It is stupid to try to blueprint the future as you blueprint an engine or as you draw up a constitution for a sorority. But if our trouble is that we don’t know what we are fighting for, then it’s up to us to figure it out. Don’t expect some other country to tell us. Stop this Nazi propaganda about fighting somebody else’s war. We fight no wars except our wars. “Arsenal of Democracy?” We may prove to be that. But today we must be the arsenal of America and of the friends and allies of America.

Friends and allies of America? Who are they, and for what? This is for us to tell them.

Don Dang or Democracy

…But whose Dong Dang, whose Democracy?

But how can we tell them? And how can we tell ourselves for what purposes we seek allies and for what purposes we fight? Are we going to fight for dear old Danzig or dear old Dong Dang? Are we going to decide the boundaries of Uritania? Or, if we cannot state war aims in terms of vastly distant geography, shall we use some big words like Democracy and Freedom and Justice? Yes, we can use the big words. The President has already used them. And perhaps we had better get used to using them again. Maybe they do mean something – about the future as well as the past.

Some amongst us are likely to be dying for them – on the fields and in the skies of battle. Either that, or the words themselves and what they mean die with us – in our beds.

But is there nothing between the absurd sound of distant cities and the brassy trumpeting of majestic words? And if so, whose Dong Dang and whose Democracy? Is there not something a little more practically satisfying that we can get our teeth into? Is there no sort of understandable program? A program which would be clearly good for America, which would make sense for America – and which at the same time might have the blessing of the Goddess of Democracy and even help somehow to fix up this bothersome matter of Dong Dang? Is there none such? There is. And so we now come squarely and closely face to face with the issue which Americans hate most to face. It is that old, old issue with those old, old battered labels –the issue of Isolationism versus Internationalism.

We detest both words. We spit them at each other with the fury of hissing geese. We duck and dodge them.

Let us face that issue squarely now. If we face it squarely now – and if in facing it we take full and fearless account of the realities of our age – then we shall open the way, not necessarily to peace in our daily lives but to peace in our hearts.

Life is made up of joy and sorrow, of satisfactions and difficulties. In this time of trouble, we speak of troubles. There are many troubles. There are troubles in the field of philosophy, in faith and morals. There are troubles of home and family, of personal life. All are interrelated but we speak here especially of the troubles of national policy. In the field of national policy, the fundamental trouble with America has been, and is, that whereas their nation became in the th Century the most powerful and the most vital nation in the world, nevertheless Americans were unable to accommodate themselves spiritually and practically to that fact. Hence they have failed to play their part as a world power – a failure which has had disastrous consequences for themselves and for all mankind. And the cure is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.


“For such purposes as we see fit” leaves entirely open the question of what our purposes may be or how we may appropriately achieve them. Emphatically our only alternative to isolationism is not to undertake to police the whole world nor to impose democratic institutions on all mankind including the Dalai Lama and the good shepherds of Tibet.

America cannot be responsible for the good behavior of the entire world. But America is responsible, to herself as well as to history, for the world-environment in which she lives. Nothing can so vitally affect America’s environment as America’s own influence upon it, and therefore if America’s envi-ronment is unfavorable to the growth of American life, then America has nobody to blame so deeply as she must blame herself. In its failure to grasp this relationship between America and America’s environment lies the moral and practical bankruptcy of any and all forms of isolationism. It is most unfortunate that this virus of isolationist sterility has so deeply infected an influential section of the Republican Party. For until the Republican Party can develop a vital philosophy and program for America’s initiative and activity as a world power, it will continue to cut itself off from any useful participation in this hour of history. And its participation is deeply needed for the shaping of the future of America and of the world.


But politically speaking, it is an equally serious fact that for seven years Franklin Roosevelt was, for all practical purposes, a complete isolationist. He was more of an isolationist than Herbert Hoover or Calvin Coolidge. The fact that Franklin Roosevelt has recently emerged as an emergency world leader should not obscure the fact that for seven years his policies ran absolutely counter to any possibility of effective American leadership in international co-operation. There is of course a justification which can be made for the President’s first two terms. It can be said, with reason, that great social reforms were necessary in order to bring democracy up-to-date in the greatest of democracies. But the fact is that Franklin Roosevelt failed to make American democracy work successfully on a narrow, materialistic and nationalistic basis. And under Franklin Roosevelt we ourselves have failed to make democracy work successfully. Our only chance now to make it work is in terms of a vital international economy and in terms of an international moral order.

This objective is Franklin Roosevelt’s great opportunity to justify his first two terms and to go down in history as the greatest rather than the last of American Presidents. Our job is to help in every way we can, for our sakes and our children’s sakes, to ensure that Franklin Roosevelt shall be justly hailed as America’s greatest President. Without our help he cannot be our greatest President. With our help he can and will be. Under him and with his leadership we can make isolationism as dead an issue as slavery, and we can make a truly American internationalism something as natural to us in our time as the airplane or the radio.

In 1919 we had a golden opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented in all history, to assume the leadership of the world – a golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial silver platter. We did not understand that opportunity. Wilson mishandled it. We rejected it. The opportunity persisted. We bungled it in the 1920’s and in the confusions of the 1930’s we killed it. To lead the world would never have been an easy task. To revive the hope of that lost opportunity makes the task now infinitely harder than it would have been before. Nevertheless, with the help of all of us, Roosevelt must succeed where Wilson failed.

The 20th Century Is the American Century

…Some facts about our time

Consider the 20th Century. It is not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America’s first century as a dominant power in the world. So far, this century of ours has been a profound and tragic disap- pointment. No other century has been so big with promise for human progress and happiness. And in no one century have so many men and women and children suffered such pain and anguish and bitter death.

It is a baffling and difficult and paradoxical century. No doubt all centuries were paradoxical to those who had to cope with them. But, like everything else, our paradoxes today are bigger and better than ever. Yes, better as well as bigger – inherently better. We have poverty and starvation – but only in the midst of plenty. We have the biggest wars in the midst of the most widespread, the deepest and the most articulate hatred of war in all history. We have tyrannies and dictatorships – but only when democratic idealism, once regarded as the dubious eccentricity of a colonial nation, is the faith of a huge majority of the people of the world.

And ours is also a revolutionary century. The paradoxes make it inevitably revolutionary. Revolutionary, of course, in science and in industry. And also revolutionary, as a corollary in politics and the structure of society. But to say that a revolution is in progress is not to say that the men with either the craziest ideas or the angriest ideas or the most plausible ideas are going to come out on top. The Revolution of 1776 was won and established by men most of whom appear to have been both gentlemen and men of common sense.

Clearly a revolutionary epoch signifies great changes, great adjustments. And this is only one reason why it is really so foolish for people to worry about our “constitutional democracy” without worrying or, better, thinking hard about the world revolution. For only as we go out to meet and solve for our time the problems of the world revolution, can we know how to re-establish our constitutional democracy for another 50 or 100 years.

This 20th Century is baffling, difficult, paradoxical, revolutionary. But by now, at the cost of much pain and many hopes deferred, we know a good deal about it. And we ought to accommodate our outlook to this knowledge so dearly bought. For example, any true conception of our world of the 20th Century must surely include a vivid awareness of at least these four propositions.

First: our world of 2,000,000,000 human beings is for the first time in history one world, fundamentally indivisible. Second: modern man hates war and feels intuitively that, in its present scale and frequency, it may even be fatal to his species. Third: our world, again for the first time in human history, is capable of producing all the material needs of the entire human family. Fourth: the world of the 20th Century, if it is to come to life in any nobility of health and vigor, must be to a significant degree an American Century.

As to the first and second: in postulating the indivisibility of the contemporary world, one does not necessarily imagine that anything like a world state – a parliament of men – must be brought about in this century. Nor need we assume that war can be abolished. All that it is necessary to feel – and to feel deeply – is that terrific forces of magnetic attraction and repulsion will operate as between every large group of human beings on this planet. Large sections of the human family may be effectively organized into opposition to each other. Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space. But Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many peoples.

As to the third point – the promise of adequate production for all mankind, the “more abundant life” – be it noted that this is characteristically an American promise. It is a promise easily made, here and elsewhere, by demagogues and proponents of all manner of slick schemes and “planned economies.” What we must insist on is that the abundant life is predicated on Freedom – on the Freedom which has created its possibility – on a vision of Freedom under Law. Without Freedom, there will be no abundant life. With Freedom, there can be.

And finally there is the belief – shared let us remember by most men living – that the 20th Century must be to a significant degree an American Century. This knowledge calls us to action now.

America’s Vision of Our World

…How it shall be created

What can we say and foresee about an American Century? It is meaningless merely to say that we reject isolationism and accept the logic of internationalism. What internationalism? Rome had a great internationalism. So had the Vatican and Genghis Khan and the Ottoman Turks and the Chinese Emperors and 19th Century England. After the first World War, Lenin had one in mind. Today Hitler seems to have one in mind – one which appeals strongly to some American isolationists whose opinion of Europe is so low that they would gladly hand it over to anyone who would guarantee to destroy it forever. But what internationalism have we Americans to offer?

Ours cannot come out of the vision of any one man. It must be the product of the imaginations of many men. It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people.

In general, the issues which the American people champion revolve around their determination to make the society of men safe for the freedom, growth and increasing satisfaction of all individual men. Beside that resolve, the sneers, groans, catcalls, teeth-grinding, hisses and roars of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry are of small moment.

Once we cease to distract ourselves with lifeless arguments about isolationism, we shall be amazed to discover that there is already an immense American internationalism. American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common. Blindly, unintentionally, accidentally and really in spite of ourselves, we are already a world power in all the trivial ways – in very human ways. But there is a great deal more than that. America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world. Americans –Midwestern Americans – are today the least provincial people in the world. They have traveled the most and they know more about the world than the people of any other country. America’s worldwide experience in commerce is also far greater than most of us realize.

Most important of all, we have that indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership: prestige. And unlike the prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan or 19th Century England, American prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as in the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole American people. We have lost some of that prestige in the last few years. But most of it is still there.


No narrow definition can be given to the American internationalism of the 20th Century. It will take shape, as all civilizations take shape, by the living of it, by work and effort, by trial and error, by enterprise and adventure and experience.

And by imagination!

As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm. And as we come now to the great test, it may yet turn out that in all our trials and tribulations of spirit during the first part of this century we as a people have been painfully apprehending the meaning of our time and now in this moment of testing there may come clear at last the vision which will guide us to the authentic creation of the 20th Century – our Century.


Consider four areas of life and thought in which we may seek to realize such a vision:

First, the economic. It is for America and for America alone to determine whether a system of free economic enterprise – an economic order compatible with freedom and progress – shall or shall not prevail in this century. We know perfectly well that there is not the slightest chance of anything faintly resembling a free economic system prevailing in this country if it prevails nowhere else. What then does America have to decide? Some few decisions are quite simple. For example: we have to decide whether or not we shall have for ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas – the right to go with our ships and our ocean-going airplanes where we wish, when we wish and as we wish. The vision of America as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of Americas [sic] as the dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities. Our thinking of world trade today is on ridiculously small terms. For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred millions a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero – or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year. And the latter are the terms we must think in, or else confess a pitiful impotence.

Closely akin to the purely economic area and yet quite different from it, there is the picture of an America which will send out through the world its technical and artistic skills. Engineers, scientists, doctors, movie men, makers of entertainment, developers of airlines, builders of roads, teachers, educators. Throughout the world, these skills, this training, this leadership is needed and will be eagerly welcomed, if only we have the imagination to see it and the sincerity and good will to create the world of the 20th Century.

But now there is a third thing which our vision must immediately be concerned with. We must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world. It is the manifest duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world who as a result of this worldwide collapse of civilization are hungry and destitute – all of them, that is, whom we can from time to time reach consistently with a very tough attitude toward all hostile governments. For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world – and all the world should know that we have dedicated ourselves to this task. Every farmer in America should be encouraged to produce all the crops he can, and all that we cannot eat – and perhaps some of us could eat less – should forthwith be dispatched to the four quarters of the globe as a free gift, administered by a humanitarian army of Americans, to every man, woman and child on this earth who is really hungry.


But all this is not enough. All this will fail and none of it will happen unless our vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals. We have some things in this country which are infinitely precious and especially American – a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of co-operation. In addition to ideals and notions which are especially American, we are the inheritors of all the great principles of Western civilization – above all Justice, the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity. The other day Herbert Hoover said that America was fast becoming the sanctuary of the ideals of civilization. For the moment it may be enough to be the sanctuary of these ideals. But not for long. It now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.

America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice – out of these elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to which we can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness and vigor and enthusiasm.

Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long – sometimes with more and sometimes with less significance. But this nation, conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man – this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses strongly through its veins from Maine to California the blood of purposes and enterprise and high resolve.

Throughout the 17th Century and the 18th Century and the 19th Century, this continent teemed with manifold projects and magnificent purposes. Above them all and weaving them all together into the most exciting flag of all the world and of all history was the triumphal purpose of freedom. It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to create the first great American Century.

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The Ongoing Trumpist Unmaking of U.S. Network Power: Tariffs, Ambivalence, & the Slow Isolation & Hence Decline

Yes, Henry Luce’s “American Century” is now over. Any further questions? Tariffs tax deterrence; & policy volatility prices U.S. reliability out of potential allies’ long-run planning along both the geostrategic and international globalized value-chain network economy dimensions. When rules wobble, allies reroute—and America’s promises lose compound interest…

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The current exterior situation, deftly summarized by the sharp-witted and observant Andreas Kluth:

Andreas Kluth: America’s Friends Will Never Trust the US Again <https://www.ft.com/content/6ed386e3-642a-4564-bfdd-3db3470656e7>: Trump keeps treating the nation’s allies with such contempt that the consequences will be lasting and ugly…. From Taiwan and the Philippines to Estonia and Germany, no American ally can be sure that Washington, in a pinch, would have its back. Trump’s willful destruction of America’s alliance capital is so self-defeating that it “discombobulates us,” says Graham Allison…. For the sake of argument, ignore factors such as honor, credibility, ideals and values for a moment and think only in terms of realpolitik…. The US’ allies are instead reacting as predicted by… “balance-of-threats”…. They’re forming other trading and security networks, excluding the US to hedge against hostility by Trump or a future president…. Gregory Meeks… “What keeps me up most,” he finally answered, is “whether or not our friends and allies will ever trust the United States again.” The way I heard it, the question was rhetorical. I fear the answer is simple and sad: They won’t…

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This is overstated. But not by much.

This is the geostrategic bottom line: Without credible, rules-based trade and steady alliance signaling, the US forfeits its unique network power, and allies’ rational hedging makes “ever-trust again” less likely each cycle. What follows is a predictable erosion dynamic: when tariffs and export controls feel arbitrary, supply chains reroute; when defense commitments oscillate, capitals draft contingency treaties without Washington; when intelligence sharing becomes politicized, joint planning degrades.

Network power is multiplicative—trust compounds across trade, finance, tech, and security—so shocks don’t just subtract, they divide. As partners internalize counterparty risk, they invest in redundancy and mini‑laterals, reducing U.S. leverage precisely where collective action is decisive against revisionist powers. Rebuilding requires transparent rules, institutional ballast, and consistent signaling over time; absent that, each episode of unpredictability deepens the discount rate allies apply to American promises, turning doubt into structure rather than merely keeping it at mood.

​⁠It is unclear what form the human social practice of superpower cold and hot war will take in the rest of the 2000s.

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Abstraction Layers: In Arithmetic & Elsewhere

Counting to 84 by offshoring much of the real work to your information-technology ASI arabic-numeral symbolic copilot, and other topics about variation in proper education for the kind of numeroliteracy worthwhile to help you function in society over the past 5000 years…

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Let us try to think, once again, about: the real ASI, we East African Plains Apes of (relatively) little brain, and our ability by drawing on the real ASI to apply the massive mental force multipliers that we call abstraction layers.

Cast your mind back five thousand years to the days of Gilgamesh, 2/3 god and 1/3 man, King of Uruk-the-Sheepfold. Climb the walls of Uruk, walk their length, survey their foundations, and study the brickwork. Is it not all made of solidly-crafted oven-baked bricks? Did not the Seven Sages lay the cornerstone? Two thousand acres for the city! Two thousand acres for the orchards! Two thousand acres for the pits of brick-clay! And one-thousand acres for the Temple of Ishtar! At peace is the city of Uruk protected by its wall. Prosperous are its people, well-provided with tools of bronze made of tin from Afghanistan and copper from Jordan well-mixed, well-fed on grain and mutton, well-clothed in wool and linen, well-housed by skilled builders.

Imagine that you are one of the understewards of King Gilgamesh, in charge of informing the cooks who are to prepare the feast for the climax of the Great Festival of Ishtar—the one in which Ishtar demonstrates that Gilgamesh is still he upon whom her favor rests. You need to tell the cooks about the sheep that they are going to roast. Fifteen sheep have arrived from the north, forty-three from the west, twenty-six from the south, and there is report that the barbarian of Elam have stolen those that were supposed to come from the east.

How do you figure out what to tell the cooks? You need to count the sheep.

The most straightforward way would be to send a shepherd, a numerate intern, plus a couple of laborers with mobile fence-sections and a gate out to the sheepfold where the sheep are. Have the shepherd drive the sheep into one corner of the sheepfold, have the laborers set up the mobile fence and the gate across the corral, let the shepherd drive the sheep one-by-one through the gate into the other half of the corral, and have the intern count them as they pass, and then report the total number as eighty-four, plus include in his report notations on the individual characteristics of the sheep, where those are thought to be at all likely to be relevant to the jobs of the cooks.

Or—provided you trust the reports of the sheep-drivers, you could use what we call arabic numerals cognitive addition technology, thus:

15 + 43 + 26
= (10 + 5) + (40 + 3) + (20 + 6)
= (10 +40 +20) + (5 + 3 + 6)
= (1 x 10 + 4 x 10 + 2 x 10) + 14
= (1 + 4 + 2) x 10 + (1 x 10) + 4
= (1 + 4 + 2 + 1) x 10 + 4
= 8 x 10 + 4
= 84

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The same eighty-four.

No need for shepherd, numerate intern, laborers, mobile fence-sections, gate, and—upstream in the production process—woodcutters and carpenters. Just you at your table with your clay tablet and your stylus. With your stylus and your ability to draw on and utilize the arabic numerals cognitive addition technology that is in the possession of the ASI, the Anthology Super-Intelligence which actually exists and which gives you your meal-ticket by virtue of your ability to interface with it. (Never you mind that we are 4300 years anachronistic here.) OH NOES!!!! JOB DESTRUCTION! (Or, maybe, the woodcutters and carpenters could make other also useful things, the shepherd could perform an extra health check on the flock, the laborers could be put to work storing beer, and the intern could goof off.)

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: Why Gillian Tett's Anthropological Take on the World Is Very Useful

Why you should listen to her; a N2PE event from 2021-11-18 Th…

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Social-science interdisciplinary centers—like the Berkeley Center for Science, Technology, Medicine, & Society, which hosted “The AI Con” book event I went to yesterday—gain perspective and insight from the multiple frameworks and toolkits that people trained in different social-science traditions bring to the problem. Yesterday I was annoyed by the absence of an economist with the economics toolkit from the event, and I vented:

But there was another social-science perspective that was absent: the perspective of the anthropologist. So let me hoist from the archives my (expanded) notes and drafts for, and a few of my an Gillian Tett’s responses, from an N2PE Berkeley event from back in 2021:

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Why Gillian Tett’s Anthropological Take on þe World Is Very Useful

Why you should listen to her; a N2PE event from 2021-11-18 Th…

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N2PE: Gillian Tett (@gilliantett) Discusses Her New Book “Anthro-Vision: A New Way to See in Business & Life”. Amid severe digital disruption, economic upheaval, and political flux, how can we make sense of the world? Leaders today typically look for answers in economic models, Big Data, or artificial intelligence platforms. Gillian Tett will discuss her new book that points to anthropology—the study of human culture. Anthropologists learn to get inside the minds of other people, helping them not only to understand other cultures but also to appraise their own environment with fresh perspective as an insider-outsider, gaining lateral vision. Moderated by Brad DeLong (@delong) with Comments from Julia Sizek (@JuliaSizek). RSVP for Zoom Link: <https://t.co/D7jbqQ1KL4 https://t.co/BO2v3Tk37v> <

https://twitter.com/N2PENetwork/status/1461061581685460998

>

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My Proposed Intro: One of the cheesier and more adolescent of the sub-genres of science fiction I must admit I still read what is one in which some plucky human hero is confronted with an anthology intelligence: millions of organisms, each of them small and mindless on its own, yet somehow adding up to a human or more than human intelligence with Ailien and hard-to-understand belief and purposes.

But it is we humans who, looked at collectively, are this alien anthology intelligence.

Due to our extraordinary propensity to gossip, what one of us knows—or rather believes—pretty soon all of us know—or, rather can believe. Alone, each of us is nearly totally incompetent at managing our environment: put one of us out naked and alone even in as green and pleasant a land is the home counties of England, and he or she would be likely to die. But assemble us and allow us to form a division of labor, and we can undertake mighty works of nature manipulation to challenge the gods. Certainly that extremely large red-bearded guy with serious anger-management problems, that guy who likes to drink and whose hammer is the lightning called “Thor”, has nothing over us.

But in order to become an anthology communicative intelligence, we have to share not only a language but also an underlying mental map of how the universe works. And in order to become an anthology productive intelligence, we have to have trust in others—that you do your and they do their part in the division of labor, and then that the products of labor by hand and brain will in fact be shared. But how do you extend a language and a mental map beyond a very few people who have grown up together“? And how do you extend trust that your part in the division of labor will be reciprocated beyond your close kin and immediate neighbors?

What happens when we extend our division of labor from our immediate circle of neighbors and kin to encompass all 8 billion of us—that is the province of economics.

What happens when we construct at least semi-shared mental maps so that communication can succeed—that is the province of sociology.

What happens when our anthology intelligence attempt reflection on its purposes and structure—that is the province of political science.

But the processes by which we do these—those are the domains of anthropology, which is in this sense the ur-social science on top of which all else is built.

So let us pay attention this afternoon to Gillian Tett, of the tribes of the Financial Times and of the anthropology community, author of the very recently published Anthro-Vision: How Anthropology Can Explain Business and Life <https://www.amazon.com/Anthro-Vision-Anthropology-Explain-Business-Life/dp/1847942881/>.

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Notes on the Berkeley "The AI Con" Book Launch Event

2025-10-02 16:00 PDT (Th): 470 Stephens Hall: Massimo Mazzotti, Morgan Ames, Alex Hanna, Khari Johnson, Tamara Kneese, & Timnit Gebru. The AI Con Book Roundtable…

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So I went to see:

  • Mazzotti, Massimo, Morgan Ames, Alex Hanna, Khari Johnson, Tamara Kneese, & Timnit Gebru. 2025. “The AI Con Book Roundtable.” Center for Science, Technology, Medicine & Society (CSTMS); University of California, Berkeley, October 2, 4:00–5:30 pm, 470 Stephens Hall. <https://cstms.berkeley.edu/events/the-ai-con-book-roundtable/>.

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Lots of interesting and true things were said. And I love the podcast of the book’s authors Emily Bender and Alex Hanna, “Mystery AI Hype Theater 3000” <https://www.dair-institute.org/maiht3k/>. And I have the book, and am going to read it straight through REAL SOON NOW. And we all owe a great cognitive debt to Emily Bender & al. (2021) <https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922> for coining the viral meme “stochastic parrots” as a metaphorical description of GPT LL MAMLMs—General-Purpose Transformer Large-Language Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Models.

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But I came away very frustrated.

Why? Because there was a huge hole at the center of the panel discussion.

The hole? The hole was the near-complete absence of a description or a view of what “AI” is. There was great agreement on what it was not:

  • not a set of Turing-Class software entities,

  • not a research program that would lead to the construction of Turing-Class software entities,

  • and especially not something that would lead in short order to the creation of the DIGITAL GOD that is “ASI”—Artificial Super-Intelligence.

But very little on what it is. There was, if I recall correctly, one reference to “stochastic parrots”. There were two to “synthetic text extrusion machines”. There was one call I wholeheartedly endorse—there is a reason I write “MAMLM” rather than the wishful mnemonic “AI”—to, roughly (this isn’t a quore): break the spell, break the myth… [by] replac[ing] cases where they say ‘AI’ with ‘matrix manipulations’ instead, and how does that change how you think about it…

But that was pretty much it.

That, to me, does not cut it.

Yes, the AI hype boom is ludicrous and delusional. Yes, the castles in the air are insubstantial things made up of clouds in accidental arrangement.

But, still, there are signs and wonders on this earth.

There are real technologies being developed and deployed. There are things happening that have triggered and reinforced the very trange beliefs we see around us, beliefs that end with:

  • a remarkably large number of people whose judgment in daily life navigating our society seems quite good, but who now fervently believe that they are going to build DIGITAL GOD within the decade

  • a smaller but still remarkably large number of people who have societal power to commit hundreds of billions of dollars of real resources to enterprises, and have decided to commit them to the AI hype bubble build-out.

Thus it seems to me that there is one most important task for an AI-skeptic today. That is to explain what “AI” is, since we, or at least me and my karass, think we know what it is not, to help us see better why this is happening. What are those signs and wonders on this earth, really? What are the possible true ways of characterizing the technologies being developed and deployed? To lament that people are falling for the hype and wrong to do so is not, to my mind, sufficiently enlightening.

So I tried to provoke. I asked a question. This, below, is not my question, but rather an expanded version that I wish I had said:

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Perhaps the most useful thing I can do now is to attempt to channel my friend Cosma Shalizi of Carnegie Mellon. He is one of the crankiest advocates I know of the “Gopnikist” line that these are distributed socio-cultural info technologies, and that the entire hype cycle is indeed extremely delusional. He views someone like an Eliezer Yudkowsky saying “shut this now or it will kill us all!” as the equivalent of someone raving about how library card catalogues must be placed inside steel cages RIGHT NOW lest they go feral. And he is equally dimissive of the other side of the doomer/boomer coin—that pairing was one of the great things about the book The AI Con, by the way. Consider Travis Kalanik boasting that his conversations with Claude have led him to the point of being about to make fundamental discoveries in physics.

Nevertheless, it is astonishing that this roiling boil of linear algebra can come as close as it can to genuinely passing the Turing Test. I mean, “It’s Just Kernel Smoothing” and “It’s Just a Markov Model” vs. “You Can Do That with Just Kernel Smoothing and a Markov Model!?!” The results are very impressive! And they were very unexpected!

Really old in ML dog-years are kernel smoothing in general. Really old in ML dog-years are Markov models for language.

But this!

What is it? It’s sorta like Google Pagerank, producing the next word a typical internet sposter would say in response to a prompt rather than the link a typical internet sposter would create in response to the keywords. It is definitely not a software entity carrying out human-level human-like thought. It’s is definiely not an embryonic DIGITAL GOD that just needs four more Moore’s Law-like doubling-cycles before it is too smart for us, and gets us all to do its bidding. It is not something that is going to get us all to do its bidding by flattering us. It is not something that is going to get us all to do its bidding by threatening us. It is not something that is going to get us all to do its bidding by hypnotizing us via its Waifu Ani avatar.

But it is definitely a something!

So what is it?

I need to know what is it before I can start to make sense of the hype cycle and the hype cycle’s remarkable persistence. I need an explanation of why people like Mark Zuckerberg have suddenly switched and become one of the chief boomer hypesters. Zuckerberg was pursuing a more cautious, open-source road. He had been having his organization build a natural-language interface to Facebook and Instagram that was good enough. He had been open-sourcing the core of LLaMa. Why? So that others would be unable to greatly monetize their own foundation models to fund the construction of competing social networks that might destroy his platform-monopoly profit flow. But then, in two months, he became the boomerest of boomer hypesters, the one who is going to spend more money than anyone else on ASI, on DIGITAL GOD.

What are he and others seeing in these GPT LLM MAMLMs that leads to these courses of action?

And the responses I got did not seem to me to hit the nail.

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: The Music to the Zombie Dance of Human Society Changes Its Key...

From 2.5 years ago. Time to start thinking about this, again, and about what I would change, and will change as versions of this go into both What Rough Beast & Enlarging the Scope of Human Empire. Algorithmic info-bio tech replacing globalized value-chain, which replaced mass-production, which replaced applied-science, which replaced steampower, which replaced imperial-commercial, which replaced mediæval, which replaced classical-ancient modes of production; but “production” is too narrow—say, rather, modes of production & distribution & communication & domination...

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<https://braddelong.substack.com/p/e-zombie-dance-of-human-society-changes>

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A very interesting piece thinking about how we should think about understanding our changing and strange society, as we rapidly move into the Info-Biotech Age:

A modern machine-learning model presenting a human face via supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with human feedback

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Henry Farrell & Cosma Shalizi: Artificial Intelligence Is a Familiar-Looking Monster: ‘”Shoggoth[im]”... artificial servants that rebelled against their creators.... We’ve lived among shoggoth[im] for centuries... “the market system”, “bureaucracy” and even “electoral democracy”.... Enormous, impersonal distributed systems of information-processing that transmute the seething chaos of our collective knowledge into useful simplifications....

[1] Hayek argued, any complex economy has to somehow make use of a terrifyingly large body of disorganised and informal “tacit knowledge” about supply and exchange.... The price mechanism... summarise[s] this knowledge and make[s] it actionable. A maker of car batteries doesn’t need to understand the particulars of lithium-processing. They just need to know how much lithium costs, and what they can do with it.

[2] Likewise... Scott... bureaucracies are monsters of information... excreting a thin slurry of abstract categories that rulers use to “see” the world.... Markets and states... inimical to individuals who lose their jobs to economic change or get entangled in the suckered coils of bureaucratic decisions... incapable of caring if they crush the powerless or devour the virtuous....

[3] It is in this sense that LLMs are shoggoth[im]... [Gopnik] “cultural technologies” which reorganise and noisily transmit human knowledge... wear more human-seeming masks than markets and bureaucracies, but they are no more or less beyond our control. We would be better off figuring out what will happen... than weaving dark fantasies about how they will rise up against us....

Weitzman... planned economies might use... “separating hyperplanes” to adapt.... Machine learning can find such hyperplanes.... LLMs might give bureaucrats new tools for adjudicating complex situations... summarise complex regulations or provide recommendations about how to apply them to novel situations.... LLMs don’t leave paper trails. But that might not stop their deployment.... Researchers talk about substituting LLMs for opinion polls.... You can interrogate LLMs more dynamically....

The modern world has been built by and within monsters, which crush individuals without remorse or hesitation, settling their bulk heavily on some groups, and feather-light on others. We eke out freedom by setting one against another, deploying bureaucracy to limit market excesses, democracy to hold bureaucrats accountable, and markets and bureaucracies to limit democracy’s monstrous tendencies. How will the newest shoggoth change the balance, and which politics might best direct it to the good? We need to start finding out. …

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What is my take on this—on how we are constrained, and thus alienated, by alien powers that we do not understand, cannot control, and that are cold and indifferent to us even though they are the products of our own minds and are, in fact, composed of our own individual human actions as they are patterned by our societal institutions and our cultural practices?

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Let me take a step back, and take the long view of human history. Start 750,000 years ago:

Joseph Henrich: The Secret of Our Success: ‘Between the Golan Heights and the Galilee mountains… Gesher Benot Ya’aqov… 750,000 years ago…. Hearths and areas for both stone-tool manufacturing and food processing… fire and… hand axes, cleavers, blades, knives, awls, scrapers, and choppers… [of] flint, basalt, and limestone, [with] tool manufacture… done on-site, often from giant slabs carried in from a distant quarry by a team… [and] us[ing]… levers as part of the quarrying process. The basalt is of the highest quality and well quarried, suggesting that someone had a storehouse of know-how…. The inhabitants…also, somehow, obtained freshwater crabs, turtles, reptiles, and at least nine types of fish, including carp, sardines, and catfish…. There were seeds, acorns, olives, grapes, nuts, water chestnuts, and various other fruits… includ[ing] the submerged prickly water lily…. Cumulative cultural evolution is up and running at this point, generating more know-how than you, me, or our lost European Explorers could have ginned up in a lifetime…. In the next 300,000 years… Homo erectus changed sufficiently, including a brain expansion to 1200 cm3, to justify a new species name, Homo heidelbergensis… projectile weapons, including wooden throwing spears with stone points… a variety of techniques for producing stone blades… consistent within sites or populations but did vary between populations. Distinct tool traditions and composite tools that exploited natural glues weren’t far behind…

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By 750,000 years ago the homo erectus version of the East African Plains Ape—that is, us—had become a limited time-binding anthology intelligence. As long as it could be transmitted through culture, what one person in the band of fifty or so knew, everyone else could learn. Moreover, what one ancestor had known or what one member of a neighboring band knew, if it were useful and if it could be incorporated into the culture, the entire band could learn. And in addition, there was the division of labor, so that every East African Plains Ape did not have to learn everything—which, of course, nobody could. We as an anthology intelligence were very smart and knowledgeable. We as individual East African Plains Apes were pretty dumb. We still are. Even today, with our brains of 1400 ml twice as large as those of homo erectus, we are lucky if we can remember in the morning where we had left our keys last night.

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Time passed. Evolution—biological and cultural—continued. Language emerged, a truly powerful force multiplier raising the thought capabilities of the anthology intelligence that was a human group to an exponential degree. We spread out all over the world, and our population grew, and grew denser. And our means of communication and interaction to enable the anthology intelligence to think and to construct a productive division of labor became more complicated, and more varied.

More-or-less in order, we developed the productive (and unproductive) anthology intelligence-intensification communication technologies of:

  • Language

  • Writing

  • Printing

  • Mass media

  • Social media

  • Algorithmic feeds

And we developed the social-organization cultural technologies of:

  • Dominance

  • Prestige

  • Reciprocal gift-exchange

  • Redistribution

  • Propaganda

  • Charisma

  • Honor

  • Market economy (which is something much more than reciprocity)

  • Bureaucracy (which is something much more than redistribution)

  • Algorithmic classification

That is the latest stage of our cultural evolution, with modern Machine Learning being the current fullest flowering of the societal-organization cultural technology of the algorithm, for both information and communication—determining what each individual not-so-smart East African Plains Ape will see and hear—and for classification—determining what each individual not-so-smart East African Plains Ape will have in the way of resources and be constrained with respect to his or her potential actions.

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How to make sense of this? One way would be to think in terms of modes: modes of communication, production, distribution, and, yes, domination, as human history proceeds:

  • Hunter-Gatherer (-10000)

  • Tribal-Agricultural (-5000)

  • Bronze Age (-3000)

  • Classical-Ancient (-500)

  • Mediæval (1000)

  • Imperial-Commercial (1600)

  • Steampower (1880)

  • Applied-Science (1915)

  • Mass-Production (1950)

  • Global Value-Chain (1990)

  • Info-Biotech (2025)

With each mode generating a different set of possibilities for the kinds of societies that can be built on top of it. And, moreover, things are massively complicated by the fact that different modes overlap—within countries and, much more, around the globe. America today, for example, is an overlapping mix of Info-Biotech, Global Value-Chain, and Mass Production modes. And in the world—well, there are still people, close to a billion of them, whose lives are underpinned by a combination of the modes all the way back to the mode that was characteristic of the Imperial-Commercial Age of around the year 1600.

Oh, this is the overarching framework into which I would put what Farrell and Shalizi (and Henrich, and Gopnik, and Scott, and von Hayek) were, and are, trying to do.

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I do have one (and only one) substantial criticism of how Farrell and Shalizi are presenting the issues: they are pessimistic. They, mostly, fear our shoggothim that we have constructed, and that have escaped our control. They fear them as threats to our ability to be free through the constraints they impose on us, and as things that crush us in their unconcern. That is a third of the story. But there are another two-thirds. They massively empower us, individually and collectively, in that they make us collectively so productive. And they massively empower us, individually and collectively, in that they make us collectively so intelligent.

A decade ago both Farrell and Shalizi quoted Francis Spufford on the underlying problem and our vain dreams for a solution:

Marx had drawn a nightmare picture of what happened to human life under capitalism, when everything was produced only in order to be exchanged; when true qualities and uses dropped away, and the human power of making and doing itself became only an object to be traded. Then the makers and the things made turned alike into commodities, and the motion of society turned into a kind of zombie dance, a grim cavorting whirl in which objects and people blurred together till the objects were half alive and the people were half dead. Stock-market prices acted back upon the world as if they were independent powers, requiring factories to be opened or closed, real human beings to work or rest, hurry or dawdle; and they, having given the transfusion that made the stock prices come alive, felt their flesh go cold and impersonal on them, mere mechanisms for chunking out the man-hours. Living money and dying humans, metal as tender as skin and skin as hard as metal, taking hands, and dancing round, and round, and round, with no way ever of stopping; the quickened and the deadened, whirling on. … And what would be the alternative? The consciously arranged alternative? A dance of another nature, Emil presumed. A dance to the music of use, where every step fulfilled some real need, did some tangible good, and no matter how fast the dancers spun, they moved easily, because they moved to a human measure, intelligible to all, chosen by all…

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And Cosma Shalizi noted:

Marx did not sufficiently appreciate [that] human beings confront all the structures which emerge from our massed interactions in this way. A bureaucracy… even a thoroughly democratic polity… can… be just as much of a cold monster…. We have no choice but to live among these alien powers which we create…. What we can do is try to find the specific ways in which these powers we have conjured up are hurting us, and use them to check each other, or deflect them into better paths.

Sometimes this will mean more use of market… sometimes… removing some… from market allocation… sometimes… expanding… democratic decision-making…. Sometimes… narrowing its scope (for instance, not allowing the demos to censor speech it finds objectionable)…. sometimes… leaving some tasks to experts… sometimes… recognizing claims of expertise to be mere assertions of authority… complex problems, full of messy compromises. Attaining even second best solutions is going to demand “bold, persistent experimentation”, coupled with a frank recognition that many experiments will just fail, and that even long-settled compromises can, with the passage of time, become confining obstacles…

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This process Shalizi calls for is, as I wish I had said in my big book (which you all should buy), our process of Slouching Towards Utopia.

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No. There Are No Even Half-Competent Chaos Monkeys in the Trump Administration. Any Questions?

Bessent needs to go. And quickly. Dan Drezner said last week that one good thing that could be said about Scott Bessent was that he was 10% less crazy than the other Trumpist chaos monkeys. Scott Bessent’s response?: “Hold my beer!” Stating that the U.S. will pay the piper but that Javier Milei will call the tune and that U.S. financial support for Argentina is “unconditional” may well be the most unprofessional thing I have ever heard a Treasury Secretary say…

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Smart. We may not have an Exchange Stabilization Fund left by this time next year:

Brad Setser & Stephen Paduano: Other people’s money, and the problem with Mileism <https://www.ft.com/content/5f4bb8d6-e93c-4bf0-b0ae-f459255eb8c7: ‘The US Treasury needs to get Argentina on a better policy path before it blows through the Exchange Stabilization Fund…. Javier Milei has taken a chainsaw to his own government’s spending, but he has shown no objections to tapping the public funds of others…. Milei’s fiscal adjustment hasn’t improved Argentina’s external position. Instead, Milei’s affection for a strong peso — intended to be an inflation anchor — has led to a deterioration in Argentina’s trade accounts and an erosion of Argentina’s reserves. That is how he ended up selling down Argentina’s limited remaining reserves and calling the US over the weekend for a new lifeline.

The US rescue loan is now in the works. But unless it comes with a condition that Argentina allow for exchange rate flexibility, it is likely that Milei will return to the foxhole, praying again for other people’s money…. Secretary Bessent said that US support would be unconditional. That is, for lack of a kinder word, unique. Past Treasury lifelines have come with extensive conditionality, intrusive scrutiny, and pledged resources for repayment….

The functional dollar liquidity of the ESF is tiny: $21.9bn in liquid dollar securities… $3.5bn in yen and $2.2bn in Euros… but that is it…. A $20bn swap facility would consume 95 per cent of the US’s dollar reserves and 72 per cent of the US’s total foreign-currency reserves…. The Treasury… [could] swap… SDRs for dollars with the Federal Reserve… [via] clever financial alchemy, but [that is] not a route an SDR-phobic administration would want to go down in any but the most exceptional circumstances…. [And] the ESF is… not set up to be a long-term lender…. [It] can extend credit for [only] six months in a 12 month window without procedural and political hurdles…

Despite Milei’s tough talk, he has taken Argentina dangerously off track of its IMF programme…. Treasury cannot afford for Argentina to miss its policy targets and blow through this swap line as easily…. Moving forward with the swap line in the absence of clear reserve accumulation targets and a clear repayment source would be a policy error. To do it right will almost certainly require abandoning the peso’s current peg, and a reworked IMF programme built around a much weaker peso…

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I do not really have any disagreements with Setser and Paduano. All I can do is to try to put their major points, explicit and implicit, into nice bite-sized talking points. Except for (10). Setser and Paduano do not go there. But it is true, and needs to be said:

  1. ​⁠The simplest test: does support raise net reserves and secure repayment? If not, it’s subsidy, not stabilization. This commitment doesn’t.

  2. Markets reward credible paths to reserves and current‑account surplus; they punish peg‑defense with thin firepower without fundamentals reform.

  3. Declarations of unconditional ESF support weakens leverage; conditionality is the price discipline that averts moral hazard.

  4. Exchange‑rate flexibility is not optional; a too‑strong peso erodes reserves and worsens the external balance.

  5. Without an FX market that clears, even severe fiscal cuts won’t fix the dollar shortage; macro anchors must align. ​⁠

  6. Stabilization must start with a devaluation large enough to create a visibly undervalued peso.​⁠

  7. That is how Mexico 1995 worked, after depreciation and hard conditions; replicating success means targets, vetoes, and pledged repayment sources.

  8. The political timing magnifies risk: elections raise defense temptations; conditionality must pre‑commit against burn‑rate panics. ​⁠

  9. IMF–Treasury coordination is existential; policy drift risks sidelining the Fund and damaging preferred‑creditor norms.

  10. A Treasury Secretary who has pledged “unconditional support” for a country in an exchange rate crisis because of its commitment to an unsustainable peg is useless, and needs to resign. If he follows through on his word, he likely transfers all of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund to currency traders willing to make the Soros Bet. If he doesn’t follow through on this word, then no statements of his are ever credible—and a Treasury Secretary whose statements are not credible is worse than useless. Bessent needs to go. And quickly.


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Lisa Cook Is Not Yet Evicted from the Federal Reserve Board

It was such a huge mistake in 2021 not to expand the Supreme Court. The lawless Republican justices had already said who they were: lawless partisan hypocrites. And yet Manchin and company would not listen. That may have been one of the key failures that future historians will say ended American democracy as we had known it…

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Unexplained lawlessness at the Supreme Court continues. The ruling principle is now: Trump wins rapidly when he cares enough to double-down on the issue, except in the case of the Federal Reserve, where he does not win rapidly, but we will not say anything more than that:

Steve Vladeck: <https://bsky.app/profile/stevevladeck.bsky.social/post/3m25bwr237224>: ‘#BREAKING: #SCOTUS punts in the Lisa Cook case, deferring resolution of Trump’s emergency application seeking to remove Cook from the Federal Reserve Board pending argument on the application in January 2026:

One word of caution to those viewing this as a big win for Cook: This will be the fifth argument #SCOTUS has heard on an application since 1971; in each of the previous four (all since 2022), the applicant *won.* Letting Cook keep her job for now won’t stop the Court from ruling against her later. To be clear, this is a much better sign for Cook than we’ve seen in any of the *other* removal cases. But the notion that letting her stay on the Board for now necessarily defeats the government’s irreparable harm argument is belied by the Court’s behavior in, e.g., the birthright citizenship cases…. This isn’t a grant of relief. So far, this is following the same path as the birthright citizenship cases. And we know how those ended…

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How is this different from any of the other removal cases. It isn’t. A Supreme Court that was an umpire—that called balls and strikes—would say: in all removal cases Trump’s dismissals are properly enjoined, because Humphrey’s Executor is good law right now, and whatever you think of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s power to rule and make and unmake law from the bench, that making and unmaking has not yet happened, and so does not cast a shadow backward in time to the present.

Yet that principle controls only in Lisa Cook’s case. In every other one, the controlling principle is: Trump cares to double-down, so he wins rapidly—and lower courts had better quickly get a clue that that is the program. Legitimate judicial reasons why Lisa Cook’s case is different? None.

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So Far We Would Only Expect Islands, Not Continents, & Even Those Knee-Deep Swamps of "WorkSlop"

A Wednesday Morning Take on Why We Would Have Expected to See Business-AI Enthusiasts Disappointed at This Stage: The dynamo, the computer, & now today’s GPT (this use; General-Purpose Transformers) LLM MAMLMs: “workslop” is not new, GPTs (this use: General-Purpose Technologies) pay out only after complementary investments & organizational change, for the gains come with redesigned work flows—governance, roles, and standards—not those that still use old pipes, plus add platform moats maintained by angry Leviathans: I see seven reasons not to have expected things to work out, so far, much differently than they have…

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Gary Marcus makes a catch:

Gary Marcus: Why is the ROI on Generative AI so poor? <https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/why-is-the-roi-on-generative-ai-so>: ‘Excerpt from a new study from BetterUp labs and researchers at Stanford: “So much activity, so much enthusiasm, so little return. Why? In collaboration with Stanford Social Media Lab, our research team at BetterUp Labs has identified one possible reason: Employees are using AI tools to create low-effort, passable looking work that ends up creating more work for their coworkers. On social media, which is increasingly clogged with low-quality AI-generated posts, this content is often referred to as “AI slop.” In the context of work, we refer to this phenomenon as “workslop.” We define workslop as Al generated work content that masquerades as good work, but lacks the substance to meaningfully advance a given task…”… [Plus:] ““Of 1,150 U.S.-based full-time employees across industries, 40% report having received workslop in the last month”. Just think how high that percentage can go!…

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What do I think of this? I think it confuses things but tangling seven different threads into a single ball of yarn. They are different things, and need to be distinguished:

(1) White‑collar work is acquiring, filtering, processing, and outputting information. When tools boost output volume without raising signal, they tax the system: more to scan, triage, reconcile, and discard. We have seen this: email’s firehose, the web’s sources, Slack’s atomized threads, dashboards about dashboards. Generative AI adds drafts, summaries, and “insights” that look polished but are thin, duplicative, or off‑task. A product team gets five “AI‑assisted” market summaries weekly, each wrong about competitor pricing. A finance group receives daily “insights” that restate filings without analysis. Attention does not scale with content; cognitive load rises nonlinearly as options multiply and coordination costs mount. Without gatekeeping, standards, and workflow redesign—schemas, editorial layers, curated repositories, incentives for fewer but better outputs—the marginal document lowers productivity by adding acquisition and filtering work. Think plumbing, not magic: a poorly tuned pump increases flow and turbulence, reducing pressure at the point of use. You would not expect a one-for-one benefit in terms of the output of the system, not at all.

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Does Each of Us Have a Big Enough Brain to Compensate for Our Lack of Fangs, Claws, Sprinting Speed, & Dodging Quickness?

I say: “No”. Not individually we don’t. The Scarecrow in “The Wizard of Oz” had a greatly exaggerated view of what he would have been able to do if he only had a brain…

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There is a shlock TV show, on the Discovery Channel, called “Naked & Afraid”.

In it, two humans are dropped into a wilderness somewhere, naked, with one and only one piece of technology each (usually something like a knife, a fire starter, or a fishing line). All around them are other mammals doing their mammal thing: living their lives, reproducing their populations, evolving to fit whatever niche they have found where they are. But the two humans dropped by themselves (well, they are surrounded by cameramen, sound technician, drivers, logistical support, and such who do not help and who stay out of the field of view) do not. Instead, the humans proceed, not too slowly, to start starving to death.

I am not being figurative or metaphorical here. Look:

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This is outdoorswoman Melissa Miller of Fenton, Michigan—Pure Michigan Melissa, Melissa Backwoods <https://melissabackwoods.com/>, across a time span of 21 days.

Melissa Miller is an expert on wilderness education and survival skills. She was dropped into the Ecuadorian Amazon with a fishing line and a partner, Chance Davis, with a knife. Over her 21 days in the jungle she lost 17 pounds: a daily metabolic deficit of about 2800 calories.

Given her likely BMR of 1500 calories, that is quite a feat.

Had she simply hunkered down and fasted, burning little energy other than her BMR, we would have expected to see a nine‑pound weight loss from burning fat. Trying to find food and avoid becoming food cost her an extra eight pounds, roughly, plus or minus.

As she described the physical stress:

Melissa Miller (2018): Naked & Afraid Weight Loss & Health Effects <https://melissabackwoods.com/naked-afraid-effects/>: ‘My hands were riddled with thorns and burn marks. We kept the fire steady the entire trip, building a mo[a]t… around it to elevate it from heavy rainfall. We also utilized a technique in which we created an oven to continually burn wet dead logs as there was no dry wood available. In order to create fire I had to construct a platform to dry out palm fibers and palm grasses for two days before I could get a tinder bundle to ignite successfully. Before that we had to ward off mosquitoes at night by covering ourselves [with] clay and mud. We prevented ants from entering our shelter area by covering the ground with thick ash from the fire…

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Back in civilization, Ms. Miller needed significant medical attention, as she rapidly regained her weight, to deal with the:

  • fungus growing underneath fingernails and toenails.

  • under weight BMI.

  • severely infected bug bites, 4 that resulted in abscess growth, surgically extracted.

  • hundreds of thorns in feet and hands (result of the spiny palm trees that littered the ground in the amazon)…

Moreover, the constestants are naked, and may well be afraid, but they are not alone. In post-show interviews, they report:

  • On‑site medics and IVs, with medics rehydrating contestants with IV saline for severe dehydration and food poisoning.​⁠

  • Field safety rangers and plant ID checks, with a ~20‑person crew plus rangers on location to confirm plant identifications to prevent poisoning.​⁠

  • Medical tent and controlled supplies, on site, with accounts of contestants obtaining (or stealing) food/electrolytes from crew/medic areas during extreme calorie deficits. ​⁠ ​⁠​⁠

  • Rapid medevac, when injuries or infections surpass on‑site care.

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And Melissa Miller’s partner, Chance Davis? He lost nearly twice as much weight as she did: 32 pounds over 21 days.

A former U.S. Army Ranger, he did not have the 17 pounds of fat to lose.

And as a bigger human he had a higher BMR.

You need to burn 3 lbs. of muscle to get the caloric energy you can get from burning 1 lb. of fat. The experience of caloric deprivation without sufficient fat resources seriously messed with his head. And not just in a “in life, we have support—friends, family, podcasts, coffee, sugar—without those, you’re outside yourself; when I get hungry, I get angry” way. Instead, in this way:

The worst part was being hungry. Long-term hunger plays with your psyche. After the show, hunger made me physically reactive and angry. I carried food stashes in my pockets and car. I gained 70 pounds in a month because I couldn’t stop eating—I didn’t want to be hungry. A big scoop of peanut butter sticks in your throat; you feel full—the taste, texture, sweetness. That’s what I wanted. Creamy or crunchy? Doesn’t matter—they’re all heaven…

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As I said: the experience seriously messed with his head, and made his body and brain desperate to build up fat reserves just in case something like that were going to happen again. The body and the brain had learned: even with the knife and fishing line that kept them from being completely naked, individual brains, even knowledgeable ones, are not going to be enough against the daily caloric math of the wilderness.

Meanwhile, back in the Ecuadorian Amazon, the other mammals were doing fine.

It was homo sapiens that floundered.

Recognize this: Melissa Miller is not some nature-shy city mouse. She started out as a outdoors educator and a nature-preserve naturalist, as a university-level wilderness teacher with a magna cum laude B.A. from the University of Michigan: primitive trapping, fire-making, native fishing methods, plant identification, tracking, wild foods, nature appreciation, and survival, with blades and their uses as her principal focus. The type of person who would put up YouTube videos demonstrating how to start a fire with a bow-drill, and how to catch turtles (for eating) in Michigan lakes:

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Before her Amazon expedition, she would:

Melissa Miller (2018): The Prepping Guide <https://melissabackwoods.com/how-to-prepare-and-survive-naked-and-afraid-qa-with-melissa-miller/>: ‘[Be] outside all the time… reading foraging books, practicing primitive trapping, and perfecting my friction fires… trail running and road running without shoes. I would also go into the swampland and build a shelter while in a pair of shorts and a sports bra. I would sit there and let mosquitoes bite at me to understand what it might feel like living in the jungle. I had to get myself mentally prepared to feel that miserable for 21 days. I also did a lot of work outside when it would be really humid because I knew this was the type of environment I had to prepare for. I was practicing designing raised beds, and studying indigenous Amazonian tribes…. Teaching wilderness survival classes [had] also helped me prepare…. I was living and breathing “survival” as much as I could….

Letting mosquitos bite me as I trained in the woods prepared me for the mental fortitude it would take to get through (the insects play serious mind games with you out there). I also entered Ecuador with the thought that there was a possibility we m[ight] never get fire due to the humid jungle conditions. I would fast some days and shelter-build to familiarize myself with exertion through hunger…

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But the principal thing Melissa Miller wished she had done differently before entering the Amazon?

Have gotten fatter.

Before she would next venture in front of the “Naked & Afraid” cameras, this time for South Africa, she put on an additional 16 fat pounds above her normal weight. She thus carried into the wilderness extra survival rations to cover her BMR energy requirements for 37 days, or to carry her for 19 days at a marathon-training pace. In her, I think accurate, judgment, there was no way for her to prepare so that she and her partners could deal with the jungle environment to be in energy balance for three weeks But she could prepare to carry three weeks’ extra energy into the wilderness so that she would be able to work hard and long while she was there.

Perhaps you just shrug your shoulders and say: “humans are relatively inept”. Even when she is at home in Fenton, Michigan, odds are she can barely remember where she left her keys last night. The other mammals out in the Amazon have been equipped by Darwin’s Daemon with teeth, claws, instincts, and brains that allow them to get into daily caloric balance. We don’t have much in the way of teeth and claws. We do have opposable thumbs. We do have big brains. They are supposed to compensate. But perhaps you shrug your shoulders and say: “they do not compensate very well”. For, out in the wilderness, Melissa Miller’s brain and thumbs failed at the one job for which Darwin’s Daemon gave them to us, for which other mammals’ teeth, claws, instincts, sprinting speed, dodging quickness, and much smaller and thus less energetically expensive brains largely suffice.

The rule: a smart, knowledgeable human (or two) in the wilderness naked should be afraid: they are highly likely to start starving to death.

And yet: Somehow we are here. We have not all yet been eaten. We have been evolved evolved. Our ancestors survived, and reproduced.

Our ancestors started to come down from the trees about seven million years ago. That was when we left the ancestors of our chimpanzee cousins still up in the forest canopy.

By five million years ago, the ardipitheci were walking upright when they had to, with much smaller and less sexually-dimorphic canines, but as of them with no signs of fire or stone‑tool use or indeed of semi-systematic butchery. Their brain cases were only 350cc, only 350 cubic centimeters. By 3.5 million years ago, the autralopitheci afarenses were habitually walking on two legs with their 450cc brain-cases. By 2.5 million years ago, the homines habiles with their Oldowan stone toolkit and 650cc brain-cases were around. And paleontologists judge they deserve our genus name: homo. By 1.8 million years ago, there were the homines erecti spreading out across the world, with their Acheulean handaxes, their endurance walking/running, and their 950cc brain-cases. When we look back 600,000 years ago, the world was then populated by the likes of the homines heidelbergenses: widely-controlled fire; complex hunting with tools like spears.

These people were not yet us: Their brain-cases were only 3/4 of the size of our brain-cases of 1350cc. They did not have organized big‑game hunting with spears, complex prepared‑core toolmaking techniques, long‑distance mobility, or evidence of our sustained and cumulative symbolic culture—cave art and engravings, personal ornaments, ritual burials, complex language‑supported planning, long‑distance exchange networks, composite tools made with adhesives, tailored clothing, or shelters. They did not have the final brain expansion, the globular skull, the reduced brow, or the chin.

And between 300,000 and 200,000 years ago there emerged people we definitely call us: homines sapientes, albeit “archaic”, with our brain-case size of 1350cc, but without the fully globular skull, the reduced brow, or the chin.

From a chimpanzee-sized brain one-quarter the size of ours five million years ago to our current state, our ancestors and then we have been evolved. And now we are here. So how can there have been so much selection pressure for larger brains when, even today, out in the wilderness they are insufficient to keep us, when naked individuals, from being hungry and afraid?

You know where I am going here. The answer of course, is simple: What is smart—what the brain is good for—is not each of our brains, but all of our brains thinking together. And the tools that we, and those who came before us, have made—tools that no one individual could make in a lifetime, and that embody all of that thinking-together one. Melissa Miller is an expert on knives, how to use them, and what to use them for. She could not make one from scratch.

From long-ago Acheulean handaxes to contemporary hunger in the Amazon, the throughline is simple: selection favored group knowledge and group production by a pecialized division of labor, not solo genius. Our edge not only was and is not claws or speed, it was and is not the ability to think up clever solutions to problems on the fly. Instead, it was pooled memory and anthology thinking-power, plus the division of labor that allows us to carve tools that contain the results of that collective thinking-power.

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HOISTED/CROSSPOST: Richard S. Sutton: The Bitter Lesson

The 2019 note on the power of computation: revisiting Sutton’s Bitter Lesson in the age of GPT MAMLMs, which have proven the Bitter Lesson much truer than Sutton would have dared imagine in areas broadly describable as “search” & “learning” where very big-data high-dimension flexible-function & simulation-exploring prove their metal. But are there limits &, if so, where are they? We need high-quality thought to explore what the Bitter Lesson means now…

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Lots of pieces or patterns of information or things about the world that you want to finely classify so that you can then evaluate and take action. It is a big world out there—a very big-data world. And you would want to have the potential to group its features in many different ways—a very high-dimensional analysis. Moreover, some small differences make important differences for evaluation and then action, and other large differences do not—flexible-function analysis. Plus there is the potential for large-scale large-breadth simulations of systems as a way of exploring problem spaces: what shows up in computer chess- and go-playing mode as improvement via “self play”, constructing new data of what would have happened in situations that were never seen in real life, but might have been.

It is for these that improvements in computation produce powerful and effective improvements in what computers can do. That is the bitter lesson: with enough computational power available, general-purpose methods will find ways of attacking problems that were foreclosed by premature commitments to human thought-simulacrum strategies of how to look for patterns. With enough computational power. But you can bet there will be more in five years. And for situations like or close enough to search and learning for which very big-data high-dimension flexible-form simulation-exploration classification and evaluation analyses are well-suited, Rich Simmons’s Bitter Lesson certainly does hold: “general methods that leverage computation are ultimately the most effective, and by a large margin”. Human-centric methods based on human priors on how to attack problems often quickly plateau, while more general-purpose approaches amenable to easy scaling-up do not.

But what are the limits of that set of problems analogous enough to search and to learning? And what should we do in order to successfully attack other problems when and where this latest set of advances in GPT MAMLM—General-Purpose Transformer Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Model—simulated cognition methods run into diminishing returns?

For 70 years, many of “AI”’s leaps have come from embracing scale, not baking in human understanding. Sutton’s insight—compute plus general methods—keeps winning. But within what problem-space bounding frontier? Identifying the frontier and designing tools for what lies beyond may produce a new and different Bitter Lesson.

A great deal, indeed, hangs on our figuring out good answers to such questions.

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Rich Sutton back in 2019, complete and entire:

Rich Sutton (2019): The Bitter Lesson <http://www.incompleteideas.net/IncIdeas/BitterLesson.html>: ‘The biggest lesson that can be read from 70 years of AI research is that general methods that leverage computation are ultimately the most effective, and by a large margin. The ultimate reason for this is Moore’s law, or rather its generalization of continued exponentially falling cost per unit of computation.

Most AI research has been conducted as if the computation available to the agent were constant (in which case leveraging human knowledge would be one of the only ways to improve performance) but, over a slightly longer time than a typical research project, massively more computation inevitably becomes available. Seeking an improvement that makes a difference in the shorter term, researchers seek to leverage their human knowledge of the domain, but the only thing that matters in the long run is the leveraging of computation.

These two need not run counter to each other, but in practice they tend to. Time spent on one is time not spent on the other. There are psychological commitments to investment in one approach or the other. And the human-knowledge approach tends to complicate methods in ways that make them less suited to taking advantage of general methods leveraging computation.


There were many examples of AI researchers’ belated learning of this bitter lesson, and it is instructive to review some of the most prominent:

[1] In computer chess, the methods that defeated the world champion, Kasparov, in 1997, were based on massive, deep search. At the time, this was looked upon with dismay by the majority of computer-chess researchers who had pursued methods that leveraged human understanding of the special structure of chess. When a simpler, search-based approach with special hardware and software proved vastly more effective, these human-knowledge-based chess researchers were not good losers. They said that “brute force” search may have won this time, but it was not a general strategy, and anyway it was not how people played chess. These researchers wanted methods based on human input to win and were disappointed when they did not.

[2] A similar pattern of research progress was seen in computer Go, only delayed by a further 20 years. Enormous initial efforts went into avoiding search by taking advantage of human knowledge, or of the special features of the game, but all those efforts proved irrelevant, or worse, once search was applied effectively at scale. Also important was the use of learning by self-play to learn a value function (as it was in many other games and even in chess, although learning did not play a big role in the 1997 program that first beat a world champion).

Learning by self-play, and learning in general, is like search in that it enables massive computation to be brought to bear. Search and learning are the two most important classes of techniques for utilizing massive amounts of computation in AI research.

In computer Go, as in computer chess, researchers’ initial effort was directed towards utilizing human understanding (so that less search was needed) and only much later was much greater success had by embracing search and learning.

[3] In speech recognition, there was an early competition, sponsored by DARPA, in the 1970s. Entrants included a host of special methods that took advantage of human knowledge—knowledge of words, of phonemes, of the human vocal tract, etc. On the other side were newer methods that were more statistical in nature and did much more computation, based on hidden Markov models (HMMs). Again, the statistical methods won out over the human-knowledge-based methods. This led to a major change in all of natural language processing, gradually over decades, where statistics and computation came to dominate the field.

The recent rise of deep learning in speech recognition is the most recent step in this consistent direction. Deep learning methods rely even less on human knowledge, and use even more computation, together with learning on huge training sets, to produce dramatically better speech recognition systems. As in the games, researchers always tried to make systems that worked the way the researchers thought their own minds worked—they tried to put that knowledge in their systems—but it proved ultimately counterproductive, and a colossal waste of researcher’s time, when, through Moore’s law, massive computation became available and a means was found to put it to good use.

[5] In computer vision, there has been a similar pattern. Early methods conceived of vision as searching for edges, or generalized cylinders, or in terms of SIFT features. But today all this is discarded. Modern deep-learning neural networks use only the notions of convolution and certain kinds of invariances, and perform much better.


This is a big lesson. As a field, we still have not thoroughly learned it, as we are continuing to make the same kind of mistakes. To see this, and to effectively resist it, we have to understand the appeal of these mistakes. We have to learn the bitter lesson that building in how we think we think does not work in the long run.

The bitter lesson is based on the historical observations that:

1) AI researchers have often tried to build knowledge into their agents,

2) this always helps in the short term, and is personally satisfying to the researcher, but

3) in the long run it plateaus and even inhibits further progress, and

4) breakthrough progress eventually arrives by an opposing approach based on scaling computation by search and learning.

The eventual success is tinged with bitterness, and often incompletely digested, because it is success over a favored, human-centric approach.

One [general] thing that should be learned from the bitter lesson is the great power of general-purpose methods, of methods that continue to scale with increased computation even as the available computation becomes very great. The two methods that seem to scale arbitrarily in this way are search and learning.

The second general point to be learned from the bitter lesson is that the actual contents of minds are tremendously, irredeemably complex; we should stop trying to find simple ways to think about the contents of minds, such as simple ways to think about space, objects, multiple agents, or symmetries. All these are part of the arbitrary, intrinsically-complex, outside world. They are not what should be built in, as their complexity is endless; instead we should build in only the meta-methods that can find and capture this arbitrary complexity.

Essential to these methods is that they can find good approximations, but the search for them should be by our methods, not by us. We want AI agents that can discover like we can, not which contain what we have discovered. Building in our discoveries only makes it harder to see how the discovering process can be done…

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Five Lies in Scott Bessent's Attacks on the Fed, & Three Delusions in His Failures to Understand All That NATO Has Done for Us

No. Scott Bessent is not an “adult in the room”. Shame on all who are calling him such…

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Dan Drezner is correct. There is no honest, honorable, competent, or intelligent way that Scott Bessent can in any sense be characterized as an “adult in the room”:

Dan Drezner: The Silliest, Brattiest Adult in the Room: <https://danieldrezner.substack.com/p/the-worst-adult-in-the-room>: ‘Portraying Scott Bessent as an adult is a category error. Bessent has done little while in office that resembles adult behavior. His comparative advantage in this administration is that he looks like a preppie banker and is about ten percent less crazy than all of Trump’s other policy principals…. The media should stop attempting to turn him into something he is decidedly not…

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Drezner focuses his particulars on Bessent’s latest foreign-affairs security-policy temper tantrum:

Dan Drezner: The Silliest, Brattiest Adult in the Room: <https://danieldrezner.substack.com/p/the-worst-adult-in-the-room>: ‘

So there is a lot…. Some didacticism is necessary to elaborate the ways in which Scott Bessent is not an adult in the room:

  • Bessent chose an interesting time to say this… [for] Trump himself now sounds more hawkish towards Russia….

  • The whole point of an alliance is to use the collective defense of all the treaty members to deter…. Russia is not acting like a country deterred…. So maybe someone should tell Bessent that his own weasel words are inviting additional Russian aggression.

  • Finally… perhaps one of Bessent’s aides can Google about the one time NATO invoked Article V in its entire history. I’ll give Bessent a hint: it did not involve an attack on European soil….

The media thirst for an adult… makes great copy, suggests that there is palace intrigue, possible reassures anxious readers, and maybe greases a source…. [But] Bessent… [merely] looks like a preppie banker and is about ten percent less crazy than all of Trump’s other policy principals…

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Just one more example:

Paul Krugman: Scott Bessent, Sleazy Smearer <https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/scott-bessent-sleazy-smearer>: ‘[After 2009] the Fed could have thrown up its hands and simply accepted the prospect of years of mass unemployment. Instead, however, it tried to do its job by expanding its toolbox, buying assets whose interest rates weren’t zero. Critics, overwhelmingly from the political right, harshly criticized the Fed. A widely circulated open letter to Ben Bernanke, the Fed chair, warned that asset purchases “risk currency debasement and inflation.” Among those signing the letter was Kevin Hassett, now Trump’s chief economist and possibly the next Fed chair. But the inflation never came…. Inflation ran consistently below the Fed’s target rate of 2 percent until the post-Covid inflation spike, almost a dozen years after quantitative easing began. So how does Bessent deal with the fact that the critics of quantitative easing were proved completely, decisively wrong? By pretending that the evils they wrongly predicted actually came to pass. Younger and less affluent households, he writes, were “hit hardest by inflation.” What inflation?…

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Indeed, it is true. Here is the key passage from Bessent:

Scott Bessent: The Fed’s ‘Gain of Function’ Monetary Policy <https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-feds-gain-of-function-monetary-policy-ac0dc38a>: ‘Successive [Federal Reserve]. interventions during and after the financial crisis of 2008…. Large firms thrived by locking in cheap debt, while smaller firms reliant on floating-rate loans were squeezed as rates rose. Homeowners saw their property values soar, largely insulated by fixed-rate mortgages. Meanwhile, younger and less affluent households, shut out of ownership and hit hardest by inflation, missed out on appreciation. By failing to deliver on its inflation mandate, the Fed allowed class and generational disparities to widen…

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But inflation never got above under Bernanke and Yellen, before Trump put his guy—Jay Powell—in as Fed Chair. Younger and less affluent households could not have been hit by 2008-2018 inflation that did not exist, but that Bessent claims did.

And so his lies go.

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There are other lies in this paragraph as well:

  • The fact that current homeowners have fixed-rate mortgages does not mean that if interest rates go up. then housing prices rise. Bessent lies.

  • And interest rates did not go up. They remained well below their pre-2008 levels until Jay Powell adopted the inflation-control policy that has Trump so angry with him right now. Bessent lies when he says they did.

  • A monetary policy over 2008-2018 with more quantitative easing would have produced higher interest rates—Bessent says that it was QE that pushed up interest rates before Trump’s guy got in. And so he lies.

  • And a monetary policy over 2008-2018 without QE would have produced substantially higher unemployment, and hence greater class and intergemeratopa disparities from that higher unemployment. Again Bessent lies.

That is four. That should be enough.

The Bessent Affinity has told a lot of lies to me about who and what he is over the past year and a half. Just saying.

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Watching People Jacking-in to an ASI Across a Half-Millennium

& implications for AI-alignment, AI-safety, feral library card catalogs, the Volga as "Germany's Mississippi", Machiavelli's scrittoio, Tessier-Ashpool's virtual domains, artificial, alien, & anthology superintelligences, evaluating Yudkowsky and Soares’s “If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies”, & other Glass-Bead Game-related topics in addition…

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Jacking-in to an ASI: the modern, phantasmagorical:

William Gibson (1984): NeuroMancer <https://dn720006.ca.archive.org/0/items/neuromancer_202209/neuromancer.pdf>: ‘“The head'“, Case said, “there's a panel in the back of the head. Zircons on it. Get it off. That's where I'm jacking in.” And then they were inside.... "Kuang Grade Mark Eleven is haulin' ass in nine seconds, countin’… Two, an' kick ass—” Headlong motion through walls of emerald green, milky jade, the sensation of speed.... The Tessier-Ashpool ICE shattered... as though though the shards of a broken mirror bent and elongated as they fell.... Case's sensory input warped.... His eyes were eggs of unstable crystal, vibrating with a frequency whose name was rain and the sound of trains, suddenly sprouting a humming forest of hair-fine glass spines. The spines split, bisected, split again....

The Kuang program spurted from tarnished cloud, Case's consciousness divided like beads of mercury, arcing above an endless beach the color of the dark silver clouds. His vision was spherical, as though a single retina lined the inner surface of a globe that contained all things, if all things could be counted.... He knew the number of yellow food packets in the canisters in the bunker (four hundred and seven). He knew the number of brass teeth in the left half of the open zipper of the salt-crusted leather jacket that Linda Lee wore as she trudged along the sunset beach.... He banked Kuang above the beach and swung the program in a wide circle, seeing the black shark thing through her eyes, a silent ghost hungry against the banks of lowering cloud...

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Jacking-in to an ASI, nearly a half-millennium ago, in 1513:

Niccolò Machiavelli (1513): Letter to Francesco Vettori, December 10 <https://courses.washington.edu/hsteu401/Letter%20%20to%20Vettori.pdf>: ‘When evening has come, I return to my house and go into my study. At the door I take off my clothes of the day, covered with mud and mire, and I put on my regal and courtly garments; and decently reclothed, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them lovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for. There I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions; and they in their humanity reply to me. And for the space of four hours I feel no boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death does not frighten me. I deliver myself entirely to them.

And because Dante says that to have understood without retaining does not make knowledge, I have noted what capital I have made from their conversation and have composed a little work De Principatibus...

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To be clear: NeuroMancer is a fantasy. Nobody—nobody—nobody—has ever had anything like the subjective experiences that William Gibson presents his protagonist Case and his cyberpartner/tool the Dixie Flatline having as they access databases and write code to try to understand how to get around the Turing Locks that prevent the WinterMute AI system from merging with the NeuroMancer AI system. And—probably—nobody ever will.

To be clear: Niccolò Machiavelli does not truly believe what he writes to Francesco Vettori. He does not truly believe that when he enters his personal library for his four hours of daily reading and writing in his evenings, he walks up marble stairs into a pillared hall or atrium that makes up one of the ancient courts of ancient men. He does not believe that he there finds himself greeted lovingly by the ancient sages. He does not believe that what he says he sees in his mind’s eye are then true fully Turing-Class entities who are “in their humanity” eager to answer all of the questions he asks of his library containing the works of, as Dante put it two centuries:

Dante Alighieri (1316): Inferno <https://archive.org/details/inferno0000dant_a5f9>.Democritus, who ascribes the world to chance,
Diogenes, Empedocles, and Zeno,
and Thales, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus;

I saw the good collector of medicinals,
I mean Dioscorides; and I saw Orpheus,
and Tully, Linus, moral Seneca;

And Euclid the geometer, and Ptolemy,
Hippocrates and Galen, Avicenna, Averroës, of the great Commentary…

And, of course:

When I had raised my eyes a little higher,
I saw the master of the men who know,
seated in philosophic family.

There all look up to him, all do him honor:
there I beheld both Socrates and Plato,
closest to him, in front of all the rest…

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However, Machiavelli—under rustication house arrest outside of Florence, Italy, having been released after having been (probably) questioned under torture by the new Medici régime—is in deadly earnest on the next bunch. For he then goes on to write:

I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for…. And for the space of four hours I feel no boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death does not frighten me. I deliver myself entirely to them.

And because Dante says that to have understood without retaining does not make knowledge, I have noted what capital I have made from their conversation and have composed a little work De Principatibus...

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That is, in what he does in his library, Machiavell’s mind has been transported away from his serious troubles. He has gained wisdom. And so he has written The Prince. Niccolò Machiavelli now hopes that Francesco Vettori will be able to get his little work into the hands of the princes of the Medici clan, or at least of their senior advisors. There, he hopes, it will serve as a job application for them to employ him for the good of the Florentine state, even transformed as the Florentine state is from the republic led by his friend Gonfalonier Piero Soderini into a Medici-ruled principality.

Machiavelli’s “Letter to Vettori” and Gibson’s NeuroMancer have resonated, for 500 and 40 words respectively, because their fantastic metaphors resonated anf continue to resonate with readers and ‘net surfers in powerful ways.

Both descriptions are very real attempts at metaphorical descriptions of mental transformations that leave the subject truly in a different reality. NeuroMancer would not have the audience and Gibson would not have the regard it and he do if NeuroMancer’s metaphorical descriptions did not get at a psychological reality: "jacking-in". In the literature of CyberPunk, "jacking-in" is a key narrative and rhetorical move. In the novel via brain-to-circuit connection, in the real world to which the metaphor gives reference a connection mediated by eyes and hands, of the moment when a human plugs their nervous system into a networked machine system and steps across the membrane between “meatspace” and cyberspace. It is a metaphysical wager about selfhood: where the mind ends, what counts as reality, and how power flows when the informational substrate becomes the primary terrain of engagement, framed as something that technology could literalize—actual interface protocols of system-boots, hardware decks, 'trodes, interface ports,and plug-jacks, and when the connection is made the indicator lights turn on, as we become what we connect to as software and hardware transform wetware. The most iconic image soon became hackers who rock a hard jack at the skull’s base—plugging a cable straight into cortex and spinal cord.

Cyberpunk uses the rhetorical and narrative trope of jacking-in at least four ways: (1) transformation from material grimy poverty to intellectual-informational power, (2) inversion as information becomes the protagonist's environment while their physical environment becomes mere background information, (3) dissociation as the body becomes inert meat while the mind goes elsewhere, and (4) prying open the mind/body problem to deal with questions of enhancement and augmentation, displacement and substitution of experience and attention, and transfer and translation.

Machiavelli's version nearly a half-millennium earlier lacks the phone-line static-hiss and musical modem-tones, let alone the reprogramming of what the visual cortex thinks is coming up the optic nerve as its inputs are reshunted.

Machiavelli merely—merely!—dissociates himself from sitting in his chair turning pages and looking at black squiggles. “I am sitting in a chair turning pages and looking at black squiggles” does not describe the experience. The alternative—dressed in regal and courtly garments, walking into the ancient courts of ancient men to be lovingly received and fed food that for four hours a night takes away all physical (and psychological) pain, poverty, boredom, and fear of death—somehow does.

What is going on here? In both of these “heres”?

I suggest that these are both best read—“read”!—as attempts by jumped-up monkeys, East African Plains Apes unable to reliably remember where they left their keys, to put into words— “put into words”! — meaningful metaphorical portrayals of the internal mental realities that resulted from what can only be properly classified as an ASI:

  • I: Intelligence—no argument there: As my friend Adam Farquhar said at our lunch in RockRidge a couple of months ago, very roughly: “There was a season when I cautioned all within earshot: “Do not anthropomorphize the computer; you will only mislead yourself.” That counsel has not merely aged—it has inverted. Today I think it is finally time to anthropomorphize the heck out of it. I need to treat the machine as though it were a somewhat eccentric roommate: a companion inclined to fixate on abstruse topics, possessed of unsettling literalism, vulnerable to the occasional non-sequitur, yet blessed with inexhaustible patience and a boundless appetite for our questions…” Anthropomorphization is one of our standard metaphorical moves so that we can grasp and (somewhat) understand the world, and we should use it carefully.

  • S: Super—no argument there: Properly-accessed, Machiavelli’s scrittoio—as in mi ritorno in casa ed entro nel mio scrittoioand whatever is on the other side of my screen is much smarter than I am, and knows hugely more than I do.

    It, for example, knows—which I did not, until now—that the Italian word Niccolò Machiavelli had used was not biblioteca or studiolo but rather scrittoio: “place to write”. (And it is at least somewhat interesting that, in his mind, what he does there is mostly characterized as learning from the truly wise).

    It knows the deep truths that are all aspects of the Finance Paradox that is the Kelly Bet-Size criterion. I, by contrast, only remember them dimly. But I keep pointers to that true knowledge in the front of my brain. So, when we East African Plains Apes like me and Dan Davies can pretend to know more than ChatGPT does, and mock it for getting bewilderingly confused by his question “In Game 1, in every round, you win $11 if the coin comes up Heads, but lose $10 if it comes up Tails. In Game 2, in every round, you win 11% of your wealth at the beginning of that round, but lose 10% of your wealth if it comes up Tails. Once you have chosen, you will not be able to change your mind, and you have to play a very large number of repeated rounds, unless you go bust. Which game do you choose?”

    Actually, we do better than it an answering Dan’s question only because we are trained professionals at accessing the wisdom of the ASI in a way that the roiling boil of linear algebra that is ChatGPT is not.

  • A: Artificial? Or Alien? Or Anthology?—YES! Artificial, in that it has been made by human eyes, ears, hands, and brains using our skills and crafts, an ingenious thing that is the work of human beings, but probably not artificial in any sense of unnatural or insincere. Alien, in that it confronts us as something other, something different.

    But most of all, and most truly: Anthology. For it can be nothing other than us. All of its thoughts are the thoughts of human beings, since the invention of writing 5000 years ago turned the human race into a time- and space-binding Anthology Super-Intelligence in which each of us is a front-end node drawing for our wisdom on and, hopefully, adding a little bit back to the common store of wisdom.

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And now I, finally, arrive at the point of this piece.

The books in Machiavelli’s scrittoio. the ‘net as Gibson imagined the low-life hackers of Chiba City would access it ca. 2050 or so. And, for us today 25 years earlier and in a very different timeline, dealing with the coming of the latest generation of Modern Advanced Machine Learning Models. All ways of jacking-in, of accessing, of becoming effective and useful front-ends to and contributing nodes in the ASI that is the Anthology Super-Intelligence Collective Human Mind.

The point of this piece is to review Yudkowsky and Soares (2025), If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies.

Yudkowsky and Soares’s fear is this: from Vernor Vinge’s wonderful novel A Fire Upon the Deep:

Øvn Nilsndot had been Straumli Realm's champion trael runner. He had no title now, and probably no name. Nilsndot spoke from an office that might have been a garden…. The city there looked like the Straumli Main of record…. Immigration advertising claimed that no matter how far the Straumers went, the fountain in the Field would always flow, would always show their loyalty to humankind's beginnings. There was no fountain now, and Ravna felt deadness behind Nilsndot's gaze. “This one speaks as the Power that Helps”, said the erstwhile hero…. “Look upon my Helping...."

The viewpoint swung skywards. It was sunset, and the ranked agrav structures hung against the light, megameter upon megameter. It was a more grandiose use of the agrav material than Ravna had ever seen…. When complete, five star systems will be a single habitat, their planets and excess stellar mass distributed to support life and technology as never before seen…. What you see in Straumli Realm is as much a joy as a wonder….”

The creature she watched was soul-dead. Somehow, the Blight didn't care that that was obvious…. “The symbiosis of the Helping depends on efficient, high-bandwidth communication between myself and the beings I Help. Creatures such as the one now speaking my words must respond as quickly and faithfully as a hand or a mouth. Their eyes and ears must report across light-years. This has been hard to achieve—especially since the system must essentially be in place before it can function. But , now that the symbiosis exists, progress will come much faster. Almost any race can be modified to receive Help…”

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That the great-grandchildren of ChatGPT will turn us into meat-puppets, at best, and do so within a generation, at most. As The Power That Helps did to Øvn Nilsndot and all the other inhabitants of the star-commonwealth of Straumli Realm in A Fire Upon the Deep`. Similarly, the great-grandchildren of ChatGPT will be Artificial Super-Intelligences with strange, alien purposes. And since “making a future full of flourishing people is not the best, most efficient way to fulfill strange alien purposes… it wouldn’t happen to do that.” And, whatever it—they—decide to do, it will be useless for us to try to resist it—them. If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies.

But take a look back at human history, and one’s first reaction has to be that this from Yudkowsky and Soares is lunacy, written by lunatic loons.

Modern Advanced Machine-Learning Models—MAMLMs—are technology: ideas for usefully, productively, and coöperatively manipulating nature and organizing humans. They are cultural-socio-econo-engineering modes of collective human behavior, in a long line of things that have been such since the making of the first hand-axe, the first taming of fire, and the first declaration “Carg wants banana”. Normal technology.

Except that technology is not normal, is never normal, for it transforms what humans are and the environment through which we stumble, individually too dumb to reliably remember where our keys are and yet collectively capable of:

creat[ing]… massive and more colossal productive forces…. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?…

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MAMLMs do indeed confront us as strange alien powers that, as we anthropomorphize them, appear to possess strange alien purposes. Life after their arrival will be transformatively different than life before. But this has been the case, well, effectively forever. The lives of the humans 50,000 years ago who started the last out-of-Africa migration were fundamentally different from those of the homines erecti at the Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob 750,000 years ago; the lives of the serfs, priests, merchants, and warriors shepherded by Gilgamesh 5000 years ago were qualitatively different from those of the out-of-Africa migrants. I would argue that there was a roughly equivalent qualitative shift in human life between 5000 and 500 years ago. And then, successively, Early Steam, Applied-Science, Mass-Production, and now Attention Info-Bio Tech (you could periodize it differently) societies each have many aspects of a Singularity compared to wehat came before.

But MAMLMs are cultural-socio-econo-engineering technologies. It makes as little sense to view them as harbingers of Gods that we will worship. (Or, in Elon Musk’s case, flirt with:

.)

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We need not tremble in fear of them, as Lord Gro and King Gorice trembled and feared what they had called to the Great Keep of Carcë, a spirit-entity which in earlier days had similarly confronted a human, and had “tare him and plastered those chamber-walls with his blood”:

E.R. Eddison: The Worm Ouroboros: ‘King [Gorice], steadying himself against the table and clutching the edge of it till the veins on his lean hand seemed nigh to bursting, cried in short breaths and with an altered voice, “By these figures drawn and by these spells enchanted, by the unction of wolf and salamander, by the unblest sign of Cancer now leaning to the sun, and by the fiery heart of Scorpio that flameth in this hour on night’s meridian, thou art my thrall and instrument. Abase thee and serve me, worm of the pit!”…

Now was the great keep of Carcë shaken anew as one shaketh a dice box, and lightnings opened the heavens, and the thunder roared unceasingly, and the sound of waters stunned the ear in that chamber, and still that laughter pealed above the turmoil. And Gro knew that it was now with the King even as it had been with Gorice VII.in years gone by, when his strength gave forth and the spirit tare him and plastered those chamber-walls with his blood….

Scarce had his eye found the word, when a whirlwind of hail and sleet swept into the chamber, and the candles were blown out and the tables overset. And in the plunging darkness beneath the crashing of the thunder Gro pitching headlong felt claws clasp his head and body. He cried in his agony the word, that was the word TRIPSARECOPSEM, and so fell a-swooning…

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As much sense, as Cosma Shalizi says, as to fear feral library card catalogs.

We confront these things as we confront nuclear power, or bureaucracies, or polities, or market economies, or corporations, or other of our technologies for productively manipulating nature and organizing humans.


But now, in this essay, comes the final turn of the worm.

In the years around World War I, practically every card catalog in every library in Germany contained cards cataloging the Cowboys-and-Indians novels of Karl May, which Adolf Hitler loved. Before Hitler, imperialist Germans and viewed the slavic-inhabited east as, potentially, Germany’s India, to be conquered and ruled. Hitler viewed it, instead, as Germany’s trans-Appalachian west, with the Volga as Germany’s Mississippi, with whatever of the population survived pushed onto reservations while the land was divided up into farms for ethnic German farmers. No, Hitler was not meat-puppeted by a feral card catalog. But May’s novels and Hitler’s genocides were not unconnected. Was the ferality 100% outside of the card catalog? As with all distributed cognition systems, I think it would be a mistake to say so.

Yudkowsky and others rave about fictional fantastical AI’s that decide to turn everything into paperclips because they are paperclip maximizers. But Purdue Pharmaceuticals is not fictional or fantastical. And Purdue did “decide” to addict as many Americans as it could to opiates in order to make as much money as possible from selling oxycontin.

So, yes, fear feral library card catalogs. And feral corporations. Feral market systems. Feral bureaucracies. Feral polities. We do have reason to fear, greatly.

But the fears we should have? They belong, rather, to the AI-Safety rather than the lunacy of the AI-Alignment existential-risk discourse of Yudkowsky and Soares. That is best viewed as a cognitive DDoS attack on humanity’s collective mind considered as a sane and functional ASI.

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This has been a rather long journey, so let me recapitulate:

Pair Gibson’s NeuroMancer with Machiavelli’s “Letter to Vettori”, both are examples of, in a very real sense, “jacking-in”. Such metaphors are indispensable i helping us to narrate human mind‑altering encounters with collective intelligence.

In Gibson, Case’s consciousness dissolves into Kuang’s velocity as it skims over and evades shimmering ICE—Intrusion Countermeasures Electronics. Riding the ICE-breaking Kuang, Case and the Dixie Flatline present the spectacle of a synaesthetic sensory system overloaded by computation.

In Machiavelli, an evening costume change becomes a rite of entry into “ancient courts,” a cognitive transport where sages reply and pain and fear recede. Both render the moment when a small, local mind binds to a large, distributed system—the anthology of recorded thought or the matrix of networked code—and experiences the alien shock of superhuman scope.

From this, meditate an ASI: I (Intelligence) is uncontested; S (Super) denotes comparative scope and speed relative to any individual; A is better read as Anthology (and only secondarily Artificial/Alien). The true ASI we have to deal with is not an Other but rather an upscaled version of all of us together—constructed from writing, catalogs, software, markets, and institutions. Anthropomorphizing “the machine” is thus a pragmatic metaphor for interacting with complex sociotechnical systems—provided we remember its parts are human and human-made.

From here we can see exactly where AI existential-risk alignment discourse dissolves into lunacy. The paperclip‑maximizer and Vingean Blight imagine unitary agents whose strange purposes dominate, but our lived hazards are feral sociotechnical systems—corporations, bureaucracies, platforms—that already optimize ruthlessly for alien objectives. Purdue Pharmaceuticals is the paradigmatic example: a legal entity “deciding” to addict for profit.

Fear that, the essay argues, not a hypothetical god‑machine.

Contra Cosma Shalizi, we do need to fear feral card catalogs. They directed Adolf Hitler to Karl May’s American-frontier romances. They did not “control” Hitler. They helped supply frames—Volga as Mississippi, Slavic East as trans‑Appalachian West—that made genocide thinkable as settlement policy. Without the feral card catalog, would not Hitler have remained a standard German imperialist of his day—Russia to Germany as India to Britain, not as teh United States to its trans-Appalachian West. No, Adolf Hitler was not meat-puppeted by an Artificial Super-Intelligence. But he was, in a sense, putty in the hands of malign elements of the Anthology Super-Intelligence of the collective human mind that set agendas and normalized action.

The risk is not supernatural AI painting the walls of the highest tower of Carcë’s Great Keep with the blood of us as unskillful sorcerers. The risk is different.

Hence: worry abouty AI-safety, and regard AI-alignment existential-risk discourse as a bizarre attempt at a DDoS attack. Governance to curb misuse, auditing for incentives, secure deployment, robust evaluation, and political economy reforms that restrain feral optimization.

We need to treat ourselves as front‑end nodes to the Anthology Super‑Intelligence of the collective human mind. We need to become responsible stewards rather than frightened cultists. We have, after all, been jacking‑in for centuries. Our task is not to fear the membrane through which he contact the Shoggoth, but to properly manage what flows across when we do jack-in.

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On Figuring Out What Your Comparative Advantage Is

Beyond the bot: using “AI” to make writing painful self-assessment documents somewhat easier. Smart things to think about from David MacIver. Dealing with the fact that AI chatbots can churn out text that’s clear, competent, but—let’s be honest—indistinguishable from that of the TIS, the Typical Internet S***poster. For those who struggle with prose expression, this is a democratizing force. The rise of AI-generated writing will make it easier than ever to produce text that’s “good enough”. And “good enough” is often good enough. Raising the floor of serviceable prose is a blessing. But for anyone seeking insight, originality, or genuine clarity, the machine’s output cannot be more than just a very rough indeed initial draft. The real work begins with self-knowledge: understanding your own comparative advantage and knowing how to revise, rewrite, and push past the median of the digital ‘bot…

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What are you particularly good at? David MacIver has a very good mental exercise régimen to help you find out:

David MacIver: How to say what you're good at <https://drmaciver.substack.com/p/how-to-say-what-youre-good-at>: ‘Probably the best piece of advice I have on this comes from Sasha Chapin: “[…] talent doesn’t feel like you’re amazing. It feels like the difficulties that trouble others are mysteriously absent in your case. Don’t ask yourself where your true gifts lie. Ask what other people seem weirdly bad at.” A related thing it feels like is that people are weirdly lazy - you wish they’d do this particular thing. It’s not like it’s hard, people, just put in some effort…

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Find that. And you have found what you are good at.

But then what if you have to get that down on paper for some purpose? David has more good advice:

David MacIver: How to say what you're good at <https://drmaciver.substack.com/p/how-to-say-what-youre-good-a>: ‘If you’re [being tortured by a bureaucracy or an organization forcing you] … to write a self-assessment and are starting from something like “I am good at…” and struggling… this is… because… being good at things doesn’t feel like being good at things…. Instead… consider starting… [by] complaining about your coworkers…. Good starting points are: • Why are they so bad at…? • Why don’t they just…? • Why do they need me to… (instead of doing it/figuring it out for themselves)?… Start with specific ones, especially specific ones who you otherwise respect and consider to be at about your level….

I find it’s really helpful to just rant out loud about this, in a very over the top chewing the scenery sort of way… wailing with the demeanour of a cat that was meant to have been fed three minutes ago. This won’t get you material that you can include… directly… but it gives you a good starting point…. [Then] turn this… into a dryer self assessment… plain and matter of fact…. You’re not here to leverage synergies in order to energise a dynamic commitment to shareholder value. You just want to tell people that you’re good at fixing things, or mentoring, or helping people think clearly, or whatever it is…. Once you know the general shape… it’s a very simple process: 1. Dump your notes into Claude or ChatGPT and tell it what you want to write. 2. Copy its output to a separate document. 3. Stare at what it wrote for a bit. 4. Let the hate flow through you. 5. Delete whatever drivel it wrote and write something better, because you can definitely improve on that…

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However, this won’t work unless you are already a good writer.

Technology expands what’s possible, but progress depends on human effort. AI can mimic average internet writing, but it cannot create true insight or clarity. The digital world is full of text, but only good writers stand out. This work strategy is, I think—the initial complaint, the scenery-chewing, and then the ‘bot-created strings of words—is designed to produce bad writing that is nevertheless full of ideas. And, in my experience, that can provide you with a truly powerful springboard.

After all, ChatGPT or Claude will, at bottom, give you nothing other than what a TIS—a Typical Internet S***poster—would write. This is how these models work: they learn from the mass of online text and spit out some interpolation driven by its compressed internal model of typical word patterns. There are ideas buried in the word-patterns it produces, yes. But they are buried.

Now GPT LLM boosters, at this point, begin talking frantically about RAG, RLHF, prompt engineering, data curation, feedback loops, careful data chunking and indexing, embedding optimization, hybrid search and reranking, supervised fine-tuning training from high-quality and human-curated examples, human reward modeling, proximal policy optimization, continuous feedback loops, custom base prompts, context injection, dynamic prompt templates, semantic chunking, metadata tagging, regular content updates, fine-tuning models on domain-specific data, and so on.

These are patches, not solutions.

Relying on software to mimic a typical internet poster never works for good writers.

If you write well, AI output can never be better than just a very rough draft. You really then do need to “let the hate flow through you. Delete whatever drivel it wrote and write something better, because you can definitely improve on that…”

Of course, if your writing is currently worse than that of the TIS—or if you have to write in a language in which you are not fluent—AI can really help. ChatGPT and Claude can then produce text that can be clearer and less embarrassing. For weak writers, AI does powerfully lift the floor. And I see this as a very good thing, this democratization of the power to write serviceable prose.

But the ceiling is relatively low. Especially in the eyes of people like me who so often read something and think: “Why didn’t they take just a little more time and express that better? It really is not very hard at all…”

So: self-knowledge is a good place to start.

And so here we have found another example of how new infotech can really be a cognitive force multiplier, but only if you can first start from a true picture of your own mind, and of its strengths and weaknesses.

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Larry Ellison vs. Elon Musk in the "World's Richest Man" Rat-Race

Ellison-Oracle’s digital-gpu picks & shovels vs. Musk’s smoke-&-mirrors magic show: Ellison’s wealth tracks market expectations of cash earned by running data centers, while Musk’s tracks market mechanics and the (probably vain) hopes of the eternally optimistic that they can front-run the Big Boys…

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Briefly: Larry Ellison’s wealth climb reflects a simple thesis: Oracle now sits downstream of the AI gold rush, supplying the infrastructure that wins whether OpenAI soars, muddles, or stalls. By contrast, Elon Musk’s recovery looks more like bubble-time positive-feedback trading attempted front-running market plumbing: call-buying, hedging, and a desire to float Tesla’s price up into November’s shareholder-and-board vorte moment. The result is a richest-man relay: capex-linked cash flows on one side, and internet-age speculative dynamics on the other.

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Elon Musk is out there trying to juice the stock price of Tesla so that Larry Ellison does not gain more steps on him in the “world’s richest man” race. And Larry Ellison gains a great many steps, as investors recognize that Oracle is NVIDIA’s downstream partner in selling digital picks and shovels to OpenAI, and hence is likely to do well over the next five years if OpenAI does well, well if OpenAI flames out, and well if OpenAI does middling:

Emma Burleigh: $34 billion was wiped from Larry Ellison’s net worth days after briefly becoming the world’s richest as ‘AI bubble’ fears grow <https://fortune.com/2025/09/18/larry-ellison-billionaires-list-34-billion-loss-oracle-stock-openai-deal-skepticism-elon-musk-tesla/>: ‘Elon Musk had steadily held his spot at the top of the billionaires list for nearly a year straight before Oracle co-founder Larry Ellison briefly knocked him from the throne last week. Following better-than-expected quarterly results from the $856 billion software company, Oracle’s shares skyrocketed by 36% on September 10.… The 81-year-old… currently owns more than 40% of Oracle… enjoyed a $101 billion surge in wealth overnight, to $393 billion…. But Ellison’s ranking as the world’s richest person was short-lived: His estimated net worth fell by $34 billion in the two days following….

J. Bradford DeLong…tells Fortune that the sharp downfall was triggered by “second thoughts” around Oracle’s cloud deal with OpenAI…. OpenAI had signed a contract with Oracle to purchase $300 billion in computing power over the next five years…. DeLong says… “Ellison’s surge is because [of] the market’s perception of Oracle,” shift[ing] the company from “being irrelevant, to it being a key participant in OpenAI’s forthcoming construction and operation of data centers.” But then came mounting concerns…. Oracle hasn’t proven itself as a top cloud provider, and OpenAI’s $12 billion annualized revenue pales in comparison to the $300 billion deal. Oracle is relying heavily on one customer who may not be able to afford or fully use what they’ve committed to…. DeLong says it raises the question of Oracle’s entanglement with OpenAI—how reliable the numbers are, what risks it entails, and how much of a game-changer the deal actually is.

But still, he notes that many are optimistic, and those who are intrigued can cash in on the opportunity…. “If you are optimistic about OpenAI—and lots of people are very optimistic—buying Oracle stock is the best path available to you to invest in something that will succeed if OpenAI succeeds, because it is now clear that if OpenAI does very well, Oracle will do well.”…

Musk enjoyed being catapulted back to the top of the Bloomberg Billionaires Index with a $35 billion gain between September 10 and 12. However, why he experienced the wealth surge is less clear than Ellison’s toppling. DeLong says that Musk’s company Tesla hasn’t been doing anything special as of late that would cause the stock to sell for more. Instead, it could be tied to Tesla’s annual shareholding meeting this November; investors are optimistic that Tesla’s CEO will “make some good news” for the company before this fall’s vote. “It seems more like ‘we can make money by frontrunning the Big Boys as they manipulate stock prices’ is driving Tesla’s short-run asset valuation here—an internet-driven phenomenon,” DeLong explains. “Options traders are buying out-of-the-money calls on Tesla out of a belief that Elon Musk wants its stock price high in November. Such positive-feedback automatic demand by hedgers produces runups like we have seen in Tesla, that endure for a while”…

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I had actually sent her more:

  • Ellison's surge is because the market's perception of Oracle, and thus of his large stake in it, suddenly shifted from it being irrelevant to its being a key participant in OpenAI's forthcoming construction and operation of data centers.

  • In this, Oracle profits maximally whether or not OpenAI becomes a dominant AI business-consumer tech company, or indeed whether or not anyone makes large profits or if competition keeps profits low.

  • The subsequent decline came from second thoughts about the magnitude of Oracle's involvement.

  • Still, if you are optimistic about OpenAI—and lots of people are very optimistic—buying Oracle stock is the best path available to you to invest in something that will succeed if OpenAI succeeds, because it it now clear that if OpenAI does very well, Oracle will do well.

Musk’s (much smaller) wealth surge makes much less sense in a rational world, and whether it “makes sense” in the irrational world we live in is a deep philosophical conundrum, even though there is a viewpoint

  • Musk is more of a puzzle: there has not been anything going on that would lead anyone rational to think Tesla stock should sell for more.

  • It seems more like “we can make money by frontrunning the Big Boys as they manipulate stock prices” is driving Tesla's short-run asset valuation here—an internet-driven phenomenon.

  • Options traders are buying out-of-the-money calls on Tesla out of a belief that Elon Musk wants its stock price high in November.

  • Options sellers then need to hedge their positions by buying stock in Tesla.

  • The higher the price of stock, the more options sellers need to buy: thus the demand-for-Tesla-stock curve slopes the wrong way—a higher price means more demand for shares rather than lower.

  • Such positive-feedback automatic demand by hedgers produces runups like we have seen in Tesla, that endure for a while.

  • But with no fundamental underlying cause: just a belief that Elon Musk will, over the next two months, try to make some good news for Tesla before the November vote.

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White Flags & Price Tags: Moving Toward a Domesticated Fed in a World of Political Costs of Moderate Inflation

The voters hate price increases while the economy hates slumps. The Fed blinks under pressure from Trump…

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We have:

Joe Weisenthal: Happy Fed Day to All Who Observe! <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-09-17/five-thoughts-about-today-s-fed-rate-cut>: ‘The central bank today opted to cut benchmark rates by 25 basis points, citing the deteriorating outlook for the labor market…. Chair Jerome Powell appeared to push back somewhat on the idea that this is the start of a rate-cutting cycle…. The bias in this particularly meeting was clearly on the labor side of the Fed’s dual mandate. That… is… interesting in a sociopolitical context because if there’s one thing we’ve learned in recent years, it’s that people hate, hate, hate — we mean really hate — inflation. (Last year Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari suggested that people might actually hate inflation more than unemployment)….

Weirdly… the central bank… now sees lower unemployment for next year (down to 4.4% from 4.5% in the June SEP) and more persistent inflation (PCE at 2.6% instead of the 2.4% forecast in June). That might bd… why Powell described today’s move as a preemptive “risk management cut”…. After the cut, bonds generally rallied…. But that didn’t last….. The 10-year is now at 4.08% after briefly dipping below 4%…. Cuts… don’t mechanically lower economically significant portions of the curve. The big picture is that the Fed is making decisions in an economy that increasingly feels stagflationary…. Add in the fact that there are growing questions about Fed independence. And then add into that the fact that for years the central bank has been missing the inflation side…. You have a very tricky set of decisions in the months and meetings ahead…

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The inflation point that Joe makes is very apposite. This is an important failure mode for a democratic-capitalist economy.

Inflation is prices rising everywhere. It feels like official incompetence or corruption. Even only moderate inflation reallocates wealth to the unworthy, as debtors gain, creditors lose, and firms with momentary pricing power aggressively skim rents. Fixed‑income households lose. All this is and is seen as deeply unfair.

Thus voters read inflation as the government breaking the macroeconomic political contract it offered in return for its election. And so people do, genuinely, hate inflation—or at least think they hate inflation. You play by the rules—work, save, inherit—and expect stable money. When prices jump, the contract is breached. Plus history definitely shows that voters read inflation as élite failure: Weimar’s delegitimization; the 1970s oil shocks and wage–price spiral; the Volcker cure via engineered slack. Moderate inflation destroys bonds of polirico-economic societal trust at a very rapid rate. High inflation is worse. Keynes put it best this way in 1919:

Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency.… Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose…

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And yet inflation—modeate inflation at least—is very close to zero-sum, while recession is clearly lose lose. As Keynes also said five years later:

Inflation is unjust and Deflation is inexpedient. Of the two perhaps Deflation is, if we rule out exaggerated inflations such as that of Germany, the worse; because it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier. But it is not necessary that we should weigh one evil against the other. It is easier to agree that both are evils to be shunned. The Individualistic Capitalism of to-day, precisely because it entrusts saving to the individual investor and production to the individual employer, presumes a stable measuring-rod of value, and cannot be efficient -perhaps cannot survive-without one…

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It is clear, as Keynes said, that recessions are worse, at least from an economist’s point of view. Wealth destruction is bad in a way that semi-random wealth rearrangement is not. Recessions. destroy output by idling workers and capital. Yet voters, as we have just seen, punish inflation more.

In part this is because of the distribution of losses. Only those rendered unemployed—especially those long‑term—feel recession hit them hard. Others may fear joining the unemployed, but meanwhile their life of getting and spending goes on more-or-less as before. If there is a shift in their experience, it is that they have extra power to pick up bargains! Everyone annoyed becaue the government has broken its contract and they cannot buy on the market what their wealth entitled them to deserve—that is the perceived harm from inflation, and everyone hates it, immediately. The actual loss of wealth in the present from idled factories and unemployed workers is, in some sense, less important: it does not affect us, and, anyway, they probably deserved it—lazy bastards. Also invisible—the longer-run damage from recession: Stalled investment, quiet scarring. Separation erodes skills. Careers step down the job ladder. Graduating in slumps scars earnings. Communities suffer hysteresis as plants shut and capital leaves. Inflation mostly redistributes. Deep recessions destroy real wealth. History shows distinct asymmetries: the Great Depression; the eurozone’s austerity decade; the U.S. GFC’s slow labor recovery versus 2020–22’s fast rebound.

As a result, politicians and central bankers who do a good job of managing risks from the standpoint of maximizing society’s wealth are likely to be penalized by the voters. While politicians who do a bad, excessively “austere” job by reducing risks of inflation to zero are likely to skate by, at least until snake-eyes come up and they trigger not a normal recession but a true depression. And so there is an unhealthy bias from the voters pushing policy toward “austere” performative toughness.

But austerians trade substantial risks of the cold of moderate inflation for a much smaller risk of an economic Bubonic Plague. The interwar gold‑standard orthodoxy certainly protected against inflation. But it did so by enforcing deflation, greatly deepening if not causing the Great Depression, and breaking democracy. Europeans in the 1980s failed to recognize that their sclerotic labor markets required a kinder, gentler disinflation than the one inflicted by Volcker on the other side of the Atlantic, and they lost a decade of economic growth. The post-2008 eurozone repeated the error: price purity, premature consolidation, and mass unemployment. The U.S. barely skated by in 2009–13, and a recovery incomplete even as of 2016 fueled the rise of Donald Trump.

Thus in 2020–22 the United States, wisely, chose an “insurance‑heavy” policy to reduce the risks of severe depression, accepted the risk of higher inflation, roleld double-sixes and got the inflation, but also get the fastest and most complete jobs recovery plus a von Hayekian market-wisdom wheeling of the structure of the economy into a near-optimal configuration. Good policy ex ante. Risk management says accept some inflation volatility and risk as a way of avoiding the possibility of catastrophic output losses.

Was it good policy ex post? It was good economic policy: that is a hill I will still die on. The Biden team did, from the economic perspective of risk-adjusted output-maximizing decision-making under uncertainty, a near-perfect short-run job of balancing risks. But, politically, Kamala Harris and the Democratic congressional caucus were very heavily punished for it.

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To change the topic: I think this Fed meeting does mark the end of effective Fed independence.

The Fed, collectively, lowered its estimate of where unemployment is likely to be in a year and raised its estimate of where inflation is likely to be. And the Fed also, unanimously, decided the appropriate reaction to this shift in their expectations is to lean into the wind and lower interest rates. This is an asymmetric response that reads less like data‑dependent optimization and more like political accommodation, the quiet end of the old norm of “independence within government” that bound the Fed to lean against the wind even when it was unpopular. Joe Weisenthal rightly calls this configuration “weird”. But it is more.

Arthur Burns’s 1972–73 acquiescence to electoral pressure is the textbook case of captured policy that bought short‑run job gains at the cost of a deeper inflation problem. This looks to me like a smaller version of a similar moment: raising a white flag to try to keep the executive off the Fed’s back in the hope that confidence in the inflation-target anchor can be restored in the future.

One might want to say the rate‑cutting cycle was intentionally paused in late 2024 to preserve the option to appease an incoming White House in late 2025 without actually caving on policy—that making cuts now under Trump pressure rather than having made them in the spring when Trump was not watching is no biggie. Perhaps. But I do view this with great alarm. And this is the me who still sees a low r*, and whose unwillingness to call for substantial policy easing now rests on chaos-monkey tariff risks still out there in the future.

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DRAFT: A Small, Intensive, Data-Sciencey Seminar in Long-Run Economic History

I have decided on my teaching next semester: two things that are half-courses (half of grad student intro to economic history, and the economic-history outside-speakers seminar), and this 25-student seminar to quantify the grand arc of economic history—and to make tools that will be usable by everyone, STEM majors or not. We’ll estimate, simulate, and argue about the quantitative shape of human economic history all the way from evolving foragers to the attention economy…

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Well, I have decided what the rest of my teaching load is going to be this forthcoming spring…

For quite some time now, I have been worried as I see CP Snow’s “Two Cultures” problem—the division between those for whom math is a way of thinking, and those for whom it is an obstacle to thought—growing bigger and bigger, as it steadily has since he laid it out nearly a century ago. And for some time now, I have been thinking that getting people comfortable with what are now called the “Data Science” tools—statistics, quantitative optimization, decision-making under uncertainty, basic operations research, and so on—are going to be for our students the equivalent of learning for their day what learning to write a fine chancery hand was for students at the mediæval university. And for some time now, I have been thinking we commit educational malpractice every time we allow a student to leave Berkeley without acquiring basic competence and comfort with numeroliteracy.

Back when I was in the rotation teaching the “applied math” version of undergraduate, macro economics, I had what I at least regarded as considerable success in moving my problem sets off of paper and into Python Jupyter Notebooks, and in the process and the process making them superior educational materials as engines of estimation and counterfactual simulation. But whenever I tried to move these things to my economic history courses, I found that the exercises I produced were (a) so simple as to be terminally boring for 1/3 of the students while also being (b) so complex that they were completely impenetrable to 2/3 of the students. I could not find the sweet spot. For 2/3 of the students who show up in my economic history courses, numbers, algebra, calculus, statistics, and so on are not tools for thought but rather arcane ritual stumbling blocks, where sometimes they can learn to mouth the proper responses, but still find them large obstacles to understanding.

So I am going to make one more attempt to shift this—this time by hand-picking twenty-five students for a seminar, meeting four hours a week, and watching them very closely to see what they find straightforward and what they find impenetrable:

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DRAFT: ECON 196: SEMINAR: Quantitative Long-Run Global Economic History

Mostly behind the paywall as it is only an early draft…

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The Best Things I Have Found on the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Neural Networks

It may simply be that I am in a very unusual position with respect to what I know & what I don't, but I found these three videos from Welch Labs to be incredibly enlightening with respect to the unreasonable effectiveness of neural-network models…

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Folding space: How back-propagation and ReLUs can actually learn to fit pieces of the world. Intuition is actually possible! Geometrically, neural nets work not by magic, but by folding planes into shapes—again and again, at huge scale, in extraordinarily high numbers of dimensions. Addition of innumerable such shapes composes simple bends into complex functions, and back-propagation finds such functions that fit faster than it has any right to.

But our geometrical intuition is limited. Our low‑dimensional brains misread the danger that a model might get “stuck” in a bad local minimum of the loss function, and not know which way to move to get to a better result. In large numbers of dimensions—when you have hundreds of thousands, or more of parameters to adjust what emerges looks to us low-dimensional visualizers as “wormholes.” As gradient descent proceeds, the proper shift in the slice you see reveals nearby, better valleys in the loss function down which the model can move.

Your mileage may, and probably will, vary. But these visual intuitions click for me. And I can at least believe, even if not see, how things change when our vector spaces shift from three- to million-dimension ones, in which almost all vectors chosen at random are very close to being at right angles to each other.

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From Welch Labs: <https://www.youtube.com/@WelchLabsVideo/videos>. The first of these (which was the third made) three “How Models Learn” videos is the one I found most illuminating.

As I understand its major points:

  1. The idea is to classify which locations are in Belgium and which are in Holland,

  2. You do this by constructing a 3-D surface, in which the x-axis is longitude, the y-axis is latitude, and the z-axis is your confidence that the location is in Holland.

  3. Anything you can do with an n-layer neural network you could do with a (much larger) single-hidden-layer network.

  4. Each node can be thought of as (a) taking a plane, (b) making a fold in it, (c) bending the fold up to a greater or lesser degree, and then (d) shift the resulting shape up or down.

  5. Your final shape is the sum of all of these bent, folded, and shifted planes.

  6. Stacking such layers composes many folds into a very rich piecewise-linear geometry.

  7. And so you can see how, with enough nodes, extraordinary flexibility is possible with a single hidden layer of nodes.

  8. But existence ≠ trainability: even with 100k neurons in one hidden layer, gradient descent may fail or simply need far too many nodes.

  9. Optimization beats existence: the universal approximation nature of a single hidden layer doesn’t get you to where the rubber meets the road.

  10. Depth of the network compounds expressivity: repeatedly folding, scaling, and combining surfaces yields far more complex tilings of input space than a single wide layer.

  11. Back-propagation has geometry: gradients shift fold lines and surface heights; learning is moving joints and planes to reduce loss.


And here is the video:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qx7hirqgfuU&list=FLupRdJE0AjQUa3Ab-fo88NQ&index=13>

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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VkHfRKewkWw&t=1s>

I learned less—but still a lot—that I could grasp and visualize from the second video, the one just above. Still, notably:

  1. Backpropagation is the workhorse of modern AI: a simple, scalable rule that updates millions to billions of parameters efficiently.

  2. With two inputs (latitude/longitude), neurons become planes; the model learns which plane sits “on top” per region.

  3. Simple linear models can’t carve intricate borders; they need depth/activation to capture complex partitions.

  4. The Belgium–Netherlands enclave map illustrates why naive linear boundaries fail and why architecture matters.

  5. History lesson: early skepticism vastly underestimated how far this mathematically modest method could scale with data and compute.

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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrO20Jb-hy0>

And still very much worth watching is the third video (the first made) above. Specifically:

  1. 3-D visualization is useful for intuition at small scale, but math (gradients, chain rule) is what actually handles the dimensionality.

  2. Gradient descent is the core learning rule, but our usual “downhill on a landscape” picture misleads for huge models.

  3. That means that loss landscapes for LLMs are effectively astronomically high‑dimensional; since parameters are tightly coupled, you need to examine gradients that provide a local “compass” of how the loss function value is varying in all dimensions at once

  4. There is a powerful “wormhole” effect when we try to visualize this with our limited 3-D brains: after a step in full-dimension space, the low‑dim region can appear to materialize in our low‑dim view.

  5. Thus local minima aren’t the showstopper once feared; in very high dimensions, getting stuck in every direction is unlikely.

  6. Backprop + gradient descent turns out to be a much more broadly applicable engine than a reasonable person would believe possible ex ante.

  7. The Bitter Lesson: effective learning emerges from simple rules applied at scale, not from clever analytical tricks.

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Neural networks aren’t as mysterious when you try to translate them into geometry. Each ReLU nearal-network unit “folds” a plane; layers compose folds into intricate, piecewise‑linear shapes that carve real‑world boundaries. Yes, a single hidden layer can approximate anything—but trainability matters, and gradient descent finds good solutions vastly more reliably when depth compounds expressivity. Welch Labs’ visuals make this concrete:

Belgium–Netherlands enclaves show how layered folds succeed. Start with a map: latitude, longitude, and a z‑axis of the degree of confidence the location is in Holland. Add neural-network ReLUs and watch each neuron fold space. And so simple bend, fold, shift, and add arithmetic neural-network unit by unit turns into true alchemy.

And the unreasonable effectiveness of neural-network models at scale suddenly appears less unreasonable.

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CROSSPOST: BRAD MUNCHEN Tesla is Rallying Again. Most Thought it Would Drop (Full Behind Paywall)

Fill your boots, as they say. An opportunity to make money both on the way up and on the way down is here again, like last December…

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Brad DeLong—not Munchen—here in this section: It is astonishing: the effectiveness of the theory that “we can make money by frontrunning the Big Boys as they manipulate stock prices” in driving short-run asset valuations of stocks on which internet social-media opinion focuses. And, to make the Worm fully Ouroboros, the ability of the Big Boys to actually manipulate stock prices is itself amplified by the availability of an army of options traders who believe they can make money by following this theory: their far out-of-the-money purchases then induce huge amounts of positive-feedback trading by those who sold them the options and need to delta-hedge their positions, and then amplify the delta-hedge on the way up with increasing gamma.

Massive short-dated call buying acts as a dog whistle to launch the process. Rallies don’t require fundamentals; headlines about robotaxi “permits” and autonomy “news” serve as triggers to juice options volumes. And, as Brad M. points out, these large “rallies for no reason” have been recurring since 2020; the current one aims at keeping Tesla above $350, then $400, and perhaps $500 into the November 6 planned vote. The incentive narrative: a huge CEO award and potential Tesla-to-xAI investment create reasons for Vested Interests to push the stock now:

  • Set the trigger: Drop a plausible catalyst (robotaxi permit, “autonomy progress,” proximity to a shareholder vote).

  • Load short-dated calls: Concentrated buying of near-the-money, near-dated calls spikes options volume.

  • Dealer hedging feedback: Market makers short those calls, then delta-hedge by buying the underlying. As price rises, gamma increases, forcing more buying—a reflexive loop.

  • Crowd amplifies: Day traders and funds chase momentum (“like last December”), pushing price toward round-number targets ($350 → $400 → $500).

  • Exit risk: When calls expire or positioning flips, the same mechanics can run in reverse.

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The possibility of this happening is, I think, the result of these features of the current market:

  • Short-dated options are ubiquitous and cheap: Weekly and even daily expirations let small money access big leverage.

  • Zero-friction retail infra: Zero commissions, fractional shares, and slick mobile UX enable fast crowd coordination.

  • Social signaling and headlines: “Permits,” “robotaxis,” and “AI” are easy dog whistles to time the options flood.

  • Dealer positioning is visible enough: Public data on open interest, implied vols, and flows makes handicapping squeezes part of the game.

  • Incentive alignment stories: The shareholder vote on a huge compensation package, plus the board vote on Musk’s tunneling money out of Tesla into xAI provide credible reasons to believe “the Big Boys” will try to keep Tesla’s price elevated through mid-fall.

  • And all of this depending on: valuation suspension: Tesla’s current 2025 earnings are estimated at roughly $1.79 a share. Musk got zero of the three things he thought he had arranged to get by striking a deal with Donald Trump—tariff exemptions, EV tax-credit continuation, the transfer of the NASA budget to SpaceX. And yet Tesla right now sells at $400: 238x EPS. But narratives and flows dominate, so traders are comfortable ignoring fundamentals—at least until a hard catalyst hits.

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Nobody is thinking that if Tesla were to be valued at the same forward 2026 earnings multiple as the others of the Magnificent Seven, it would trade not at is current $400 but $70. And, as Brad M. points out, where Tesla to be valued as an actual car company, “Tesla would be worth $17… 96% downside…”

Back before the Great Depression, on Wall Street we had:

  • Stock pools & tape-reading culture: In the 1920s, syndicates (“pools”) quietly accumulated shares, washed traded, and planted news to bid prices up. The public “rode” the pool when they saw the tape go.

  • Media amplification ^ tip sheets: Newspapers and brokerage bucket-shops spread the story flow that pools needed.

  • Loose rules, high leverage: Minimal disclosure, little enforcement, and easy margin enabled operators to move markets—and for small players to try to tag along.

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In short: operators would “paint the tape”; the crowd would try to surf behind them. Options purchases, corresponding delta-hedging, and then the “gamma squeeze” is a modern, more transparent, more mechanical analogue. The continuity with—rather, the revival of—the 1920s and before consists of: narrative catalysts, motivated insiders/“operators” with well-understood aims, feedback from flows, and a public eager to believe it could skate behind the Zamboni rather than find itself trying to pick up nickels in front of the steamroller. The break from the patterns of the 1920s and before is that the big “operator” here is often the structure of the call options market itself, with mechanical dealer hedging creating very reliable positive-feedback stock demand curves for those with eyes to see the setup first and act quickly.

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Gee, I guess—especially since I am unwilling to quote too much from behind Brad M.’s paywall—this really isn’t a crosspost, is it?

Is this in fact what is going on now?

Brad M. thinks so:

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And, so, now over to Brad M. of Motorhead:

Tesla is Rallying Again. Most Thought it Would Drop

Fill your boots, as they say. An opportunity to make money both on the way up and on the way down is here again, like last December.

Motorhead
Sep 13, 2025 ∙ Paid

Tesla is rallying hard on record-high call option volumes because Musk needs the share price to be high ahead of Tesla’s November 6 shareholders meeting (there’s a $1 trillion CEO compensation award and more at stake)….

Tesla… risen by 17% in… six trading days… no apparent reason…. Possible catalyst… Musk has a $1 trillion pay package up for a vote at the November 6th shareholders meeting…. 2 main reasons… [I] believe that this rally aims to get Tesla’s share price as high as possible ahead of the November 6th shareholders meeting….

  • Musk has a $1 trillion CEO performance award up for a vote, which would make his stake in Tesla 29% and worth $2.45 trillion if he manages to get Tesla to the market cap milestone of $8.5 trillion by 2030.

  • As important, from a liquidity standpoint for Musk, is the shareholders’ vote on whether Tesla can invest in Musk’s AI start-up, xAI, in which he holds a 54% stake. It’s a yes or no vote… could be more than… $5 to $10 billion… signals at least $2.7 billion to $5.4 billion of immediate cash for Musk.

With all this money to be had (by Musk’s design), I fully expect Q3 deliveries on October 2nd and Q3 earnings around October 23rd to be spectacular…. The current rally in Tesla’s stock is simply based on short-term momentum and has no regard for the huge Q4 pull-back in US demand, and the ensuing cash burn. But no one cares right now, because the Vested Interests in Tesla need the stock price to go up and, as is seen in Figure 1, juicing the options market always works: It’s like a dog whistle for day traders and hedge funds, who pile in and intensify the move upwards, like last December…

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Before ChatGPT, There Were Markets, Ministries, & Meritocracies—Our Oldest, Strangest Shoggoth-Like "AI"s

The gears of modernity: why our institutions are the original “machine minds”. “Kafka’s castle, Smith’s invisible hand, the Protestant ethic, and the Manhattan Project are slow-AI systems that have long built—and haunted—modern life. GPT LLM MAMLMs are just the latest wave…

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Consider the “slow-AI” systems that underpin what we glibly call “modernity”: markets, bureaucracies, and democracies.

These are not, of course, artificial intelligences in the sense of silicon-based neural nets or LLMs, but rather vast, distributed, algorithmic social technologies—embodied in rules, norms, and institutions—that process information and coordinate the actions of millions, even billions, of individuals. Markets, for example, aggregate dispersed knowledge about preferences and scarcities, translating them into prices that guide production and consumption. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is not magic; it is a computational device, one so powerful that it can, at its best, rival the most advanced optimization routines. Yet, as any student of economic history knows, markets are neither omniscient nor benevolent: they are prone to failure, manipulation, and—when left unchecked—can produce outcomes that are efficient only in the narrowest, most technical sense, while being socially catastrophic.

There are also: ideologies, corporations (not just for-profit ones), and professions. These, too, are algorithmic social technologies—ensembles of beliefs, organizational forms, and status hierarchies—that enable societies to coordinate at scale. Ideologies provide a shared cognitive map, a set of priors and heuristics that allow disparate actors to align their actions, even in the absence of direct communication. Consider how the Protestant ethic, as Max Weber argued, underpinned the rise of capitalism, or how the ideology of scientific progress fueled the institutionalization of research universities and laboratories. Corporations—whether for-profit, non-profit, or governmental—aggregate resources and channel human effort through managerial hierarchies, incentive structures, and mission statements. Professions, meanwhile, are defined by their self-regulating codes of conduct and credentialing mechanisms: the Hippocratic Oath, the bar exam, the tenure review. Each of these is a “slow-AI” in its own right, encoding and enforcing patterns of behavior across generations.

These are all necessary social technologies for making complex societal coordination possible.

Without them, the sheer scale and intricacy of modern societies would collapse into cacophony, and poverty. The construction of the transcontinental railroad, for example, required not just capital and labor but the coordinated action of bureaucrats, engineers, financiers, and politicians—each operating within their own institutional logic, but all ultimately bound by a latticework of rules and norms. The Manhattan Project, that apotheosis of mid-century technocracy, was less a triumph of individual genius than of institutional design: a network of laboratories, procurement offices, and military commands, all synchronized by protocols and reporting lines. In this sense, “modernity” is less the product of heroic individuals than of the slow, steady accretion of social machinery.

These are also all potentially and actually terrifying to those caught in their gears.

The very features that make these systems powerful—their impersonality, their scale, their capacity to operate according to abstract rules—render them opaque and unaccountable. The bureaucrat in Kafka’s castle, the worker in Chaplin’s “Modern Times,” the citizen confronting the faceless state: each is a testament to the alienation that can arise when human beings are reduced to cogs in a system. The 20th century offers no shortage of cautionary tales: the bureaucratic machinery of the Holocaust; the technocratic hubris of the Vietnam War’s “body count” metrics; the financialization of the economy that turned homes into tranches and people into data points. To be caught in the gears of these slow-AIs is, often, to be rendered powerless.

Henry Farrell, Cosma Shalizi, and their karass see MAMLM-driven algorithmic organization as the latest of such “shoggoths.” In his evocative metaphor, the Large Language Model (LLM) is a kind of shoggoth—a Lovecraftian creature of immense, inscrutable complexity, stitched together from the traces of human language and thought, yet operating according to logics that no individual can fully comprehend. But this is merely the latest iteration of a much older pattern: from the bureaucratization of the Roman Empire to the rise of the modern corporation, humanity has repeatedly conjured up organizational forms that exceed our individual understanding, and then struggled to render them legible, governable, and humane. The difference now, I guess, is that the pace has accelerated: the shoggoths are no longer slow, but fast, adaptive, and—potentially—autonomous.

The real challenge is to grapple with how these new systems will mesh with their older kin—hopefully yielding richer information channels, more humane bureaucracies, more successful democracies, and so on. The question is not whether we can halt the advance of algorithmic organization (we cannot), but whether we can steer it toward ends we actually desire. Will LLMs and their ilk serve to augment public reason, or will they become new instruments of manipulation and control? Will they democratize expertise, or entrench new forms of epistemic inequality? The optimistic scenario is one of productive synthesis: algorithmic tools that render bureaucracies more transparent, markets more efficient, and democratic deliberation more inclusive. The pessimistic scenario is, well, the shoggoth unbound.

But new technologies, even wildly successful and productive ones—whether technologies of nature-manipulation or human-organization—are swords with two edges. The printing press spread literacy and knowledge, but also enabled the proliferation of religious pamphlets and the wars of the Reformation. The telegraph shrank distances, but also enabled new forms of surveillance and financial speculation. Every advance in organizational technique brings with it new risks: principal-agent problems, collective action failures, perverse incentives. The challenge is not to reject new technologies, but to cultivate the institutional reflexes—regulatory, ethical, democratic—that can harness their power while containing their pathologies.

Francis Bacon, early in the 1600s, was enthusiastic about how the compass, gunpowder, and printing had transformed the world, potentially for very much the better. He saw in these inventions the promise of human mastery over nature, a new age of discovery and progress. Bacon’s optimism was, in retrospect, both prescient and tragically naïve—a reminder that every technological leap is embedded in a web of social relations, power struggles, and unintended consequences.

But the very tools that promised liberation became instruments of domination and destruction. The latter two—gunpowder and printing—were then also bringing about two centuries of near-genocidal religious war.

<https://www.programmablemutter.com/cp/169412731>

Programmable Mutter
Shoggoths amongst us
It’s a week since the Economist put up my and Cosma Shalizi’s piece on shoggoths and machine learning, so I think it’s fair game to provide an extended remix (which also repurposes some of the longer essay that the Economist article boiled down…
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HOISTED FROM OTHER PEOPLE'S ARCHIVES: Unprofessionals Spreading Misinformation Edition

In which John Cochrane claims that Walter Bagehot's "Lombard Street" & all subsequent analyses of lenders-of-last-resort are not economics...

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People are pushing back on me—nobody believing that John Cochrane in March 2009 was as moronic as he was.

Few people believing that in the late winter of 2009 one of the most important things Sebastian Mallaby thought he should do from his perch at the CFR was to run a conference in which people who understood anything at all about a financial crisis were as scarce as hen’s teeth.

But at least some of the lurkers in email will credit that, back in Those Days, the usually reliable Chrystia Freeland offered no pushback at all to a panel she was running that was, largely, insane.

However, it now can be found only at the WayBack Machine. CFR has trashed the record of its conference.

So here is what John Cochrane was saying back then:

Nobody in the Great Depression… was fooling enough to think that toxic assets were the problem or that the government, by somehow stirring up the liquidity of $10 trillion of toxic assets, was going to make the banks look all right again. This is an amazing fairy tale we've been telling ourselves for eight months now. Think of every step of the chain. Stirring the pot is going to make everything more valuable. Making everything more valuable is going to make the banks look solvent again. Making the banks look solvent again means people are going to start buying bank stocks. Banks are just dying to go and lend if only they had more equity -- it's not just going to happen. Well, that one we're inventing on our own.

My job is a finance professor so let me mention a few things about securities. Fundamentally what happed in the '20s to '30s and in the recent time to now has very little to do with the Fed. The risk premium was very low in the boom and is very high now. There's almost no economics that describes how the Federal Reserve, by monkeying around with three months of Treasury bills and reserves, can lower long-term interest rates, but absolutely no economics that says how the Federal Reserve is in charge of the risk premium, and that's what was going on. People were willing to hold mortgages, stocks, risky bonds at amazingly low premiums on the way up and now they want very high premiums on the way down. That's not something the Federal Reserve is in charge of.

Let me say something nice also about Glass-Steagall. It had many faults but its essential wisdom is that if there's something systemic that you're going to bail out, you draw a circle around that and then you say, this is not systemic and will be allowed to go under. That's what we're going to have to do, and our current Treasury plans still don't envision that. They envision we're going to let these monster businesses keep going and somehow perch a little fairy of regulation on everybody's shoulders to make sure they do the right thing. That just is not going to work.

General -- well, a last couple of general comments. Many things are depressingly the same. Policy is chaotic. Who would invest in this climate? It's not about toxic assets; it's about who wants to go in on a deal with Darth Vadar, who can change his mind at any moment? That's the uncertainty that's keeping things from getting going and that's what's slowing the rebuilding of financial markets. We're facing growth-destroying marginal tax rates, an excuse for the government takeover of large and completely unrelated sectors, class warfare, vindictive ex post taxations. This is the chance for a credit crunch -- which normally resolves itself fairly quickly -- to turn into a Great Depression. And perhaps most of all there is the danger of learning the wrong lessons; that our grandchildren will have to come back to the next meeting to say, what were the lessons -- the lessons mis-learned of the last time around?

My great hope is that the bounce-back will be quick before the quack medicine can be said to have worked. (Chuckles.) Just as we sort of -- as people think that this insane idea of fiscal stimulus -- which I'll go on with later if I get a chance -- came from Roosevelt's experience with no reason why it should work, there is a danger of thinking all of the crazy stuff they're doing now will have caused the bounce-back, if that happens, in five years, but my only hope is that it happens quickly and doesn't leave us with another Great Depression.

It’s not as if Cochrane thinks the entire subfield of financial-crisis-&-lender-of-last-resort economics from Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street through Charlie Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, & Crashes to, say, Andrew Hauser’s (2021) “From lender of last resort to market maker of last resort via the dash for cash” is wrong.

Cochrane is unaware that that subfield exists.

Which is a stunning and unprofessional degree of ignorance that still boggles my mind.

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On the Deeply Corrupt Republican Justices

Constitutional Moments & Constitutional Mischief: The Court, Trump, the Limits of Law, Emergency dockets, partisan rulings, and the peril of a judiciary that never expects to have to answer to the current loyal opposition…

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In the era of Trump, the Supreme Court’s conservative bloc has wielded the emergency docket as a weapon, dispensing unexplained, often incoherent rulings that favor Republican interests and undermine legal norms. Lower courts—once the backbone of judicial process—find themselves chastised for not divining the true intent behind these shadow decisions.

Thus the emergency docket has become a mechanism for partisan advantage as the Court’s Republican majority has repeatedly exempted Trump and his allies from established legal standards.

Is this how “constitutional moments” have, in reality, always worked? The Age of Jackson, Reconstruction, Reconstruction’s Reversal into Jim Crow, the New Deal, the Civil Rights Revolution—all those political causes won repeated elections by convincing majorities before “the Supreme Court follow[ed] the election returns”, as Finley Peter Dunne wrote in 1901. (The context? The Insular Cases, in which the Supreme Court decided, contrary to all previous practice and precedent, that the Constitution did not automatically follow the flag into newly-organized U.S. Territories when not just a few Amerindians but a lot of brown people already lived there, as was the case with Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.)

But this seems to be a different kind of Ackermanian Constutional Moment—one engineered not from popular votes and mobilized public opinion below, but fro above. Indeed, the future and existence of American democracy hangs in the balance.

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Steve Vladeck appears to at least contemplate that the Republican justices might be people one can at least attempt to reason with:

Steve Vladeck: The (Not-So-)Interim Docket <https://www.stevevladeck.com/p/177-the-not-so-interim-docket>: ‘Reflect… [on] Justice Kavanaugh’s (continuing) effort to rebrand the body of rulings the Court hands down on emergency applications as the “interim docket,” and his conciliatory tone… [to] judges…. The Grand Canyon-sized chasm between what Justice Kavanaugh is saying in public and what he (and a majority of the Court) is actually doing in these cases… [to] migrants who have been sent to third countries without due process… federal employees who have lost their jobs and have virtually no chance of getting them back… grant recipients who have lost funding on which their research has depended; and… lower-court judges who were chastised just two weeks ago by Justices Gorsuch and (you guessed it) Kavanaugh for not doing enough to guess what the implications of even unexplained interventions by the justices are….

Justice Alito insisted in his 2021 speech that these rulings don’t create precedents, [but] we now know better…. The Court has now repeatedly insisted that they do. And in his concurrence in the NIH case, Justice Gorsuch went further—heavily criticizing lower-court judges in three cases for defying the Court’s rulings on emergency applications…. If you’re a lower-court judge genuinely puzzling over how to handle the Court’s unexplained or thinly explained rulings in these cases, the lesson of the Gorsuch NIH opinion sure appears to be that judges must divine the substantive significance… and that,,, arguments for… distinguish[ing]… are only appropriate to consider if five justices are ultimately going to endorse them…. For Justice Kavanaugh to turn around on Thursday and play up the difficult position in which lower courts are finding themselves in these cases is rather striking given his own role in making their position so difficult in the first place….

Lawrence Hurley… [finds] lower-court judges… expressing mounting frustration…. If I were a Supreme Court justice… I would view that story as a massive red flag—and I’d be thinking about ways to provide reassurance… rather than (or, at least, in addition to) delivering empty platitudes at a semi-public judicial conference and trying to re-brand what those rulings are called, I might think about whether my own behavior in those cases ought to change. Alas…

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Here is Hurley:

Lawrence Hurley: In rare interviews, federal judges criticize Supreme Court's handling of Trump cases <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-trump-cases-federal-judges-criticize-rcna221775>: ‘Ten judges tell NBC News the Supreme Court needs to explain its rulings better, with some urging Chief Justice John Roberts to do more to defend the judiciary against external criticism…. Federal judges—appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents, including Trump, and serving around the country—pointed to a pattern…. Lower court judges are handed contentious cases involving the Trump administration. They painstakingly research the law…. When they go against Trump, administration officials and allies criticize the judges in harsh terms. The government appeals to the Supreme Court, with its 6-3 conservative majority. And then the Supreme Court, in emergency rulings, swiftly rejects the judges’ decisions with little to no explanation. Ten of the 12 judges who spoke to NBC News said the Supreme Court should better explain those rulings, noting that the terse decisions leave lower court judges with little guidance for how to proceed. But they also have a new and concerning effect, the judges said, validating the Trump administration’s criticisms. A short rebuttal from the Supreme Court, they argue, makes it seem like they did shoddy work and are biased against Trump. “It is inexcusable,” a judge said of the Supreme Court justices. “They don’t have our backs”…

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And Ian Millhiser sums it up:

Ian Millhiser: The overwhelming evidence that the Supreme Court is on Donald Trump’s team <https://www.vox.com/scotus/460270/supreme-court-republican-partisan-hacks-donald-trump>: ‘Welcome to the Supreme Court’s Calvinball era…. On August 21, the Supreme Court handed down a baffling order that required researchers, who claim that the Trump administration illegally cut off their federal grants, to navigate a convoluted procedural maze in two different courts. [Justice Ketanji Brown] Jackson labeled this decision “Calvinball jurisprudence with a twist.” Calvinball, an ever-changing game featured in the Calvin and Hobbes comic strip, “has only one rule: There are no fixed rules.” In this Court, Jackson continued, there are two: The rules always change, and “this Administration always wins.”…

The Court’s Republican majority now hands Trump several victories every month, only explaining themselves when they feel like it. When they do explain those decisions, they are often incomprehensible. The Republican justices exempt Trump from rules that apply to every other litigant, including the most recent Democratic president…. The most reasonable explanation for the Republican justices’ behavior is that they are acting in bad faith….

As the Court explained in Nken v. Holder (2009)… a party asking an appellate court to block a lower court decision while the case is still being litigated normally cannot prevail, even if they show they’re likely to win the case… [unless they] show that they “will be irreparably injured absent a stay,” and that a decision blocking the lower court’s order won’t do too much harm to the public interest or to third parties. But… the Republican justices appear to have exempted Trump and his administration from this requirement….

The Court’s decision in NIH is so convoluted that it is impossible to parse. But it appears to hold that researchers who lost their grants must first go to a federal district court to obtain an order saying the grants were illegally cut off, then defend that order on appeal, and then go to a different court (the Court of Federal Claims) to get a second court order requiring the administration to give them their money—a process that will likely take years…. the Court achieved partisan results simply by manipulating procedure. It played a similar game, with opposite results, when Biden was president…

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Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman had a theory of “constitutional moments”. Ackerman argued that it was a legitimate part of American governance to change the structure and meaning of the Constitution without going through the formal amendment process outlined in Article V. Ackerman argued that, occasionally, American governance shifted into a period of heightened public debate and mobilization, during which a political party proposed major changes to doing things that did more than stretch but rather contradicted previous and prevailing constitutional interpretations. When the public then repeatedly endorsed those changes through elections, those new statutes and practices become embedded in constitutional law, even without a formal amendment. Ackerman’s examples were Reconstruction, its late-1800s reversal with the coming of Jim Crow, the New Deal, and the 1960s Civil Rights Revolution. The Supreme Court accepted changes in the way the law worked and what the law meant as constitutional, despite the lack of formal amendments. In Ackerman's view, these “constitutional moment” shadow amendments were as fully legitimate as formal amendments, as they required broad public participation and consensus-building, rather than just elite negotiation.

I have long thought that the Age of Jackson should count as a constitutional moment as well. Andrew Jackson probably never actually said “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it”, but it is very clear, to me at least, that Chief Justice John Marshall had a Supreme Court majority behind him who thought (a) that stealing their land from the Cherokee was very bad juju, and (b) that when the black letter of the law required them to rule they would so rule to protect the Cherokee, but (c) they would use every procedural trick in the book to avoid having to actually rule to materially protect the Cherokee’s property—for a fight with Andrew Jackson was one that they would probably lose, to the long-run detriment of the court and the nation.

The difference between then and now is that (a) John Roberts is on Trump’s side in a way that John Marshall was not on Jackson’s, and (b) Jackson was genuinely popular in the nation as a whole—his brand of populism as to what America was and would become regularly won elections up until Stephen A. Douglas decided to push the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854.

The most scary thing to me is that this mode of behavior makes long-term sense for the six Professional Republican justices only under one condition. It makes sense only if the future that they contemplate is one of there never ever ever again being, simultaneously, a Democratic President, a Democratic Senate Majority Leader, and a Democratic Speaker of the House. For even the bluest of Blue Dog Democrats in the Congress, a Supreme Court focused on finding ways to make sure that laws passed by Congress do not bind a Republican President is unacceptable. And so breaking the constitutional principal that the Article I branch is the most powerful invites the complete neutralization of the future Supreme Court.

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Employment Growth Stalled: America's Labor Market in Tariff-Uncertainty Twilight

The Federal Reserve is boxed in—with neither a reduction in rates to fight possible recession nor an increase to fight possible inflation prudent—with sputtering payroll as continued random tariff threats cloud economic policy and Federal Reserve decision-making…

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Let me extend my note from Friday September 5, 2025 dawn:

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS#","body_json":{"type":"doc","attrs":{"schemaVersion":"v1"},"content":[{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Well, well, well: seasonally-adjusted, payroll employment in July was no higher than we had thought yesterday it had been in June. Our estimate of the June level has been revised down by 21,000—yes, the last report that maddened Trump was more optimistic than it looks now like the situation warranted. And the seasonally-adjusted gain from June to July was only 22,000:"}]},{"type":"blockquote","content":[{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","marks":[{"type":"bold"}],"text":"BLS"},{"type":"text","text":": Employment Situation Summary: ‘Total nonfarm payroll employment changed little in August (+22,000) and has shown little change since April, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported today. The unemployment rate, at 4.3 percent, also changed little in August. A job gain in health care was partially offset by losses in federal government and in mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction…. The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for June was revised down by 27,000, from +14,000 to -13,000, and the change for July was revised up by 6,000, from +73,000 to +79,000. With these revisions, employment in June and July combined is 21,000 lower than previously reported…"}]}]},{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Total gain over the past three months: 88,000, which 29,000 per month: genuine stall speed. "}]},{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"If the tariff situation were at all settled, this would put me on the side of looking through what are (probably) still one-off price-level increases and lead me, were I on the FOMC, to prefer an 0.50% policy interest rate cut."}]},{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"But the tariff situation is not at all settled, is it?:"}]},{"type":"blockquote","content":[{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","marks":[{"type":"bold"}],"text":"Josh Wingrove"},{"type":"text","text":": Trump Says ‘Fairly Substantial’ Chips Tariffs Coming ‘Shortly’ <"},{"type":"text","marks":[{"type":"link","attrs":{"href":"www.bloomberg.com/news/arti… ugc noopener","class":"note-link"}}],"text":"www.bloomberg.com/news/arti…},{"type":"text","text":">: ‘“Tim Cook would be in pretty good shape,” Trump said Thursday of the Apple chief executive officer…. “I’ve discussed it with the people here, chips and semiconductors, and we’ll be putting tariffs on companies that aren’t coming in,” Trump said. “We’ll be putting a tariff very shortly. You probably are hearing we’ll be putting a fairly substantial tariff, or not that high, but fairly substantial tariff”…"}]}]},{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So the right and prudent policy for the Fed at its September meeting is, still, to stand pat."}]},{"type":"paragraph","content":[{"type":"text","text":"<"},{"type":"text","marks":[{"type":"link","attrs":{"href":"fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PA… ugc noopener","class":"note-link"}}],"text":"fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PA…},{"type":"text","text":">"}]}]},"restacks":0,"reaction_count":0,"attachments":[{"id":"7b4feb74-0d49-4d40-95e8-f398a2836134","type":"image","imageUrl":"substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/im…},{"id":"1e5b1183-924b-41bf-9b21-87639152d80d","type":"link","linkMetadata":{"url":"fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PA…,"host":"fred.stlouisfed.org","title":"All Employees, Total Nonfarm","description":"All Employees, Total Nonfarm","image":"substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/im…},"explicit":false}],"name":"Brad DeLong","user_id":16879,"photo_url":"substackcdn.com/image/fet…}}” data-component-name=“CommentPlaceholder”>

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Well, well, well: seasonally-adjusted, payroll employment in July was no higher than we had thought yesterday it had been in June. Our estimate of the June level has been revised down by 21,000—yes, the last report that maddened Trump was more optimistic than it looks now like the situation warranted. And the seasonally-adjusted gain from June to July was only 22,000:

BLS: Employment Situation Summary: ‘Total nonfarm payroll employment changed little in August (+22,000) and has shown little change since April, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported today. The unemployment rate, at 4.3 percent, also changed little in August. A job gain in health care was partially offset by losses in federal government and in mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction…. The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for June was revised down by 27,000, from +14,000 to -13,000, and the change for July was revised up by 6,000, from +73,000 to +79,000. With these revisions, employment in June and July combined is 21,000 lower than previously reported…

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Total gain over the past three months: 88,000, which 29,000 per month: genuine stall speed.

If the tariff situation were at all settled, this would put me on the side of looking through what are (probably) still one-off price-level increases and lead me, were I on the FOMC, to prefer an 0.50% policy interest rate cut.

But the tariff situation is not at all settled, is it?:

Josh Wingrove: Trump Says ‘Fairly Substantial’ Chips Tariffs Coming ‘Shortly’ <bloomberg.com/news/arti…>: ‘“Tim Cook would be in pretty good shape,” Trump said Thursday of the Apple chief executive officer…. “I’ve discussed it with the people here, chips and semiconductors, and we’ll be putting tariffs on companies that aren’t coming in,” Trump said. “We’ll be putting a tariff very shortly. You probably are hearing we’ll be putting a fairly substantial tariff, or not that high, but fairly substantial tariff”…

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So the right and prudent policy for the Fed at its September meeting is, still, to stand pat. It is in a box, and there is no good path out of it until we get some policy stability.

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Given the corruption of the Trump Administration, it is probably time to shift my attention to the ADP employment series. It has problems, and is different from the BLS establishment survey in its biases in ways I do not understand. But my knowledge base from an adult lifetime of learning the biases and quirks of the BLS establishment survey is about to be burned in a fire, isn’t it? And looking forward big disagreements between BLS and ADP have to be presumed to be something going very wrong at the BLS.

Here’s ADP payroll, monthly changes:

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And here is the ADP monthly manufacturing change:

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From William Bolts to Jeff Bezos: John Cassidy Writes the Story of Capitalism as Seen in the Mirror of Its Discontents & in the Imagination of Its Alternatives

I cannot claim that this is in any sense the Director’s Cut—the actual Democracy Journal review is a very different beast entirely. I was supposed to write a 2000-word review of John Cassidy’s Capitalism & Its Critics. I wrote 10,000, which I then boiled down to 7,000. I then started over again, and wrote 2000, which is what is going to appear. But there is enough good thought here that I want to let it out into the world…

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Self-described as “a sweeping, dramatic history of capitalism as seen through the eyes of its fiercest critics…”, John Cassidy’s new book Capitalism & Its Critics has a very strong trinity of blurbs:

Capitalism and its Critics is everything that we’ve come to expect from John Cassidy. He weaves an engaging and trenchant discussion of key critics of capitalism over its more than 200 years into a history of capitalism itself. The battle is not only about economic ideas, but about the VERY nature of our society. Especially now, when some see the failures of capitalism as more than a little responsible for the Trumpian oligarchy, while others see its successes as ushering in a new era of AI-led prosperity, this is an illuminating and essential read. — Joseph Stiglitz , winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics and author of The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society.

And:

Fascinating and informative. The history of capitalism is told through the eyes and legitimate concerns of its most articulate critics. This is intellectual history at its best. Essential reading for anyone who wonders how the modern world wandered off course. — Simon Johnson, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics and coauthor of Power & Progress.

And

John Cassidy’s Capitalism & Its Critics is an impressive history of arguments about capitalism, from the industrial age to our time. Clear and accessible, it is an invaluable touchstone for current debates about economic renewal in our post-globalization moment. — Michael Sandel, author of The Tyranny of Merit.

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What do I think? Cassidy has written a panoramic intellectual journey through the turbulent, often tragic chameleon’s progress of something called capitalism. It is not an ordinary history—it’s a kaleidoscope of dissent, where the voices of critique echo overwhelming and loud. Cassidy’s cast of characters helps us rethink the system we often take for granted. Critics have always claimed they are heralds of its funeral, but the system keeps mutating. And so critiques of capitalism aren’t just academic, they are survival tools.

Cassidy opens with the story of William Bolts and the East India Company–not the usual starting point for histories of capitalism, but a brilliant one. Bolts, a former Company man turned whistleblower, exposed the violent contradictions of a corporation that had become sovereign in Bengal. Cassidy’s point here is not simply that early capitalism was brutal (it was), but that from the beginning, capitalism’s critics recognized the perils of combining monopoly, military force, and private profit. The themes of rent extraction, corporate overreach, and regulatory capture that Bolts illuminated in the 1770s echo loudly in our own age of Amazon, Google, Facebook—and Trump.

Throughout, Cassidy maintains a commitment to telling capitalism’s history through the eyes of its critics. This is, he admits, a conceit. But it is one that pays off handsomely. Consider his treatment of Marx. Cassidy focuses on Marx’s intellectual evolution—from the romantic alienation of the 1844 Manuscripts to the attempt at rigor trying to build an analytical theoretical orrery of surplus value and commodity fetishism. He sets Marx in motion–both literally, across Paris, Brussels, and London, and intellectually, in dialogue with Ricardo, Hegel, and the tumultuous world of 1848 and after. Marx is not an all-wise Dante-like guide here; he is a man struggling to understand the whirling, contradictory dynamism of capitalist development.

Cassidy’s Keynes, similarly, is rescued from the caricature of technocratic demand-management. The Keynes we meet is the architect of a fragile compromise—a world where markets are tamed but not abolished, and where the state becomes capitalism’s housekeeper. Cassidy gives us Keynes the moralist, Keynes the Cassandra of Versailles, Keynes the designer of Bretton Woods—ever wary of instability, ever distrustful of laissez-faire, but never tempted by revolutionary rupture. The contrast with his intellectual foil Friedrich von Hayek, who makes his appearance in the Thatcherite chapter, is deftly drawn.

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