Is Abigail Spanberger Seeking to Escalate or to De-Escalate Youngkin & Trump's Culture War?

Trustees of a university exist to be a buffer between the university as an academic body and the pressures upon it from politicians and other outsiders who do not well-understand the mission of a university. They do not exist to be transmission belts. My two cents are that Spanberger needs to constitute a set of UVA trustees who will be effective as the exact opposite of transmission belts. Will she?…

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My view: I have never met anyone who will say in private that Rachel Sheridan has the temperament to be anything other than a disaster as a trustee of any university.

Manning has been very generous to UVA, and a great ally to the university, and understands its mission deeply.

But nobody willing to serve as Trump’s messenger should be a trustee. The right thing for Manning to have said when talking to the Justice Department was: “I’m not your messenger boy. I’m here to tell you that UVA has the resources to strongly resist illegal harassment by the DOJ”. Manning did not do that. And so here we are:

Michael Schmidt & Stephanie Saul: Some U.Va. Board Members Asked to Resign as a Democratic Governor Takes Power <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/16/us/uva-resignations-abigail-spanberger.html>: ‘The incoming Democratic governor of Virginia, Abigail Spanberger, has asked at least five members of the board overseeing the University of Virginia who were appointed by her Republican predecessor to resign…. Among those… are Rachel Sheridan, the head of the board, and Paul Manning, a board member who is a major donor to the school. Both were appointed by the outgoing governor, Glenn Youngkin, a Republican…. There are 12 members of the Board of Visitors, which oversees the school, and all were appointed by Mr. Youngkin. The turmoil at the university over its board is the latest fallout from the decision last summer by the school’s president, Jim Ryan, to resign amid pressure from the Trump administration…. Some Virginia Democrats and school faculty members have been calling on Ms. Spanberger to have the new university president, Scott C. Beardsley, removed, saying that he was too hastily appointed by a board that refused to stand up to Mr. Trump. But it is unclear what Ms. Spanberger plans to do about Mr. Beardsley…. Some top Virginia Republicans were shocked by Ms. Spanberger’s decision. They believe that Mr. Manning has been integral to the school’s growth and that ousting board members will just continue the turmoil at the school. Mr. Manning, who made a $100 million donation to the school a couple of years ago, had a discussions with senior Justice Department officials in July in which they told him that Mr. Ryan had to go. “Paul Manning reached out directly to the D.O.J. lawyers to make sure he was not missing anything, and he said that they told him that if I didn’t resign, they would ‘bleed UVA white,’” Mr. Ryan later wrote in a letter about his firing…

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I commend the following paragraph from my somewhat right-wing brother-in-law Paul Mahoney, who was appointed Interim President after Ryan’s resignation, in his letter to the Trump administration:

Paul Mahoney: Community message from interim President Paul Mahoney <https://news.virginia.edu/content/community-message-interim-president-paul-mahoney>: ‘Thank you for your letter inviting comment on the proposed Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education. We wholeheartedly agree that “American higher education is the envy of the world.” We also agree with many of the principles outlined in the Compact…. We seek no special treatment in exchange for our pursuit of those foundational goals. The integrity of science and other academic work requires merit-based assessment of research and scholarship. A contractual arrangement predicating assessment on anything other than merit will undermine the integrity of vital, sometimes lifesaving, research and further erode confidence in American higher education…

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On Friday, December 19, 2025 Sheridan and company fired Paul from his job, rushing the search process for a permanent president in an extraordinary and unprofessional manner in order to get Beardsley into the chair before Spanberger’s inauguration. It is unclear to me that she had the power to do so: the UVA trustees are constituted as a 17-member Board of Visitors, of whom at least 12 must be Virginia residents and 12 must be UVA alumni. On December 19, 2025, the Board of Visitors had only 12 members total, of whom only 9 were residents and 9 alumni. The Board did not comply with the statutory requirement that it seek the advice of the Faculty Senate before choosing a new permanent president.

No, I do not understand why Beardsley would take the job. The odds were that any legal challenge would lead to a judge declaring that his appointment was ultra vires. And when was substantial impropriety, at least, in his appointment: The natural reading of Sheridan’s actions in short-circuiting the search is that she was desperately seeking to entrench a president who would enter into talks with the Trump administration to arrive at “a contractual arrangement predicating assessment [of the university and of governmental funding of it] on anything other than merit”. Being a university president is a very hard job these days. One can do it effectively only if, at a minimum, one begins how one intends to go on. And this was a bad beginning.

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: Four Years Ago Today: CONDITION: Manic!:

From 2022-01-16: A Note from the Galleys! (I have the galleys of Slouching Towards Utopia <https://bit.ly/3pP3Krk> to check this MLK weekend.) No Letters of Fire—but still damned good: DAMNED GOOD! My book that is. BUY IT! READ IT!! Expect no secret codes or immortal flames—just paragraphs that earn their keep, one by one.

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Reading the galleys in reverse, the prose sharpens and the mood tilts toward manic joy. Forget the hunt for esoteric commas; think paragraphs not fumbling but driving towards very good ideas. Every paragraph with either a real idea or an arresting factual gem to hang on the nail that is the idea to make it memorable. Every page with enough of a forward narrative “what happens next?” thrust to make the reader (or, at least, the author) want to turn the page. And the whole thing turning into a well-architected Memory Palace that does indeed promise that those who read jt from cover to cover will indeed leave having acquired a κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ, a treasure for all time.

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…And it is a long slog: I never trained my brain to see what is in front of my eyes as opposed to what my brain predicts should be in front of my eyes.

But as I do try to check it, going in reverse order from the back sentence by sentence in an attempt to see each one with truly fresh eyes and without preconceptions about what it must say, I find myself becoming more and more manic.

True: I see no letters of fire that will by the logic of iron necessity inscribe themselves on the minds and souls of readers, and thus make it κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ, a treasure for all time.

But it is damned good. Paragraph by paragraph, it is damned good. Damned Good. DAMNED GOOD!

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Back up to the spring of 1979, my first year of college: my best friend Michael Froomkin came up from New Haven, where he was going to school, to Cambridge. We wound up going to my Government 106B political philosophy lecture. Afterwards we went up to the podium, where the lecture, the God like Michael Walzer was gathering his notes, to join the people asking him clarifying questions. My friend Michael noted a striking difference between how Walzer dealt with the texts and what the teachers at Yale were doing. Straussians, that weird tribe. They were giving extraordinarily close and convoluted readings of individual sentences, as if every comma in a key sentence was supposed to carry deep weight, send you on a 10-minute reflection on what that comma might mean, and conclude that it reversed the apparent surface import of the sentence. (But, since you couldn’t do that for the whole book, you had to somehow pick out which were the key sentences to be tortured, and have their surface meaning reversed in that way. That, of course, meant that the shared coöperation between the reader and writer in information transmission became 99.9% reader, and only 0.1% the writer as sock puppet. Yes, persecuted writers and writers who feared persecution did not say all they meant. But you could not untangle it by picking twenty sentences and torturing them until they confessed.) Walzer, by contrast, treated each paragraph as one of a set of fumbling attempts by the author to put his finger on a set of concepts and ideas that they only dimly grasped.

Walzer replied that, first, we should not forget that this book, Machiavelli’s The Prince <https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.221835/page/n2/mode/1up>, was hastily written as an audition for a job in the post-coup Medici régime of Florence (and also as an attempt to make them realize that he was a useful tool they could use, rather than an obstacle to be tortured)—not one in which every comma was labored over to ensure that the key esoteric message was conveyed to a small hermetic circle of cognoscenti while escaping the notice of casual or even careful-but-not-initiate readers.

Walzer replied that, second, he had to view writers like Machiavelli and Locke as guys sorta like him—smarter than him and probably more insightful about the worlds they were enmeshed in, but also at a disadvantage since Walzer had more giants to stand on the shoulders of. And he, Walzer said, could not help but remember as he read them how he felt when he wrote a book:

  1. He started out with what seemed to be brilliant and irrefutable important insights that he could not quite see how to get down on paper.

  2. He wrote feverishly, confident that he was riding were letters of fire that would by the logic of iron necessity inscribe themselves on the minds and souls of readers for all time.

  3. But when the book emerged from the press—no letters of fire, just black-ink chicken scratchings, from which only a thoughtful and generous reader could derive the insights he had hoped to impart, which he, Walzer, now found inadequate and beyond his full grasp.

I am not having that kind of letdown right now. Not at all.


UPDATE: I was indeed very gratified, working backward to try (unsuccessfully) to sharpen my proofreading eyesight and to keep perception honest, to find that the galleys of Slouching Towards Utopia did indeed hold up—not as an eternal flame, but as genuine heat. Avoid fetishizing textual minutiae, honor the paragraph as the unit of thought, and trust the disciplined joy that surfaces when you actually see that what is there really is really good!

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CROSSPOST: SAM BOWLES: The Origin & Future of Economic Inequality

Enduring inequality didn’t “just happen”—we built our societies-of-domination, quite late in human history, with very specific technological & societal-organization tools. The Neolithic coming of agriculture supplied the raw materials for inequality—storable surplus, ownable productive assets—but egalitarian norms & institutions (“aggressive egalitarianism”) actively sit on them for millennia: public eating, communal storage, burial practices that block dynastic display, even deliberate destruction of productive capital to prevent bequests. Inequality shows up, but as short‑lived “aggrandizer” episodes, not as durable structure.
Then about the year -3000 come the technological shifts to land‑limited production (ox‑drawn plow, etc.) that makes land the binding factor and raises the payoff to holding material capital; the rise of an archaic protostate to tax, conscript, and reliably back property claims, stabilizing elite positions; & slavery, which turns labor itself into heritable material capital & allows even labor‑intensive technologies to behave like capital‑limited regimes.
In this very long run view, modern capitalism is just another material‑capital‑intensive regime. & doubling down on enclosure via intellectual property is the slavery move all over again: trying to transform a non‑excludable human capacity into tradable, dynastic material wealth. Democracy, social insurance, unions, & redistributive fiscal policy could keep a knowledge‑ & care‑intensive economy from reproducing Bronze‑Age inequality levels with digital means…

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Major Takeaways from Sam:

  • In Bowles’s Vision of the Cosmic All, enduring economic inequality is not a timeless feature of human societies but the result of specific technologies, institutions, and political failures. Inequality is historically contingent.

  • Wealth inequality stayed low for millennia—even after agriculture—because of “aggressive egalitarianism”. Early farmers were no more unequal than hunter‑gatherers because strong egalitarian norms and deliberate institutional designs (public storage, anti‑dynastic burial practices, even destroying productive assets) actively suppressed inequality. Humans spent most of prehistory as a relatively egalitarian ape.

  • Neolithic societies invested in norms and practices—public eating, communal storage, egalitarian burial regimes, deliberate destruction of capital—to prevent wealth from becoming dynastic. Aggressive egalitarianism was real and costly.

  • Average wealth Gini coefficients stay low from about 10,000 BCE until the Bronze Age. Then wealth inequality exploded in a relatively brief Bronze-Age window in western Eurasia—that was when land‑limited technologies (ox‑plow), proto‑states, and slavery jointly made inequality durable. Agriculture alone didn’t cause enduring inequality.

  • Since then, wealth inequality has not done much. then jump to roughly 0.7 and remain at that high level—with no clear long‑run trend—from the Bronze Age to today. The action is in the early Bronze Age.

  • Bowles models persistent inequality as arising from the strength of intergenerational wealth transmission interacting with the sizes of random shocks, with material wealth much more heritable than skills or social ties. Material wealth transmits and polarizes more than skills or networks.

  • Stationary inequality in log wealth is proportional to the variance of shocks divided by 1 − β², with β the hereditary transmission coefficient. Land‑limited societies, societies with archaic states, and societies with both archaic states and slavery each shifted progressively toward higher wealth Ginis, relative to labor‑limited, stateless societies. Stronger transmission (higher β) nonlinearly amplifies inequality from shocks.

  • Bowles sees the Engels‑style “surplus did it” story is inadequate: what matters is how plows, private land, political power, and slavery turned surplus into entrenched class structures. Proto‑states enable elites to tax, conscript, and defend wealth. Slavery converts labor into inheritable material capital. State power and slavery “lock in” inequality. :

  • Bowles suspects today’s knowledge‑ and care‑intensive economy could, politically, push us back toward more egalitarian arrangements, if we resist enclosing information as private property.

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OK. Now what do I think? Four things come to mind immediately with respect to why inequality is a problem for human societies:

  1. utility amount distribution,

  2. the negative-sum dynamic of spite and envy in addition

  3. being bossed around either directly or by a system that sees you only if you control, wealthy profit,

  4. enforced by violence.

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Plus I have some (perhaps considerable?) worried that the stylized facts are not what Bowles thinks they are, or should be presented in a different way than Bowles does. Three things come to the forefront, I think:

  1. I have a hard time crediting the stability of inequality post the year -3000. Yes, the coming of bronze and writing and the consequent technological gulf—the bronze hoe, plough, and sword on the one hand and the written record on the other—was a YUGE deal. But there have been a huge number of very big changes since in technologies of nature-manipulation and societal-organization. And not just technologies of production narrowly specified. Technologies of distribution, communication, information, and domination as well. If all of those changes did not have effects we can see on a set of inequality measures, perhaps those inequality measures are not what we really should be looking for—not good ways of summarizing the human experience.

  2. Suppose we have two societies-of-domination, with the same amount of inequality in each. How much violence is needed to maintain that inequality can and does vary very widely—both in extractive élite-poor interactions, and within the élite’s dealings with itself and with neighboring or potentially competing candidates to be top dog among the élite. This matters. I see faily large distinction between land-focused and seaborne empires, between societies that take at the point of a spear and those that structure terms of bilateral exchange—Helden und Händler—between empires and confederations. By contrast, I do not see big differences between lowland countries and highlands: the risks of being dominated seem about equal in Britain in 1740 with respect to living under the aegis of King George II Hanover or under the aegis of Angus, Chief of the MacLeods at Glenfinnan.

  3. With respect to Gini Coefficients: the underlying motivation is that the Gini Coefficient tells you, if you interact with other members of society at random, how much inequality is present at and potentially structuring that interaction. But people do not interact with other members of society at random. Network patterns matter—a lot. A star-network society with the rich at the center of the star will make the experience of being bossed and being under constraint much more salient, as a much larger share of interactions are between rich and poor than in a society in which people interact at random.

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And, of course, Sam Bowles knows all of this better than I do.


Sam Bowles (Nov 19, 2025): The Origin & Future of Economic Inequality. University of Chicago. Harris School. Stone Center <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lV-9-qoSX2o>:

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MAMLM-cleaned transcript! Check against original at: <www.youtube.com/watch>:

2025 11 19 Bowles Inequality Mamlm Cleaned Transcript
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Query to Self: Is It, This Semester Worth Incorporating in My Classes My Introductory Digression on: "The Liberal Arts, Education, & 'AI'"?

Masters of the Liberal Arts, or servants of the machine? Education as learning how to jack in to the real ASI—the Anthology Super-Intelligence of the collective human mind. The skills needed by free people living by their wits just got more, not less, important with the coming of “AI”: use “AI” to deepen our connection to humanity’s knowledge stack—or let it quietly hollow us out…

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I have a new set of slides for this perennial topic I sometimes include and sometimes don’t—short, very short:

2026 01 15 Lecture Slides Introductory Digression Latin Ars Skill Liber Free
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Latin is, for once a useful starting point. Ars is skill. Liber is free. The artes liberales—the liberal arts—were, at their origins, not high-minded exercises in self-expression or vague “critical thinking,” but rather the skills appropriate to a free man. That phrase, “free man,” is already doing a lot of work. In context, it meant someone:

  • Not bound to onerous obligation;

  • Not fixed in place to obey the will of another—not a slave or a serf;

  • But also not a military-judicial aristocrat near the top of a society-of-domination hierarchy;

  • Not a guild master and not a large property owner;

  • Not somebody with ample societal power, and conversely not somebody with strongly negative power either.

The liberal arts the toolkit that allowed one who had no land, no inherited office, no fixed corporate-body privilege, to navigate the world. They were about surviving and thriving in a complex, literate, institutional society in which your only capital was what you knew and how you could use it. Thus away the Latin and the robes from the medieval university and you find something remarkably contemporary: a curriculum for people whose main asset is their brain.

To wit:

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CROSSPOST: Alan Wolff: Bamboozled: What made anyone think the Trump tariffs were legal?

A phantom emergency power allowed Trump to blow up the constitution with respect to tariff and revenue: the first separation-of-powers victory ever won over England’s Plantagenet kings by the House of Commons thus falls without a whimper. Now the Supreme Court come very late—deliberately very late—to the party: but the six neofascist justices have rendered decisions with none of statutory, constitutional, logical, or philosophic underpinnings before, whenever they wanted to, or were scared not to. It was bad history and cowardly politics that broke this particular set of guardrails. The only way to pretend it was legal was to lean on a botched folk memory of Nixon’s 1971 surcharge and to assume that neither Congress nor the courts would seriously push back. They didn’t. What failed here was the non-Democrats in office sworn to uphold the Constitution, as something contrary to its plain text, original intention, original public meaning, or pattern as a living document nevertheless ruled…

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The key takeaway here:

Alan Wolfe: Bamboozled: What made anyone think the Trump tariffs were legal? <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2026/bamboozled-what-made-anyone-think-trump-tariffs-were-legal>: ‘Three courts found correctly that IEEPA included no extensive tariff authority, if it had any at all. But the strange history of Nixon’s surcharge with the incorrect supposition that he had invoked TWEA persists…. It was convincing to four Federal Circuit appellate justices (none appointed by President Trump) for them to find this last year that broad tariff authority did exist in the more recent statute IEEPA…. [But] the claimed emergency tariff authority, not even mentioned in the statute, and not anywhere recorded in Congress’s consideration of the legislative authority cited by the president’s lawyers, never existed at all…

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The legal authority to impose Trump’s tariffs never existed. But what did exist was a Republican congressional leadership that wanted to avoid picking any fights with Trump they could avoid, no matter how stupid and destructive the policies; Republican congressional sheeple scared of Trump’s hold over their core electoral base and tribally unwilling to join with Democrats to vindicate the separation of powers or even, you know, stop destructive policies; and a Supreme Court anxious to blow up procedure whenever it delays something of Trump’s that its six-member neofascist majority likes, and eager to slow-walk anything that might wind up with them picking a fight with Trump they think they have a chance of losing.

Hence constitutional government went completely out the window last April 2.

One—I, at least—am once again reminded of Andrew Marvell:

Andrew Marvell (1650): An Horatian Ode upon Cromwell’s Return from Ireland <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44683/an-horatian-ode-upon-cromwells-return-from-ireland>: ‘Much to the man is due,
Who… by industrious valour climb[s]
To ruin the great work of time,
And cast the kingdom old
Into another mould.
Though justice against fate complain,
And plead the ancient rights in vain;
But those do hold or break
As men are strong or weak…

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An entire political structure composed of very weak people indeed, without either testicles or ovaries. “A Republic, if you can keep it”—so said Benjamin Franklin. But an entire Republican Party political structure not just unwilling to try to keep it, but eager out of fear, cowardice, and enervation to throw it away.

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<https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2026/bamboozled-what-made-anyone-think-trump-tariffs-were-legal>

Bamboozled: What made anyone think the Trump tariffs were legal?

Alan Wm. Wolff (PIIE)
January 15, 2026 9:25 AM

The American people deserve an explanation on how the president of the United States on April 2 last year announced the largest tariff package in modern history with no action by Congress. It is not the province of the president to set tariffs. This is entirely within Congress’s power. It is true that the Congress has delegated the power to the president to use tariffs for certain limited purposes, but very selectively, and hedged with strict conditions.

The US Constitution is quite clear that tariffs are entirely Congress’s prerogative. How could what Trump did happen? How could it even be a matter for litigation to prove the point that it was unauthorized? Presidents have proposed tariff legislation, they have signed tariff bills the Congress has passed, and they have administered some tariffs selectively under delegated authority. They have never imposed a single tariff, whether on steel, semiconductors, or peanut butter, without first getting a grant of authority from Congress. Not in any one’s wild imagination (saving the current president) could a president impose across-the-board tariffs against all products from all countries, on any authority said to have been granted.

There are reasons for this debacle. It comes from a complete misreading of the US law and history. In normal times, it would be worth a serious congressional investigation into why this happened. That will have to await the Congress reestablishing itself as a co-equal branch of government.

What happened? The president declared an emergency last April. Congress, the American people at large, and the countries with which we trade, were caught completely off guard, even though President-elect Trump had repeatedly said that he would impose massive tariffs.

As president, Trump declared an “emergency.” Everyone knew there really wasn’t one, the kind for which it would make sense to invoke a sort of martial law for trade. But “emergency” is a very imprecise word. The facts: Nothing out of the ordinary had occurred. Perhaps US trade deficits had begun to add up. But there had been no single shocking event, no calamitous fall in the dollar’s exchange rate. Interest rates were stable. It was just another year. The economy was growing. But there was a law on the books, pretty much the same since World War I, allowing the regulation of trade in an emergency. With the word “emergency” nowhere defined, presidents had gotten used to declaring emergencies all too often, some 77 of them even before Trump returned to office. The statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), was used to impose economic sanctions, to deal with transactions with the likes of the Palestinian group Hamas and North Korea. IEEPA is not a general trade statute. It does not mention tariffs. Within the purposes for which it had been applied, it made sense to limit trade with bad actors, those who would harm the United States. Who else but the president should Congress have given authority to, to declare emergencies? It would destroy the usefulness of the statute if Congress has to begin deliberating about what an emergency is when a real one comes along.

The built-in guardrail was that Congress could override the declaration of emergency. But in an unrelated Supreme Court case, a vote in both houses of Congress was found to need the president’s signature to have any effect. This was accompanied by a natural reticence of the courts to seek to overturn a presidential emergency. Who told the judges they should intervene in matters of the highest national importance in foreign affairs, it would be argued. Result: Carte blanche was given to the presidency; there would effectively be no guardrails.

Then there was the matter of precedent. It was said that President Richard Nixon had imposed an import surcharge in 1971 during a real balance of payments emergency using predecessor authority, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). In 2025, numerous trade experts and three courts set off looking at the “precedent” of the supposed use of the 1917 statute. A clue should have been that that Nixon’s proclamation did not cite that authority. But the president’s proclamation was drafted in tight secrecy. Outside of two Treasury Department lawyers, only the Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist (later Supreme Court chief justice) saw it. In fact, the historical record is now crystal clear that President Nixon had been adamant in discussions with his aides at closed meetings at Camp David, again secret at the time, that he was not going to invoke the wartime emergency authority because it was an insult to call our allies “enemies.”

Why does this matter? Because when President Trump did employ emergency authority, the 1971 tariff use precedent was baked into legal lore, that in an emergency, Nixon had imposed an import surcharge for a very short time (four months). That should not have mattered for events 50 years later. And the mistaken belief persists to this day that Trump could do the same with tariffs in an emergency as had been done under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the nearly identical predecessor to IEEPA that Trump invoked. But two generations ago, desiring to stop a repeat of what Nixon did with tariffs (although he in fact had used other authority), Congress passed a law in 1974 that in a balance of payments crisis, the president could impose up to an additional 15 percent tariff for up to 150 days. After that, the Congress would take over total control of setting tariffs. Congress had declared what to do in an emergency, and the authority was tightly limited.

In 1977, Congress restored the general emergency authority, IEEPA, trimmed down, for peacetime use. But no one thought it provided general tariff authority. The statute does not even mention tariffs. It is telling that the bill to create IEEPA was not referred to the committees with jurisdiction over tariffs. Congressional committees are very jealous of their jurisdictions. It cannot have been an oversight on their part to have ignored the passage of a bill that could equally be used to impose additional tariffs on everything from everywhere. As international trade lawyer Leonard Shambon explains, “neither committee with tariff jurisdiction believed that the bill concerned any significant delegation of tariff authority to the President.” It was an economic sanctions bill.

On the Trump tariffs, three courts found correctly that IEEPA included no extensive tariff authority, if it had any at all. But the strange history of Nixon’s surcharge with the incorrect supposition that he had invoked TWEA persists: Government lawyers argued 50 years ago and again in 2025 that these two authorities, TWEA and IEEPA, contained emergency broad tariff authority. It was convincing to four Federal Circuit appellate justices (none appointed by President Trump) for them to find this last year that broad tariff authority did exist in the more recent statute IEEPA.

This was how the Trump “reciprocal” tariff case finally got to the Supreme Court, which is about to rule on one of the most important constitutional questions of our age—on the separation of powers between the Congress and the president.

The claimed emergency tariff authority, not even mentioned in the statute, and not anywhere recorded in Congress’s consideration of the legislative authority cited by the president’s lawyers, never existed at all.

It is fitting that during the 250th year celebration of the country’s birth that it is recognized that the constitution granted the power to set tariffs to the Congress not the president.

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Thinking of a Very Loose Coalition as an Organism with a Single Heart, Mind, & Will Makes You Stupid

Thinking of a very loose coalition as an organism with a single heart, mind, & will makes you stupid. Or, at least, it makes your audience stupid to the extent that they believe you—& for some malevolent actors, that is what they want. If you think “Congress doesn’t care” about ICE murderings, you’ve already lost the plot. The story that matters is about specific legislators, specific incentives, and a Republican Party that (largely) has a Party Line and punishes Line Wobbles far more effectively than its Democratic rival. This is of broad applicability—I see this most often in the difference between Democratic professional economists who are economists first, and Republican professional economists who are Republicans first. But right now we see it at work all across the entire American spectrum of American governance…

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Hoisting this from SubStack Notes <https://substack.com/profile/16879-brad-delong/note/c-199669299> up to the main Grasping Reality feed, because it is important:

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The extremely sharp Krenik writes:

Krenik: <https://substack.com/@macrothinking/note/c-199507887>: ‘‘“Democrats” is just a collective term for a group of people who tend to vote the same way and also those people who they elect. There is no organisational structure that can decide what Democrats should or should not do. To ask “what can Democrats do?” is a category error, similar to asking “what can Nebraskans do?”. This gets to the heart of the failure of American politics. Power is distributed to individuals, not parties, and there is no way to get them to agree on things because there is no consequence for defection. Ditto for Republicans…

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I 100% agree with his main point: Krenik has this right: There is no Central Committee for the Democratic Party that sets out a Party Line, and enforces it by imposing consequences on those who engage in Line Wobbles. So to say “Democrats”, as if it is a unified anthology intelligence with a single position, a single rationale, and a single will is to commit a grave category error. When it is made by people, they are either (a) engaged in making themselves stupid, or (b) malevolently misinforming their audiences. You can excuse people, on the grounds that we are all hair-trigger primed to attribute human-level consciousness, intellect, and intention to things that do not have it—to individual lions or to the collectivity of a prey species or to the goddess of the hunt or to the thunderstorms. And this extends to collections of us East African Plains Apes, whether Uma’s band, the Imperial Japanese Empire, the Knights Templar, or rthe Democratic Party. But when you do this attribution you need to be very careful, because it is a significant failure mode of human reasoning.

And I would double down on my claim that when people do it, they are either:

  • engaged in making themselves stupid, or

  • malevolently misinforming their audiences

For example, something that annoyed me yesterday. The shape Steve Vladeck claiming that their is an organization called “Congress” with a single mind, will, and intention that is fine with ICE’s murderings and does not actually care:

Steve Vladeck: <https://substack.com/@delongonsubstack/note/c-199259864>: ‘It would take a two-word amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to subject ICE agents and other federal law enforcement officers to the same liability for constitutional violations that local and state officers currently face. If Congress actually cared about what it’s seeing, it could pass that overnight…

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My knee-jerk intemperate response: May I say that every time somebody makes the pathetically stupid—when it is not malevolently disinformational—intellectual-cognitive error of writing about “Congress” as if it were a single animal with a single unified mind and set of goals, I really want to puke? Steve Vladeck is smarter than this. Or, at least, I had thought he was <https://substack.com/@delongonsubstack/note/c-199259864>.

Let me expand:

There are Democrats in Congress who do care, but are powerless. There are some Republicans in Congress who care, and who could join with Democrats to get it done, but who fear the consequences for their careers—and, quite possibly, for their and their families personal safety, not being rich enough to be able to afford intensive private security. And there are Republicans in Congress and outside who are absolutely fine with ICE’s murderings. But there is no single entity “Congress” that does not actually care. And Steve Vladeck is making himself and his audience stupider by claiming that there is.

My old teacher Mancur Olson would, at this point, tell me that I am putting it too strongly. He would start talking his book about The Logic of Collective Action, and the importance of selective incentives in turning a heterogeneous collection of East African Plains Apes going every which-way into at least a somewhat unified group pointing in the same direction that can, for some purposes, be usefully modeled as an anthology intelligence with a single consciousness, point of view, and intention. But, as Krenik observes, “ask[ing] ‘what can Democrats do?’ is a category error…. [With] individuals… there is no way to get them to agree on things because there is no consequence for defection…”

And yet, you say, isn’t there a sense in which, if there isn’t an entity “Congress” that does not care about ICE’s murderings, there is an entity “Republicans” that doesn’t care? Can you find me a single Republican who cares, and so who wants to amend 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to subject ICE agents and other federal law enforcement officers to the same liability for constitutional violations that local and state officers currently face?

I cannot find any such who will say this in public. Yet I will still say no, there isn’t any single entity “Republicans” that does not care.

I would say that there is a group, “Republicans”, that is right now undertaking actions that cannot be easily distinguished from what an anthology intelligence that did not care would undertake. But you have to immediately qualify this with the phrase in public—in private, a surprisingly large number of them are horrified, or claim to be horrified when talking in private to Democrats.

So why do these shut up in public? As Mancur Olson would say: because there are selective incentives here. Krenik is substantially wrong when he says “Ditto for Republicans” with respect to the existence of “consequences”, and thus the tendency for them all to fall in line.

I know this best and in most detail in economic policy. So consider my old teacher, the late Marty Feldstein:

Marty Feldstein got into immense trouble in the 1980s with respect to his position as a Republican Grandee of economic policy. Why? For not shutting up over 1982-1984 about the likely damage that the Reagan deficits would do to the economy.

Now Marty was right about the damage. But that he was right cut no ice with respect to his standing as a Republican Grandee of economic policy:

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The Reagan deficits diminished investment in America by pushing up interest rates, began the substantial erosion of American’s midwestern manufacturing communities of engineering practice via their high-dollar consequences, produced significant headwinds for economic growth, prolonged the productivity slowdown of the 1970s for an extra decade—until Bill Clinton and all of his spear-carriers, both those of us in the administration and the Democratic congressional caucuses, fixed it in the early 1990s. (And then George W. Bush 43, his spear-carriers (I’m looking at you and many others, Greg Mankiw; and at you, Alan Greenspan, for unlike Marty you did not dare try to get in their way), and the Republican congressional caucuses broke it again in the early 2000s.

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Contra Marx, the Record Since 1870 Is Rotating Upheavals in Leading Sectors, Not Synchronized Economy-Wide Revolutions

Josef Schumpeterian sectoral creative-destruction vs. Karl Marxian economy-wide transformation of base with impacts on superstructure: Marx promised rupture once technology fettered property relations; history delivered sectoral churn and chronic institutional lag; let us try to keep the soft‑true elements & discards the millenarian theological stagecraft in Marx…

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Columbia’s Adam Tooze said last week that he is thinking a lot about the 1859 Preface to Karl Marx’s abysmal A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.

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He does not say why:

Adam Tooze: Top Links 976 <https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/top-links-976-ai-investment-surges>: ‘[Karl Marx] “Men… enter into definite relations… independent of their will… [with] their material forces of production…. [That] constitutes the economic structure of society… on which arises a legal and political superstructure and… consciousness…. Material productive forces… come into conflict with… [property] relations of production… [which] turn into their fetters [on development]. Then… social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure…. Ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight… out… the contradictions of material life….

New superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured…. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve….

In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs…. The bourgeois mode of production is the last… form… antagonistic… emanat[ing] from the individuals’ social conditions of existence—but… bourgeois society create[s] also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes…

Refer a friend

But I can say why I, at least think about this. Divide the passage into six threads:

Let us look at the passage. (I have reparagraphed the passage to make the separate thoughts clearer.) Here we have, working backward:

  1. Theology: the millenarian claim (made in 1859!) that the end was at hand of the long era in which human societies were societies of domination,

  2. Stage Theory of History: The six modes of production—tribal, Asiatic, ancient, feudal, bourgeois, and socialist—as the successive stages of human history, social revolutions driving the transitions between them.

  3. Theology: Refracted through Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis: the claim that history has an arrow of progress driven by econo-political change.

  4. Sociology & Ideology: The conflicts generated by the rupture between old relations of production and the requirements of the new, growing forces of production play themselves out in ideological forms.

  5. Political Economy: Relations of production constrain technological development and investment, and then constraint fails as society’s property order is broken by social revolution.

  6. Historical Materialism: The relations of production have to be fitted to the technology of society and thus to the way people experience their worklife. And then everything else has to be fitted to that

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And I argued <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/six-analytical-threads-in-search>:

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CROSSPOST: MARCY WHEELER: Annals of Sanewashing: NYT Labels Trump’s Confession of Psychological Unfitness as Leadership

ORANGE MAN CLINICALLY INSANE. AND VERY BAD. Plus “The New York Times” a mendacious lying enemy of truth and freedom yet again through a to-the-max parody of sanewashing: the “Times” calls “madness” “leadership”, turns a Greenland tantrum into “statesmanship”, and dares not say Trump is unhinged. Access journalism keeps translating blatant narcissism into respectable foreign policy, NSD as Trump confesses his psyche comes first; the paper of record dutifully calls it “protecting the West.”, and “real estate mogul’s eye” stands in for “has no business near nuclear codes”…

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Marcy Wheeler: <https://www.emptywheel.net/2026/01/09/annals-of-sanewashing-nyt-labels-trumps-confession-of-psychological-unfitness-as-leadership/>: ‘Remember the term “sanewashing,” which Parker Malloy used to describe how the press minimizes Trump’s ramblings to describe them as something reasonable to people who don’t see them personally?

Four years ago, in an article for Media Matters for America, I warned that journalists were sanitizing Donald Trump’s incoherent ramblings to make them more palatable for the average voter. The general practice went like this: The press would take something Trump said or did—for instance, using a visit to the Centers for Disease Control to ask about Fox News’s ratings, insult then–Washington Governor Jay Inslee, rant about his attempt to extort Ukraine into digging up dirt on Joe Biden, and downplay the rising number of Covid-19 cases in the U.S.—and write them up as The New York Times did: “Trump Says ‘People Have to Remain Calm’ Amid Coronavirus Outbreak.” This had the effect of making it seem like Trump’s words and actions seemed cogent and sensible for the vast majority of Americans who didn’t happen to watch his rant liv…

This “sanewashing” of Trump’s statements isn’t just poor journalism; it’s a form of misinformation that poses a threat to democracy. By continually reframing Trump’s incoherent and often dangerous rhetoric as conventional political discourse, major news outlets are failing in their duty to inform the public and are instead providing cover for increasingly erratic behavior from a former—and potentially future—president.

The consequences of this journalistic malpractice extend far beyond misleading headlines. By laundering Trump’s words in this fashion, the media is actively participating in the erosion of our shared reality.

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These three paragraphs about why Donald Trump wants to take over Greenland when the US already has a base there, the rights to establish more bases, the ability to mine its minerals really exist in NYT’s third milking of their interview with Donald Trump:

“Ownership is very important,” Mr. Trump said as he discussed, with a real estate mogul’s eye, the landmass of Greenland — three times the size of Texas but with a population of less than 60,000. He seemed to dismiss the value of having Greenland under the control of a close NATO ally.

When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

The conversation made clear that in Mr. Trump’s view, sovereignty and national borders are less important than the singular role the United States plays as the protector of the West.

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First of all, NYT interjected that “real estate mogul’s” comment; I assure you, Trump is not going to start building hotels in Greenland.

But more … uh … insane still, after Trump describes contemplating blowing up the alliance that has been the centerpiece of American national security since World War II out of a psychological need to own other people and other countries, nothing more, the NYT describes it to be a comment about Trump’s imagination that he is “the protector of the West.”

You’re both fucking insane! Donald Trump, for contemplating making the US and Europe less safe because of his own psychological inadequacies that drive him to covet big empty spaces on a map, and the NYT for describing it as the exact opposite of what it is, not Donald Trump needing to tend to Donald Trump’s increasing fragile psyche, but instead as something that protects the West rather than destroys the very concept of it.

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This is how access journalism works. You give an outlet that spent the entirety of the Biden Administration bitching that they didn’t get any sitdown interviews with the President two hours to watch the President ramble incoherently, and in return for that access — the latest of a series of stories screaming, look at us!! Donald Trump takes our calls and tells us nothing!! — you describe the most dangerous kind of malignant Narcissism as the opposite of what it is.

Update: The exchange is far worse in the transcript.

David E. Sanger

Why is ownership important here?

President Trump

Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document, that you can have a base.

David E. Sanger

So you’re going to ask them to buy it?

Katie Rogers

Psychologically important to you or to the United States?

President Trump

Psychologically important for me. Now, maybe another president would feel differently, but so far I’ve been right about everything.

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##public-reason
##annals-of-sanewashing
##nyt-labels-trump’s-confession-of-psychological-unfitness-as-leadership
##orange-man-very-bad
##neofascism
#moral-irresponsibility
#sanewashing
#journamalism
#journamalism-new-york-times
#new-york-times
#marcy-wheeler
#trump-psychology
#malignant-narcissism
#press-accountability
#democracy-at-risk
#journalistic-malpractice
#access-journalism
#media-literacy
#elite-media-failure
#greenland-obsession

A Snapshot from the Fall of the Roman Republic: Cicero Wrote as Caesar Crossed the Rubicon

Two Months to the collapse of the anti-Caesarean Republican Pompeius-Senatorial Optimates coalition in Italy…

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A small river, a large signal: “the die is cast” backed by paid-for grain, unsacked cities, and unburned warehouses. In brittle institutions, the cause that appears to be for a functioning state wins the coördination and recruitment game. Caesar didn’t conquer Italy with slaughter in the winter-spring of -49. But how did he do it?

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Caesar would brook no superior, and Pompeius would brook no rival, and the senatorial optimates faction were a pack of chaos monkeys. Marcus Tullius Cicero to his ex-slave and then-current secretary, Marcus Tullius Tiro, at Patrae, on January 12, -49: <https://theilian.livejournal.com/7270.html>:

CICERO and his son, Terentia, Tullia, Quintus and his son, send warm greetings to Tiro.

Though I miss your ever-ready help at every turn yet it is not for my sake so much as for yours that I grieve at your illness. But now that the violence of your disease has abated so far as to become a quartan fever—for so Curius writes me word—I hope that with care you will soon become stronger. Only be sure—as becomes a man of your good sense—to think of nothing for the present except how to get well in the best possible way. I know how your regret at being absent worries you, but all difficulties will disappear, if you get well. I would not have you hurry, for fear of your suffering from sea-sickness in your weak state, and finding a winter voyage dangerous.

I arrived at the city walls on the 4th of January. Nothing could be more complimentary than the procession that came out to meet me; but I found things in a blaze of civil discord, or rather civil war. I desired to find a cure for this, and, as I think, could have done so; but I was hindered by the passions of particular persons, for on both sides there are those who desire to fight.

The long and short of it is that Caesar himself—once our friend—has sent the senate a menacing and offensive despatch, and is so insolent as to retain his army and province in spite of the senate, and my old friend Curio is backing him up. Farthermore, our friend Antonius and Q. Cassius, having been expelled from the house, though without any violence, left town with Curio to join Caesar, directly the senate had passed the decree ordering “consuls, praetors, tribunes, and us proconsuls to see that the Republic received no damage”. Never has the state been in greater danger: never have disloyal citizens had a better-prepared leader.

On the whole, however, preparations are being pushed on with very great activity on our side also. This is being done by the influence and energy of our friend Pompey, who now, when it is too late, begins to fear Caesar.

In spite of these exciting incidents, a full meeting of the senate clamoured for a triumph being granted me: but the consul Lentulus, in order to enhance his service to me, said that as soon as he had taken the measures necessary for the public safety, he would bring forward a motion on the subject.

I do nothing in a spirit of selfish ambition, and consequently my influence is all the greater. Italy has been marked out into districts, shewing for what part each of us is to be responsible. I have taken Capua.

That is all I wanted to tell you. Again and again I urge you to take care of your health, and to write to me as often as you have anyone to whom to give a letter.

Good-bye, good-bye.

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The most interesting things about this letter are three:

  1. That the political state of Rome in early January -49 came as such a surprise to Cicero.

  2. That he believed the joint Pompeius-senatorial optimates alliance was in good shape with “very great activity…being done by the influence and energy of our friend Pompey…”

  3. Cicero’s statement that he “desired to find a cure… and… could have done so; but I was hindered by… passions… on both sides… [of] those who desire to fight”.

Cicero was always very full of himself, and greatly overestimated his own power, influence, and reputation. But, still, what did he mean by (3)? And why did he have so much confidence in (2)? And why did (1) come as a surprise?

It still puzzles me. But here are my guesses as to the likely answers to (some of) these questions:

The course of events from Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon on January 11 to Pompeius’s flight to Greece on March 13 or so is one of the most amazing in history. Start with the fact pattern. During an early-January night Gaius Julius Caesar stepped across a small, cold, bureaucratically important stream called the Rubicon. By mid-March his rival, sometime ally, and former son-in-law Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus fled to Greece, taking with whom only two legions or so. In between tota Italia had done something extraordinary. Not extraordinary as in “epic speech and clashing shields,” but extraordinary as in “the revealed preference curve moved sharply and quickly.” All the people in Italy with both the means and inclination to bear arms either decided to bear them for Caesar—or else decided not to bear them at all. The sword supply tightened for Pompey; the sword demand shifted to Caesar.

Caesar was charismatic, yes. But why was his charisma effective?

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Quantitative Long-Run Global Economic History: Econ 196: Special Topics in Economics (Spring 2026)

And we are now launched, with a new preparation for a new course: a Royal Road into the millennia of global economic history, hopefully designed for both humanists and quants who want an introduction to learning to model pieces of the world economy throughout its history—from agriculture to attention economies—without needing to already have learned to be a coder first. (Why am I doing a new preparation the last semester before I go emeritus? Because I am a moron…)

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Quantitative Long-Run Global Economic History: Seminar

Special Topics in Economics (Spring 2026)

< https://bcourses.berkeley.edu/courses/1551896 >
J. Bradford DeLong

delong@econ.berkeley.edu brad.delong@gmail.com delong@hey.com +1-925-708-0467

Tu 1-3 Evans 560 :: Th 1-3 Zoom :: additional mandatory office hours to be arranged


Course Welcome Email:

< bcourses.berkeley.edu/courses/1… > (repeats this weblog post)





The idea is to put all of the course materials below the paywall fold so that those who want to follow along and virtually participate—and ask questions and get answers!—can do so.

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ORANGE MAN, BAD MACRO: Trump’s War on Powell & Economic-Policy Reality

Bessent, Lutnick, Hassett, Yared, & company should all have resigned last night, if they want anybody ever to regard any of them as a man. Just saying…

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The most important thing for you to focus on right now is: ORANGE MAN VERY BAD.

The Trump-Noem ICE is populated by murderous fascist thugs, people whose brutality arises because, as Noah Smith puts it, of “unprofessionalism and low recruitment standards” plus that they have been brainwashed. As he goes on to say:

Noah Smith: <twitter.com/Noahpinio…>: ‘ICE is recruiting people using the Great Replacement ideology, so it’s getting agents who think they’re in an EXISTENTIAL RACE WAR…

And they are starting to wage that war against one-third of America: the foreign-born, with or without valid H1-B and other visas and green cards; citizen children of the foreign-born; other U.S. citizens who look funny to them; and liberals.

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But, shift gears. Also we have:

Right now the ORANGE MAN—President Donald Trump—is trying to put Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell in jail. Who is Jay Powell? He is the man who Donald Trump chose eight years ago as the best human in the entire world to do the job—the very best out of all eight billion of us. Remember: Trump could have nominated anyone, and the Republican senators would have confirmed his nomination. Trump could have nominated his favorite horse Incitatus. In fact, he could not have done that. But the blockage is not because the Republican senators would have nixed such a nomination nomination. It is because Trump is such a total misanthropic narcissistic alexithymic that he is incapable of having a favorite horse.

He chose Powell. Now he has regrets. And he wants to put Powell in jail:

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Jay Powell: Statement by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KckGHaBLSn4>: ‘Good evening. On Friday, the Department of Justice served the Federal Reserve with grand jury subpoenas threatening a criminal indictment related to my testimony before the Senate Banking Committee last June. That testimony, concerned, in part, a multi-year project to renovate historic Federal Reserve office buildings.

“I have deep respect for the rule of law and for accountability in our democracy. No one, certainly not the chair of the Federal Reserve is above the law. But this unprecedented action should be seen in the broader context of the administration’s threats and ongoing pressure. This new threat is not about my testimony last June or about the renovation of the Federal Reserve buildings. It is not about Congress’s oversight role. The Fed, through testimony and other public disclosures, made every effort to keep Congress informed about the renovation project. Those are pretexts.

The threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates, based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the President. This is about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions, or whether instead, monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation.” ​⁠

I have served at the Federal Reserve under four administrations, Republicans and Democrats alike. In every case, I have carried out my duties without political fear or favor, focused solely on our mandate of price stability and maximum employment. Public service sometimes requires standing firm in the face of threats. I will continue to do the job the Senate confirmed me to do with integrity and a commitment to serving the American people.” ​⁠

Thank you.

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Donald Trump says right now that he does not like Jay Powell’s Republican-grandee relatively hard-money orientation toward Fed policy?

This is the bed he made.

He had two very well-qualified Fed officials who did not share that orientation to hand when he chose Powell. He had two who were better equipped, in my mind at least, to do the job: then-Fed Chair Janet Yellen and then-Fed Governor Lael Brainard. He rejected both of them. For Powell.

And now he is trying to put Powell in jail.

Why?

For doing his job as he sees it. And, under any cool and rational assessment, doing a very good job as well.

The monetary policy of Powell and his committee has done a very large number of very good things, successfully:

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The Spearpoint Right Now of Human Technological Engineering

From Veldhoven, in the Brainport Eindhoven region of the Netherlands, comes the bleeding-edge point of the spear of human technological capabilities: the manipulation of nature and the organization of the human economic division of labor at a truly insane and unbelievable—and that is not hyperbole: I simply do not believe that Naked East African Plains Apes with brains of only 1400 cc each and neuronal processing clock speeds only one-ten-millionth as fast as NVIDIA Blackwells in our data centers actually manage to do this…

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The stack is vertical and unforgiving. Cymer → Zeiss → ASML → TSMC (right now using CoWoS) → Shin-Etsu Chemical → NVIDIA chip-design → CUDA (NVIDIA’s software stack): Cymer makes the light. Zeiss makes the mirrors. ASML assembles the machines to make the EUV photolithography carve the right circuit paths. Shin-Etsu Chemical makes and slices the pure silicon crystal wafers for TSMC to imprint with the chips NVIDIA designs that then run CUDA. And it is, right now, the single most pricey economic value chain in the world today. And all parts of it are essential. (OK: Shin-Etsu faces competition, and you could with perhaps a 30% penalty replace TSMC with Samsung or Intel, and you could with perhaps a 75% penaltry replace NVIDIA’s chips-plus-CUDA with an alternative).

And yet, somehow, right now, rather than being divided up, NEARLY ALL THE MONIES FLOW TO NVIDIA.

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Rightly recommended by the Accidental Tech Podcast <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0QTVSHTjBKExtdExrBca5w> of John Siracusa, Casey Liss, and Marco Arment: the most mind-blowing hour you can spend learning about engineering today. It is all about the Twinscan NXE and EXE EUV (Extreme Ultra-Violet) photolithography silicon chip-making machines manufactured by ASML at its factories in Veldhoven in the Brainport Eindhoven region of the Netherlands, and elsewhere:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiUHjLxm3V0>

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Yes, “Brainport” is a Dutch term for regions built around dense collaboration between industry, universities, and government to create knowledge‑intensive growth.

ASML has no competitors in the making of EUV photolithgraphy. It and its partners own the business in a way that nobody else—not Applied Materials, even—can match.

It seems to be a matter of:

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The Curious Case of Karl Marx's 1859 "Preface"

Engels pitched methodology; but Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy delivered very little in the way of actually, you know, critiqueing political economy, let alone using that as a springboard to transform how you should think about the economy, or what one should do to bring progress toward true human flourishing. The “Preface” endures, the book does not. Perhaps Marx thought he needed to publish it to demonstrate that he was doing something more than occasional pieces in the long drought between 1852 and 1867. But, if so, it does not look to me as though it was a successful demonstration…

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Columbia’s Adam Tooze said a couple of days ago that he is thinking a lot about the 1859 Preface to Karl Marx’s abysmal A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.

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He does not say why:

Adam Tooze: Top Links 976 <https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/top-links-976-ai-investment-surges>: ‘[I] keep thinking of this…. [Karl Marx] “Men… enter into definite relations… independent of their will… [with] their material forces of production…. [That] constitutes the economic structure of society… on which arises a legal and political superstructure and… forms of social consciousness…. Material productive forces… come into conflict with… [property] relations of production… [which] turn into their fetters [on development]. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure…. [Then come] the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out…. This consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life….

New superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve….

In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last… form… antagonistic… emanat[ing] from the individuals’ social conditions of existence—but… bourgeois society create[s] also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation…

Refer a friend

A couple of days ago I said why I, at least think about this <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/six-analytical-threads-in-search>. I divided the passage into six threads:

  1. Theology: the millenarian claim (made in 1859!) that the end was at hand of the long era in which human societies were societies of domination,

  2. Stage Theory of History: The six modes of production—tribal, Asiatic, ancient, feudal, bourgeois, and socialist—as the successive stages of human history, social revolutions driving the transitions between them.

  3. Theology: Refracted through Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis: the claim that history has an arrow of progress driven by econo-political change.

  4. Sociology & Ideology: The conflicts generated by the rupture between old relations of production and the requirements of the new, growing forces of production play themselves out in ideological forms.

  5. Political Economy: Relations of production constrain technological development and investment, and then constraint fails as society’s property order is broken by social revolution.

  6. Historical Materialism: The relations of production have to be fitted to the technology of society and thus to the way people experience their worklife. And then everything else has to be fitted to that

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I argued strongly that to pick up one (or more) of these six claims and then to try to develop it and demonstrate its truth and draw forth its implications for human knowledge, human society, human political action, and the human future is what it is to be a “Marxist” in any sense meaningful. And I argued:

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Yes, mRNA Vaccines Work—&, It Appears, Work Much Better than I Thought

At the moment, COVID-19 is recorded as the cause of death for about 1/100 of the 0.4% of 19-64 year-olds who die each year—and failing to get your mRNA vaccine quadruples that. But it really looks like unvaccinated 19-64 year-olds have a greater risk of death not 0.016%/year higher than the vaccinated, but fully 0.12%/year higher. And the presumption has to be that there are an extra 6.5 19-64 year-olds who die from something else that they would have successfully fought off, had they gotten vaccinated and so had suffered under less of a metabolic burden from fighting COVID…

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Am I wrong? Vaccine skepticism really, really, really should not be a thing.

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Receiving the mRNA vaccination for COVID-19 is very strongly and causally associated with lower mortality from COVID: only ¼ of those who would die from COVID otherwise die if they were smart enough to get vaccinated.

But there are more correlations in the system:

  1. Is receiving the mRNA vaccination for COVID-19 associated with lower non-COVID mortality because it indicates that you are a sensible person who can actually undertake to take reasonable care of your health?

  2. Is it associated with higher non-COVID mortality because people in bad health have more powerful incentives to actually get vaccinated?

  3. Is it associated with lower non-COVID mortality because COVID-19, even if it does not kill you, is a substantial drag on your metabolism and so opens your way to other things that do kill you?

Well, clearly (2) is not dominant: for every four people who die if they do not get the vaccine, only three people die who do.

Laura Semenzato & al.: COVID-19 mRNA Vaccination & 4-Year All-Cause Mortality Among Adults Aged 18 to 59 Years in France <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2842305>: ‘A total of 22,767,546 vaccinated and 5,932,443 unvaccinated individuals were followed up for a median (IQR) of 45 (44-46) months. Vaccinated individuals were older… on average, more frequently women (…51.3%]…vs… 48.5%) and had more cardiometabolic comorbidities… (9.3%… vs…7.8%]. During follow-up… 0.4%… and.. 0.6%… all-cause deaths occurred in the vaccinated and unvaccinated groups…. Vaccinated individuals had a 74% lower risk of death from severe COVID-19… and a 25% lower risk of all-cause mortality… with a similar association observed when excluding severe COVID-19 death. Sensitivity analysis revealed that vaccinated individuals consistently had a lower risk of death, regardless of the cause…

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So is it (1) or (3)? Sample selection for intelligence in a life-preserving sense, or reduced metabolic load?

Probably both play a role, but reduced post‑infection disease burden is the more plausible dominant channel. There broad, cause‑specific reductions across major ICD‑10 categories. It would be very hard to explain all of these reductions solely by health‑preserver selection. ​⁠

And we do, by now, know a lot about SARS‑CoV‑2 infections. They do elevate medium‑to‑long‑term risks across organ systems: cardiovascular, thrombotic, metabolic, neurological, and still others. This is consistent with a persistent metabolic and inflammatory burden. Such a burden could easily raise non‑COVID mortality.

Complementary data show vaccination lowers the risk and persistence of post‑COVID conditions (including in breakthrough cases), reinforcing the pathway whereby fewer or milder infections reduce later non‑COVID mortality. Thus there is a very clear channel here: Reducing infection and severity, vaccination plausibly cuts these downstream hazards. This aligns with extensive evidence on long COVID’s multi‑system consequences, and elevated post‑acute event risks. ​⁠

While residual confounding can’t be completely ruled out (but when can it?), the preponderance of evidence does suggest the primary driver of the roughly 25% non‑COVID mortality reduction is fewer and less severe infections—and thus a lighter post‑infectious physiological load—rather than vaccinated individuals simply being “more sensible.”

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So right now 1/5 of the American population is unvaccinated. Just doing the arithmetic: At the moment, COVID-19 is recorded as the cause of death for about 1/100 of the 0.4% of 19-64 year-olds who die each year—and failing to get your mRNA vaccine quadruples that. But it really looks like unvaccinated 19-64 year-olds have a greater risk of death not 0.016%/year higher than the vaccinated, but fully 0.12%/year higher. And the presumption has to be that there are an extra 6.5 19-64 year-olds who die from something else that they would have successfully fought off, had they gotten vaccinated and so had suffered under less of a metabolic burden from fighting COVID.

How did we get into this mess?

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On the Birth of Science as We Know It: Thinking Out Loud: Thursday Economic History

Why did science emerge—& persist—in early modern Europe? Instruments, math, & print: the bundle that built nullius in verba, the Republic of Science, and then modern science as we know it— why & how Europe’s geographic & élite fractures forged a method that made empircal curiosity about nature’s workings pay…

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Galileo facing the Inquisition he provided every argument for toleration he could and still the Church couldnt tolerate him.

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Science as we know it didn’t blossom in Europe by accident; it was subsidized by rivalry and craft. Add print, religion’s institutional shelters, and academies—and novelty suddenly could make a payroll. Earlier efflorescences had stalled; Europe’s persisted because it lowered the cost of verification. The bundle—artisans + math + print + institutions + more—made curiosity compounding because that specific bundle aligned incentives for empirical truth about nature rather than for the support of élite power.

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Draw a line in the sand for “science as we know it”. The convenient dates are 1543 and 1687: Andries van Wesel—Vesalius—with his De Humani Corporis Fabrica and Mikołaj Kopernik—Copernicus—with his De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium as the front door, Isaac Newton’s Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica as the oak-and-iron back gate, and in between the Royal Society’s nullius in verba: take nobody’s word for what is true. There and then a distinctive way of knowing—mathematico‑experimental, evidence‑seeking, increasingly public, and then institutionalized—was born in early modern Europe. It persisted, rather than sputtering out. Europe did not invent curiosity, or cleverness. It assembled a social machine in which curiosity could keep paying its own way. And for the first time cleverness was not tuned to elaborating the ideas in sacred texts, or to advancing ideas that were useful to the lords of the society-of-domination who ran its force-and-fraud exploitation machine. Cleverness was, rather, tuned to determining what worked out there in the world of nature.

We can see a knot of mutually reinforcing forces:

  • élite fragmentation and status‑competition that raised the payoff to being right;

  • a craft world of instruments that forced an interventionist epistemology;

  • a religious‑intellectual climate that, ambivalently but often positively, authorized empirical inquiry;

  • printing press-enabled networks that forged a public and logistics for ideas; and

  • institutions that lowered the cost of arriving at and maintaining stable belief.

These together made the Republic of Science more than a heroic efflorescence episode: they made it a going concern.

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Fragmented Elites & the Political Economy of Being Right

Strong bureaucratic empires and unified élite cultures are excellent at assimilating improvements into “more of the same.” Early modern Europe, by contrast, was unsuccessful at both. It was not a unified empire. It did not have a unified élite. There was a patchwork rather than a monopoly—on both force of arms, and on the ideology that granted one status as one of those who deserved to dominate. First, there were stable geography-marked kingdoms. Dukes of Burgundy may have merely ruled “our lands over here” and “our lands over there”; but kings of England, France, Aragon, Naples, Portugal and Bohemia; Princes of Wales; Dukes of Saxony, Bavaria, Milan, Lorraine, Brittany, and Austria; and a few others had a social reality and thus a durable political strength much more than a selection of lordships owing a common feudal allegiance. And kings, popes, dukes, bishops, burghers, theologians, urban merchants, craft guilds, and even universities all fought with ideas and swords to reconfigure the logic of societal order and hierarchy, seeking better position sat the trough of the 1/3 of all the farm produce and craftwork that flowed to the dominators.

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Six Analytical Threads in Search of Useful Empirical Traction: On Karl Marx's 1859 "Preface"

Josef Schumpeterian creative-destruction vs. Karl Marxian base-superstructure: What history actually looks like as Marx’s 1859 vision promised imminent revolution followed by utopia, sketching six bold claims about how technologies drive economies drive societies. The evidence since 1870 points to rotating, sectoral upheavals—not synchronized social revolutions: sectoral churn and institutional lag. Historical materialism, soft-true; stage theory and millenarianism, not so much. Even stripped of millenarian theology of utopia, the Marxist apparatus explains far less than it promises…

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Columbia’s Adam Tooze says this AM that he is thinking a lot about the 1859 Preface to Karl Marx’s abysmal A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.

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He does not say why:

Adam Tooze: Top Links 976 <https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/top-links-976-ai-investment-surges>: ‘[I] keep thinking of this passage right now: Karl Marx 1859, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: “In… existence, men… enter into definite relations… independent of their will… appropriate to… their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society… on which arises a legal and political superstructure and… forms of social consciousness.... It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces… come into conflict with… relations of production or… the property relations… framework…. From forms of development… these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure….

It is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production… and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out…. This consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life….

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.

In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society.

The bourgeois mode of production is the last… form… antagonistic… in the sense… of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence—but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation…

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But I can say why.

Let us look at the passage. (I have reparagraphed the passage to make the separate thoughts clearer.) Here we have, working backward:

  1. Theology: a millenarian claim (made in 1859!) that the era in which human societies were societies of domination—ones profoundly shaped by the presence in them of an élite that successfully runs an exploitation-and-domination scheme on the rest, taking one third of the crops and one-third of the crafts for itself—is now about to end. Why? Marx himself never set out a rational argument—he pretty much limited himself to CAPITALISM BAD. (But Engels, two decades later, did make one in his Socialism: Utopian & Scientific.)

  2. Stage Theory of History: The five pre-socialist modes of production—tribal was later added by Engels to Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and bourgeois—as the successive stages of human history before the socialist mode of production brings an end to the societies of domination, with history’s ages of social revolution driving the transitions between them.

  3. Theology: In this case, refracted through Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis: the claim that history has an arrow, in that when a society’s relations of production become fetters constraining its economic development there has already been sufficient technological development to drive a social revolution which will produce new and progressive different relations of production.

  4. Sociology & Ideology: The conflicts generated by the rupture between old relations of production and the requirements of the new, growing forces of production play themselves out in ideological forms—men “become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” in ways substantially removed from the actual material basis of the rupture.

  5. Political Economy: As advancing technology and investment transforms the forces of production, the previous existing relations of production—the “property” order of society—no longer fits them. The relations of production constrain technological development and investment for a while, and then the pressure of constraining development breaks society’s property order via an era of social revolution.

  6. Historical Materialism: The relations of production have to be fitted to the technology of society and thus to the way people experience their worklife. And then everything else—“legal and political superstructure and… forms of social consciousness”—has to be fitted to the combination of technology and the property order, to the forces and relations of production.

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I would argue strongly—this is, in fact, an intellectual hill I would die on—that to pick up one (or more) of these six claims and then to try to develop it and demonstrate its truth and draw forth its implications for human knowledge, human society, human political action, and the human future is what it is to be a “Marxist” in any sense meaningful, other than grabbing that term as a positive or negative marker of tribal allegiance. If someone shows up calling themself a “Marxist”, and cannot demonstrate which of the threads from at least one of these six claims they are pursuing in their thinking—well, they should find something else to call themself.

Conversely, looking at the development of social science since 1870 or so, it is a fact that nearly everybody else doing historical social science worth reading who is not picking up and developing one of these six claims is spending a lot of their time trying to disprove and dispel one or more of them.

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I would also argue strongly that (6) Historical Materialism is, in a soft sense, true: to be stable, human relations of production have to be fitted to the technology of society and thus to the way people experience their worklife; and the rest of society is not determined by the forces and relations of production, but is constrained by the necessity that it fit with them.

Moreover, I would also argue that (5) Political Economy is equally true, except for the “social revolution” part—changing technology does cause immense trouble for societal order as the rest of society finds itself no longer properly fitted to it. Then follows a reworking. But the reworking does not have to be driven by anything one would call “social revolution”.

As for (2) Stage Theory—well, setting up ideal-types of forms of techno-economic-societal orders that are in some sort of rough homeostasis, and thinking of history as the transitions from one to another, can be very useful. Indeed, it is next to impossible for us East African Plains Apes of very little brain to think at all coherently without it. But are “[tribal,] Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and bourgeois” the right stages? My rough guesstimations as to how different the techno-economic underpinnings are at a global scale gets us something more like:

  • Attention info-bio tech: 2040 (human technological capability index H = 35)

  • Globalized value-chain: 2000 (H = 15)

  • Mass-production: 1960 (7)

  • Applied science: 1920 (3)

  • Steampower: 1870 (1)

That’s an almost 2.5-fold shift for what seem to me to be meaningful differences at a global scale in the modern age.

But then, if we cast back looking for roughly equally large quantitative shifts in the deeper past, we get to:

  • H = 0.4 in 1400—I guess I am happy calling that “Mediæval”.

  • H = 0.15 in -1000—I guess I am happy calling that “Ancient”.

  • H = 0.06 in -5000—I guess I am happy calling that “tribal”.

But I do have a strong sense that we need to set up our ideal-type stage benchmarks differently before the modern age—that it is not just modes of production, but of distribution, communication, domination, and legitimation that matter. Hence I would be happier with:

  • 1700: Commercial-imperial (H = 0.65)

  • 1200: Feudal (H = 0.35)

  • -500: Ancient (H = 0.2)

  • -3000: Early bronze (H = 0.8)

  • -7000: Tribal (H = 0.065)

  • -48000: Gatherer-hunter (H = 0.03)

The shifts in society are profound, yet they come accompanied by changes in the value of known and applied technologies that seem to me, quantitatively, less than those seen between what I regard as the natural ideal-type benchmarks to set up in understanding history since 1870.

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With (4), I think Marx has left reality behind: History and its conflicts are sometimes about forces and relations of production and the relationships of those to the “superstructure” that is the rest of society. History and its conflicts are sometimes really conflicts over forces and relations of production but are masked by ideologies so that they seem to be about something else. And history and its conflicts are sometimes not about forces and relations of production at all, but are really about other things—that when people fight over whether God is three-personned with the Father almighty, the Son giving us mercy, and the Holy Spirit bringing compassion, or whether al-‘Azīz, al‑Raḥmān, al‑Raḥīm are three principal attributes of divine unity, that is, usually, really what they are primarily fighting about. And (3) as well is nonsense on stilts: the arc of history does not bend toward justice, or even prosperity.

And (1), of course, was Millenarian theological fantasy.

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Yet, as I said, a huge amount of effort over what is now one and a half centuries has gone into either trying to develop and prove these six threads or demolish and disprove them. Plus there is the historical fact that the writings of Karl Marx became the sacred texts of one of the most destructive world religions ever.

What else do I have to say about this? Three things—but let me delay those, because this has grown long enough as it is.


Note: The full quoted Marx passage as Tooze gives it:

Karl Marx (1859): Preface to “A Contribution to the CI am running a few minutes late; my previous meeting is running overitique of Political Economy”: ‘In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.…


References:

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HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: International Relations Has a "Mearsheimer" Problem

From 2022-05-06. Hoisted so I can find it easily in the future…

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International Relations Has a Mearsheimer Problem

One thing worth reading:

Jarrod Hayes & Adam B. Lerner: ‘Mearsheimer’s interventions reveal some larger problems for IR… First and foremost is the issue of agency and responsibility…. If, as Mearsheimer’s theory predicts, the Russian invasion is due to its inevitable quest for regional hegemony in the balance of power, why blame anyone?…. Second… the Politico… describ[ing] weighty moral issues in the same gamified tone as fantasy baseball… portray[ing] the predictions of our theories as excuses for war crimes…. If the Russian Foreign Ministry is citing you favorably, you might want to have a good look in the mirror…

LINK: <https://www.duckofminerva.com/2022/03/a-tale-of-two-interviews-ir-theory-and-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine.html>

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And another one:

Stephen Kotkin: Don’t Blame the West for Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: ‘Way before NATO existed in the 19th century, Russia looked like this. It had an autocrat, it had repression, it had militarism. It had suspicion of foreigners and the West. This is a Russia we know, and it’s not a Russia that arrived yesterday or arrived in the 1990s. It’s not a response to actions of the West. There are internal processes in Russia that account for where we are today…. NATO expansion has put us in a better place to deal with this historical pattern in Russia that we’re seeing again…. Russia is a great power, but not the great power…. In trying to… manage the differential between Russia and the West, they resort to coercion, a very heavy state-centric approach…. That works for a time, ostensibly…. And then, of course, it hits a wall…. The worst part of this dynamic in Russian history is the conflation of the Russian state with some personal ruler…. They get a dictatorship, which usually becomes a despotism. So Putin is what he is… ruling in Russia…. Russia cannot successfully occupy Ukraine…. They don’t even have a quisling yet…

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Russia today has a population of 150 million people. Of those some 120 million are “Russians” and 30 million are classified as ethnic minorities. Russia’s GDP is in the range of Japan, Germany, Indonesia, Brazil, Britain, and France—20% above France, 30% below Japan. In a world in which NATO exists to make real into implement, for Europe at least, the dreams of ending war and military coercion set out at the San Francisco founding of the United Nations, Russia’s ability to bully other countries via its military is very small. It can wreck things, but “making a desert and calling it ‘peace’” is no longer a rational strategy.

Military conquest seems unlikely to be durable in this day and age, unless accompanied by nigh-complete ethnic cleansing and demographic replacement.

But was it ever? In 1721 King Frederick I Vasa of Sweden surrendered Swedish Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, Kexholmslän, and Karelia to Tsar Peter the Great. But Peter accepted that his conquest was limited: the Germanic-speaking Baltic nobility retained “their financial system, their existing customs border, their self-government, their Lutheran religion, and the German language”. Starting in 1860 the Tsarist Empire attempted to erode these privileges and “Russify”. But as of today of all these conquests of the Great Northern War of the early 1700s, only Peter’s conquest of Swedish Ingria—where St. Petersburg now stands—has stuck.

Indeed, in this day and age, military adventures appear more likely to make durable enemies rather than win subjects and influence. It will be very difficult to get Ukrainians to think of themselves as in any sense Muscovites after this.

Thus if Russia wants to be a great power rather than a contained menace, it must rely on its soft power. Hence a Russia that wants to have influence over the course of the world in the future and lead the people of Ross and the other Slavic peoples and their neighbors into the future will have to rely on its soft power: its role as a provider of natural resources, and both the wealth and the possibly weaponized interdependence that come with resources; plus its cultural power. A Russia that wants to be an influential Russia should be building not tanks but touring companies of the Bolshoi Ballet, and binding the world economy to its resource base.

The problem is—the problems are—(a) that Putin is not rational, (b) that Russia’s autocratic domestic politics have long leaked into its foreign-policy adventurism and right now is doing it again in a way that seems strongly counterproductive, and (c) the very unrealistic “Realist” assumption that only the United States has agency, and as the only actor with agency bears complete responsibility for whatever bad things happen, would cloud our thought on all this, if we let it.

Perhaps the most strange and bizarre thing about Mearsheimer is that the theory he draws on implies that states seeking regional hegemony are never satisfied with any borders, and continue adventuring in a pointless quest for more security until they run up against a force to contain them. “Realism” in its tragic model recognizes that spheres-of-influence borders are always and inherently potentially bloody. Thus the only question for a consistent Mearsheimer is whether Muscovy will bloody Donbas, Moldava, the Hungarian Plain, the Fulda Gap, or the Rhine.

But the drive to blame America first overrides consistency.

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William Butler Yeats (1914): The Magi

They found what they had sought above all things, and yet find that it slipped away and left them permanently unsatisfied. & now there they are & we are they…

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Or so I read it today:

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The Magi

William Butler Yeats

Now as at all times I can see in the mind’s eye,
In their stiff, painted clothes, the pale unsatisfied ones
Appear and disappear in the blue depths of the sky
With all their ancient faces like rain-beaten stones,
And all their helms of silver hovering side by side,
And all their eyes still fixed, hoping to find once more,
Being by Calvary’s turbulence unsatisfied,
The uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor.

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(Largely) HOISTED FROM THE ARCHIVES: “West”, “North Atlantic”, or “Dover Circle”?

Hoisted so I can find this easily in the future: From January 2023. With a little bit of reëditing:
“West” or “Dover Circle”? A student asked me why, in my lectures earlier this week, I kept on referring to the “North Atlantic” rather than the “Western” economies. Why did I use the first to refer to those that have become vastly richer than the world average over the past 200 years? Even as of the early 1800s, “North Atlantic” made more sense than did “West”. By 1960, “North Atlantic” itself became less apposite. Would “Global North” be a good replacement? And in the 2000s things have changed still further: I have swung around to think that a more useful and informative label would be “Dover Circle-Plus”: those economies and societies that are, that have received very large settler inflows from, or that have strained every nerve to emulate the particular economic structures and patterns and practices that developed in the years after 1500 in a 300-mile radius circle centered on the port of Dover at the southeast corner of England:

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When asked why I kept on referring to the “North Atlantic” rather than the “Western” economies, I responded: I was not aware that I had settled on “North Atlantic”— I had thought that I found myself bouncing around when I am not focusing on what descriptor to use.

I do, however, try to avoid “West”. Part it is that “West” is out-of-date. “West” comes from a time and a place now long ago: a time and a place when it was assumed that pretty much everything of interest was in Eurasia, and that the most important thing was the contrast between the western edge of Eurasia and everything else that was east—that was the “Orient”, from the Latin word for the direction from which the sun rose.

But even then, “West” as in “Western edge of Eurasia” did not really cut it.

The phrase does not even begin to take off until after 1840 or so. And by then, there was no sense in which Portugal, Spain, Italy, and southern France were no longer securely among the relatively rich. The United States, and Canada too, were very rich indeed, and the United States’s population was growing rapidly. Even as of the early 1800s, “North Atlantic” made more sense than did “West”.

And today? “Global North”? “Global North” is not quite right either: New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and soon—we hope—Chile?

Here is a hill to defend: A more useful and informative label would be “Dover Circle-Plus”: those economies and societies that are, that have received very large settler inflows from, or that have strained every nerve to emulate the particular economic structures and patterns and practices that developed in the years after 1500 in a 300-mile or so radius circle centered on the port of Dover at the southeast corner of England.

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But there is another reason to avoid much talk of the “West” and the “East”.

Above is a map showing what Stanford’s Ian Morris <https://archive.org/details/whywestrulesforn00morr_1/mode/1up> thinks are the economic and civilizational "core areas" of “Western” and “Eastern” civilization since the year -9600.

For nearly all the time since the invention of agriculture, the Eastern core is the Yellow River and Yangtze Valleys, according to Morris. He sees it as, by 1900, moving a little further east: gaining Manchuria and Japan, while losing Sichuan and the upper Yellow River Valley. By 2000 the core has further gained Taiwan island and the Pearl River Delta, but lost has non-coastal China (including Manchuria).

There is continuity here: political continuity, cultural continuity, unbroken chains of influence, even substantial continuity of genetic descent.

This is in great contrast to the “Western core”. Morris claims that from -9600 to 1400 it extended from Basra on the Persian Gulf to Tbilisi in the Caucasus to Ithaka off the northwest corner of Greece to Thebes in Egypt. Then, from -250 to 250 it…moved? …had added on? … comprised Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia. Yet after 250 it reverted back to the original Basra-Tbilisi-Ithaka-Thebes quadrangle.

In 1400, however, that then pops like a bubble. For the period 1400 to 1800, according to Morris, the “Western core” picked up stakes and moved to Western Europe. And by 1900 the Western “core area” has extended a pseudopod across the Atlantic to the American northeast and contracted in Eurasia, where it is: Ireland and Britain, the Low Countries, northern and western France, and northwest Germany.

Come 2000, Morris’s “Western core” is the continental United States plus the more-settled parts of Canada.

Truly a moveable feast.

I feel a great lack of continuity here. What has the civilization of Uruk in -3000 have to do with the civilization of Silicon Valley today? In what sense are they both “the West”, save that there are some people at Stanford who read The Story of the Man Who Saw the Deep, the Epic of Gilgamesh <https://archive.org/details/gilgameshnewrend00ferr>?

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Certainly there was a time in the 1800s when people wanted to tell the Story of Civilization as something like an Olympic-torch relay race:

  • The flint is struck and the torch lit in the Uruk of Gilgamesh and in Ur of the Chaldees.

  • It is then passed down to the Pharaohs of Egypt and to the Babylon of Hammurabi.

  • It winds up in Jerusalem, in the hands of Kings Dovid Melech Yisrawel and his son Salomo.

  • The torch is then passed—perhaps through Kurush and the other Loyal-Spirit Great Kings of the Persian Empire—to Athens!

  • And then on to Rome!

  • And conquering Rome is then conquered by Jerusalem and Galilee, as the torch is carried forward!

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And so on. In the aftermath of the fall of Rome, barbarian invasions and western Christendom then meld themselves into European feudal civilization, which picks up the torch. The torch is handed off to the Renaissance. The Reformation, The Enlightenment rise of representative government and common-law systems: governments that exist to secure people’s natural rights and that derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Then the British Industrial Revolution. And on to modern democratic capitalism, or capitalist democracy.

But this is like picking out pictures of things you like in a photograph and claiming that they are “yours”.

Moreover, the phrase rocketed up in prominence just in those early-1900s years in which anything that might be called “civilization” in Europe was catastrophically falling apart. Europe in those years was indeed becoming, as Mark Mazower calls it, the “Dark Continent”. And at its apogee at the start of the 1950s—I think that my long-ago teacher the brilliant Judith Shklar put it very well in her assessment of why it was that in the post-WWII United States, “Western Civilization” had a moment:

Judith Shklar: A Life of Learning <https://www3.nd.edu/~pweithma/Shklar/Haskins%20Lecture.pdf>: The real ideal of many teachers at Harvard in the 1950s was the gentleman C-er. He would, we were told, govern us and feed us, and we ought to cherish him, rather than the studious youth who would never amount to anything socially significant. There was, of course, a great deal of self-hatred in all this…. Harvard in the 1950s was full of people who were ashamed of their parents’ social standing, as well as of their own condition… closet Jews and closet gays and provincials… obsessed with their inferiority… [to] some mythical Harvard aristocracy….

[There] was also a bizarre refusal to think through the real meaning of the Second World War…. I found Harvard conversations unreal. I knew what had happened in Europe between 1940 and 1945, and I assumed that most people at Harvard also were aware of the physical, political, and moral calamity that had occurred, but it was never to be discussed…. If these matters came up in class, it was only as part of the study of totalitarianism, and then it was pretty sanitized and integrated into the Cold War context….

A look at the famous “Redbook,” which was the plan for the general education program at Harvard, is very revealing:

  • Its authors were determined to immunize the young against fascism and its temptations so that “it” would never happen again.

  • There was to be a reinforcement of The Western Tradition, and it was to be presented in such a way as to show up fascism as an aberration, never to be repeated.

  • I would guess that in the pre-war Depression years some of the young men who devised this pedagogic ideology may have been tempted by attitudes that eventually coalesced into fascism, and now recoiled at what they knew it had wrought. They wanted a different past, a “good” West, a “real” West, not the actual one that had marched into the First World War and onward. They wanted a past fit for a better denouement.

  • I found most of this unconvincing…


“Western Civilization”, the Harvard Redbook, Humanities 1 and Social Sciences 2, the through-line of cultural, political, historical, and logical development from Gilgamesh to FDR—an ideological project principally aimed, whether consciously or unconsciously, at constructing a fake but usable past for a post-World War II New Deal Order of social democracy in a free, capitalist, and above all anti-Leninist anti-Stalinist anti-Hitlerian society.

In fact, there was no single torch. There were no hand-offs. And if there had been a single torch, it would come with all kinds of things that we do not like at all.

However, do not get me wrong: There is a great deal of value in teaching:

Matthew Yglesias: Thankful mailbag <https://www.slowboring.com/p/thankful-mailbag>: ‘There’s just a big divergence between what most people see as potentially valuable in the liberal arts and what most humanities faculty think is valuable and important…. Educated professionals… it’s good for them to be inculcated with… values… the history of proto-constitutionalism in England and the classical republics… religious freedom… [which] develop[ed] out of the specific circumstances of the Protestant Reformation….

Historical events… Greece to Rome to “the Dark Ages” and the Renaissance and Reformation and the founding of America… philosophical lineage from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Locke and Mill and Rawls… literary and artistic cultures… informed by these… and that also informed them…. That kind of traditional broad liberal education would of course involve some exposure to radical critics of Anglo-American liberal capitalism….

[But] current trends on campus are toward an atmosphere where the radical criticism predominates…. The critical theories themselves would tell you, there’s no way Anglo-American liberal capitalist society is going to sustain generous financial support for institutions whose self-ascribed mission is to undermine faith in the main underpinnings of society…

But I do substantially disagree with Matt here. For one thing, I do not think Matthew has Ground Truth as to what is going on in American universities. I have said this before, and I do believe I have receipts:


Thus it does annoy me when people speak of cultural-civilizational patterns rooted in the early-modern imperial-commercial age Dover Circle and then the Dover-Circle-Plus as “the West” and talk of and unreflective believe in some “it” that is “Western Civilization”, which the people living in the Thames Valley of the island of Great Britain in the 1800s possessed as rightful heirs.

Earlier peoples ascribed the rôles of torch-bearers in this relay would have been very surprised to learn that the inhabitants of the Thames Valley were in any way them or their heirs. In the -50s, Roman Senator and Proconsul Marcus Tullius Cicero snidely snarked argued that the Britons had no silver and were too stupid and uneducated to make good slaves—hence they were not worth imperializing. Athens had very little tolerance for Jerusalem. And Jerusalem had even less tolerance for Athens.

If you want continuity starting at the Western edge of Eurasia of the same kind as you see in the “Eastern Core”—political, cultural, linked chains of influence, some continuity of genetic descent—you certainly cannot start before 800, and almost surely not before 1500. And you have to start in the Dover Circle.

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But do not carry this tradition-demolition project too far.

In 800 the Dover Circle a backwater, technologically behind—and hundreds of years technologically behind, much of the time—the world average. But around the year 800, in the Dover Circle, a local barbarian, a Frankish king, Charles, son of the usurper Pippin the Short, extended his military reach from his sometime capital city of Aachen or Aix-la-Chapelle in the Dover Circle to the Elbe River in Germany, the Tiber in Italy, the Ebro in Spain, and to the borders of Hungary.  Pope Leo II then crowned “Charlemagne” Emperor, the first emperor dwelling west of Constantinople for three and a quarter centuries. And after that interesting things did begin to happen between Stockholm and Sevilla, ultimately concentrating in the Dover Circle.

But they did not happen rapidly. Even as of 1500 the Dover Circle held no place special in world civilization. Yes, the Dover Circle by 1500 was no longer a backwater. Yes, it ad from 800 to 1500 had a rapid creative run of growth and technological advance for a pre-Imperial-Commercial civilization in the Middle Ages. But much of that was simply a Viking-raided backwater’s catching up to world civilization. In 1500 it certainly had no “edge” in governance or culture, and in technology whatever edge it had was narrow—ships and gunpowder and cannon, and perhaps precision machinery like, clocks.

Maybe it has a small technological edge on average in 1500. Perhaps 1.1 over the other high civilizations of Eurasia? It did forge ahead after 1500 in technology faster than the world average, but not that much faster.

It certainly developed a politically and militarily important technological edge in ocean navigation and gunpowder weaponry. Caravels begin to dominate the world’s oceans from 1500 on—although the first great exploratory-imperialist wave comes from Portugal and Greater Castile. But do not overstate that edge. The Ottoman Empire was still besieging Vienna in 1688. It was only in ships that it dominated up until 1800. And its ships did not dominate always: the Omani from Muscat threw the Portuguese out of East Africa, and then ruled the coasts of the Indian Ocean from Zanzibar.

As of 1500 the Dover Circle had potential. And I see that potential as consisting of five important elements:

  1. The Joseph Henrich point: the Mediaæval church’s war on cousin marriage and on relationship affinities—an attempt to make Jesus, and the Church, the place you went to for help—had created a diffuse sociability in which you could, within reason, trust almost everyone in society who you dealt with, rather than just your close kin. Diffuse sociability rather than clan-based was to be very important after 1500.

  2. Harold J. Berman’s point, in his 1983 Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, that the struggle over whether emperors bossed popes or popes bossed emperors had created for the first time ever Dover Circle civilizations were places in which the default assumption was that the law was not a mere tool of the most powerful, but that even the most powerful were bound by the law.

  3. Durable proto-nation states rather than more or less evanescent continent-spanning empires amped up the pressures of military competition for governmental effectiveness.

  4. The primarily rural-military basis of the Dover Circle aristocracies, which meant that cities were an anomaly in the major military-political power network, and so became self-governing, making merchants not the clear subordinates but the near-equals of warriors and bureaucrats among the society-of-domination élites.

  5. The Patricia Crone point that Dover Circle societies were imperfect and rather unsuccessful society of domination. In the other high civilizations of Eurasia-Africa (and MesoAmerica), it was very clear how the society-of-domination élite ran its force-and-fraud game, it was very clear that it was a sweet deal, and it was very clear to all that big changes would turn many big power brokers into big losers; in the Dover Circle, by contrast, kings, aristocrats, merchants, priests, and more all had claims to various levers of society of domination power.

  6. All these created a remarkable plasticity in social organization—a situation in which many things could be tried, some of which would turn out to be productive and effective. Society was not bound by kinship, not under the thumb of a ruler unbound by procedure and law, subject to fierce incentives to improve productivity and efficiency to mobilize for war, creating a place in which at least some societal power could be exercised by those—merchants—more interested in efficiency in productivity than in exploitation, and in which the possibility of change and revolution in favor of some élite faction was regarded by large segments of the élite with something other than horror and dismay.

Only place, and only time, all of these came together was in the post-1500 Dover Circle.


Even in the late 1700s it was touch-and-go. The British started to conquer India, but they could not maintain their hold on North America. What had been a perhaps 1.1-1 edge in technological prowess in 1500 was only perhaps 1.4-1 in 1770.

Even in the 1800s the French failed in their conquest of Mexico and had a devil of a time conquering and colonizing Algeria.

Not until 1880 and the machine gun did it become the case that Dover Circle-Plus armies could march anywhere and conquer anything (save, for the Italians, Ethiopia; and save, for the British and the Russians, Afghanistan). And in the end the durable expansion of the Dovber Circle to the Dover Circle-Plus of today was as much a soft- as a hard-power process.

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READING: John Maynard Keynes on Isaac Newton

Newton wasn’t just the architect of modern physics and celestial mechanics; he was also theologian and alchemist. “voyaging through strange seas of thought” indeed. Even the “Principia” was intuition dressed-up as geometry…

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The Isaac Newton we mostly know is the Newton of physics at Cambridge University before 1696, and then the Newton the Age of Reason Enlightenment Grandee, the quarter-century President of the Royal Society, and the Master of the Royal Mint up until his death in 1727.

The relatively affable man-about-town renowned genius receiving callers later in life—the person who may (or may not) have said:

I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me…

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The diamond-hard brilliance of insight into natural physical law early in life—the person who could write to Robert Hooke in a sort-of friendly and sort-of not dispute over priority:

What Des-Cartes did was a good step. You have added much in several ways, and in particularly in taking the colours of thin plates into philosophical consideration. If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants…

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recognizing the importance of cumulative teamwork across the ages in discovery, while the subtext is that he, Isaac Newton, is a very tall person himself.

Newton was indeed among the First of the Scientists—those who sought ideas that described how the world revealed itself in experiment, and then back-propagated those into premises which were valid only by their success at organizing the results of experiments, and hence always subject to debate and change, as experimental knowledge grew. He was, in his rôle as physicist, not one of those who started with rock-solid premises and sought to derive from them by logical deduction detailed implications that would be equally rock-solid. He was, in his rôle as physicist, not one who developed and promoted ideas that felt right for the acknowledged or unacknowledged reason that they were convenient for a ruling caste that operated a society-of-domination by which it took 1/3 of the crops and 1/3 of the crafts, giving nothing in return. And in this role, and in his role as one of the main Philosophers of the Age of Reason promoting the advance of a world in which not just claims about Natural but about Moral Philosophy required reasonable reasons, he was and remains an inestimable treasure for humanity.

However, Keynes’s extensive reviews of Newton’s papers identified a third Newton, an intermediate Newton, after the Principia but before London. A man, in the words of Wordsworth that Keynes picked up, appropriated, and first applied to Newton: “voyaging through strange seas of thought, alone…”:

[Having] read the riddle of the heavens… he believed that by the same powers of his introspective imagination he would read the riddle of the Godhead, the riddle of past and future events divinely fore-ordained, the riddle of the elements and their constitution from an original undifferentiated first matter, the riddle of health and of immortality… if only he could persevere to the end, uninterrupted, by himself, no one coming into the room, reading, copying, testing-all by himself, no interruption for God’s sake, no disclosure, no discordant breakings in or criticism, with fear and shrinking as he assailed these half-ordained, half-forbidden things…

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He was that after physics. And then his friends rescued him from what Keynes believes had become the edge of madness by convincing him to move to London, and re-engage with human society. ANewton who was not only among the First of the Scientists and the Philosophers of the Age of Reason, but also among the Last of the Magicians:

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John Maynard Keynes: Newton, the Man:

It is with some diffidence that I try to speak to you in his own home of Newton as he was himself. I have long been a student of the records and had the intention to put my impressions into writing to be ready for Christmas Day 1942, the tercentenary of his birth. The war has deprived me both of leisure to treat adequately so great a theme and of opportunity to consult my library and my papers and to verify my impressions. So if the brief study which I shall lay before you today is more perfunctory than it should be, I hope you will excuse me.

One other preliminary matter. I believe that Newton was different from the conventional picture of him. But I do not believe he was less great. He was less ordinary, more extraordinary, than the nineteenth century cared to make him out. Geniuses are very peculiar. Let no one here suppose that my object today is to lessen, by describing, Cambridge’s greatest son. I am trying rather to see him as his own friends and contemporaries saw him. And they without exception regarded him as one of the greatest of men.

In the eighteenth century and since, Newton came to be thought of as the first and greatest of the modern age of scientists, a rationalist, one who taught us to think on the lines of cold and untinctured reason.

I do not see him in this light. I do not think that any one who has pored over the contents of that box which he packed up when he finally left Cambridge in 1696 and which, though partly dispersed, have come down to us, can see him like that. Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians, the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago. Isaac Newton, a posthumous child bom with no father on Christmas Day, 1642, was the last wonderchild to whom the Magi could do sincere and appropriate homage.

Had there been time, I should have liked to read to you the contemporary record of the child Newton. For, though it is well known to his biographers, it has never been published in extenso, without comment, just as it stands. Here, indeed, is the makings of a legend of the young magician, a most joyous picture of the opening mind of genius free from the uneasiness, the melancholy and nervous agitation of the young man and student.

For in vulgar modern terms Newton was profoundly neurotic of a not unfamiliar type, but - I should say from the records - a most extreme example. His deepest instincts were occult, esoteric, semantic-with profound shrinking from the world, a paralyzing fear of exposing his thoughts, his beliefs, his discoveries in all nakedness to the inspection and criticism of the world. ‘Of the most fearful, cautious and suspicious temper that I ever knew’, said Whiston, his successor in the Lucasian Chair. The too well-known conflicts and ignoble quarrels with Hooke, Flamsteed, Leibniz are only too clear an evidence of this. Like all his type he was wholly aloof from women. He parted with and published nothing except under the extreme pressure of friends. Until the second phase of his life, he was a wrapt, consecrated solitary, pursuing his studies by intense introspection with a mental endurance perhaps never equalled.

I believe that the clue to his mind is to be found in his unusual powers of continuous concentrated introspection. A case can be made out, as it also can with Descartes, for regarding him as an accomplished experimentalist. Nothing can be more charming than the tales of his mechanical contrivances when he was a boy. There are his telescopes and his optical experiments, These were essential accomplishments, part of his unequalled all-round technique, but not, I am sure, his peculiar gift, especially amongst his contemporaries. His peculiar gift was the power of holding continuously in his mind a purely mental problem until he had seen straight through it. I fancy his pre-eminence is due to his muscles of intuition being the strongest and most enduring with which a man has ever been gifted. Anyone who has ever attempted pure scientific or philosophical thought knows how one can hold a problem momentarily in one’s mind and apply all one’s powers of concentration to piercing through it, and how it will dissolve and escape and you find that what you are surveying is a blank. I believe that Newton could hold a problem in his mind for hours and days and weeks until it surrendered to him its secret. Then being a supreme mathematical technician he could dress it up, how you will, for purposes of exposition, but it was his intuition which was pre-eminently extraordinary - ‘so happy in his conjectures’, said De Morgan, ‘as to seem to know more than he could possibly have any means of proving’. The proofs, for what they are worth, were, as I have said, dressed up afterwards - they were not the instrument of discovery.

There is the story of how he informed Halley of one of his most fundamental discoveries of planetary motion. ‘Yes,’ replied Halley, ‘but how do you know that? Have you proved it?’ Newton was taken aback - ‘Why, I’ve known it for years’, he replied. ‘If you’ll give me a few days, I’ll certainly find you a proof of it’ - as in due course he did.

Again, there is some evidence that Newton in preparing the Principia was held up almost to the last moment by lack of proof that you could treat a solid sphere as though all its mass was concentrated at the centre, and only hit on the proof a year before publication. But this was a truth which he had known for certain and had always assumed for many years.

Certainly there can be no doubt that the peculiar geometrical form in which the exposition of the Principia is dressed up bears no resemblance at all to the mental processes by which Newton actually arrived at his conclusions.

His experiments were always, I suspect, a means, not of discovery, but always of verifying what he knew already.

Why do I call him a magician? Because he looked on the whole universe and all that is in it as a riddle, as a secret which could be read by applying pure thought to certain evidence, certain mystic clues which God had laid about the world to allow a sort of philosopher’s treasure hunt to the esoteric brotherhood. He believed that these clues were to be found partly in the evidence of the heavens and in the constitution of elements (and that is what gives the false suggestion of his being an experimental natural philosopher), but also partly in certain papers and traditions handed down by the brethren in an unbroken chain back to the original cryptic revelation in Babylonia. He regarded the universe as a cryptogram set by the Almighty - just as he himself wrapt the discovery of the calculus in a cryptogram when he communicated with Leibniz. By pure thought, by concentration of mind, the riddle, he believed, would be revealed to the initiate.

He did read the riddle of the heavens. And he believed that by the same powers of his introspective imagination he would read the riddle of the Godhead, the riddle of past and future events divinely fore-ordained, the riddle of the elements and their constitution from an original undifferentiated first matter, the riddle of health and of immortality. All would be revealed to him if only he could persevere to the end, uninterrupted, by himself, no one coming into the room, reading, copying, testing-all by himself, no interruption for God’s sake, no disclosure, no discordant breakings in or criticism, with fear and shrinking as he assailed these half-ordained, half-forbidden things, creeping back into the bosom of the Godhead as into his mother’s womb. ‘Voyaging through strange seas of thought alone’, not as Charles Lamb ‘a fellow who believed nothing unless it was as clear as the three sides of a triangle’.

And so he continued for some twenty-five years. In 1687, when he was forty-five years old, the Principia was published.

Here in Trinity it is right that I should give you an account of how he lived amongst you during these years of his greatest achievement. The east end of the Chapel projects farther eastwards than the Great Gate. In the second half of the seventeenth century there was a walled garden in the free space between Trinity Street and the building which joins the Great Gate to the Chapel. The south wall ran out from the turret of the Gate to a distance overlapping the Chapel by at least the width of the present pavement. Thus the garden was of modest but reasonable size. This was Newton’s garden. He had the Fellow’s set of rooms between the Porter’s Lodge and the Chapel - that, I suppose, now occupied by Professor Broad. The garden was reached by a stairway which was attached to a veranda raised on wooden pillars projecting into the garden from the range of buildings. At the top of this stairway stood his telescope - not to be confused with the observatory erected on the top of the Great Gate during Newton’s lifetime (but after he had left Cambridge) for the use of Roger Cotes and Newton’s successor, Whiston. This wooden erection was, I think, demolished by Whewell in 1856 and replaced by the stone bay of Professor Broad’s bedroom. At the Chapel end of the garden was a small two-storied building, also of wood, which was his elaboratory. When he decided to prepare the Principia for publication he engaged a young kinsman, Humphrey Newton, to act as his amanuensis (the MS. of the Principia, as it went to the press, is clearly in the hand of Humphrey). Humphrey remained with him for five years - from 1684 to 1689. When Newton died Humphrey’s son-in-law Conduitt wrote to him for his reminiscences, and among the papers I have is Humphrey’s reply.

During these twenty-five years of intense study mathematics and astronomy were only a part, and perhaps not the most absorbing, of his occupations. Our record of these is almost wholly confined to the papers which he kept and put in his box when he left Trinity for London.

Let me give some brief indications of their subject. They are enormously voluminous - I should say that upwards of 1,000,000 words in his handwriting still survive. They have, beyond doubt, no substantial value whatever except as a fascinating sidelight on the mind of our greatest genius.

Let me not exaggerate through reaction against the other Newton myth which has been so sedulously created for the last two hundred years. There was extreme method in his madness. All his unpublished works on esoteric and theological matters are marked by careful learning, accurate method and extreme sobriety of statement. They are just as sane as the Principia, if their whole matter and purpose were not magical. They were nearly all composed during the same twenty-five years of his mathematical studies. They fall into several groups.

Very early in life Newton abandoned orthodox belief in the Trinity. At this time the Socinians were an important Arian sect amongst intellectual circles. It may be that Newton fell under Socinian influences, but I think not. He was rather a Judaic monotheist of the school of Maimonides. He arrived at this conclusion, not on so-to-speak rational or sceptical grounds, but entirely on the interpretation of ancient authority. He was persuaded that the revealed documents give no support to the Trinitarian doctrines which were due to late falsifications. The revealed God was one God.

But this was a dreadful secret which Newton was at desperate pains to conceal all his life. It was the reason why he refused Holy Orders, and therefore had to obtain a special dispensation to hold his Fellowship and Lucasian Chair and could not be Master of Trinity. Even the Toleration Act of 1689 excepted anti-Trinitarians. Some rumours there were, but not at the dangerous dates when he was a young Fellow of Trinity. In the main the secret died with him. But it was revealed in many writings in his, big box. After his death Bishop Horsley was asked to inspect the box with a view to publication. He saw the contents with horror and slammed the lid. A hundred years later Sir David Brewster looked into the box. He covered up the traces with carefully selected extracts and some straight fibbing. His latest biographer, Mr More, has been more candid. Newton’s extensive anti-Trinitarian pamphlets are, in my judgement, the most interesting of his unpublished papers. Apart from his more serious affirmation of belief, I have a completed pamphlet showing up what Newton thought of the extreme dishonesty and falsification of records for which St Athanasius was responsible, in particular for his putting about the false calumny that Arius died in a privy. The victory of the Trinitarians in England in the latter half of the seventeenth century was not only as complete, but also as extraordinary, as St Athanasius’s original triumph. There is good reason for thinking that Locke was a Unitarian. I have seen it argued that Milton was. It is a blot on Newton’s record that he did not murmur a word when Whiston, his successor in the Lucasian Chair, was thrown out of his professorship and out of the University for publicly avowing opinions which Newton himself had secretly held for upwards of fifty years past.

That he held this heresy was a further aggravation of his silence and secrecy and inwardness of disposition.

Another large section is concerned with all branches of apocalyptic writings from which he sought to deduce the secret truths of the Universe - the measurements of Solomon’s Temple, the Book of David, the Book of Revelations, an enormous volume of work of which some part was published in his later days. Along with this are hundreds of pages of Church History and the like, designed to discover the truth of tradition.

A large section, judging by the handwriting amongst the earliest, relates to alchemy - transmutation, the philosopher’s stone, the elixir of life. The scope and character of these papers have been hushed up, or at least minimized, by nearly all those who have inspected them. About 1650 there was a considerable group in London, round the publisher Cooper, who during the next twenty years revived interest not only in the English alchemists of the fifteenth century, but also in translations of the medieval and post-medieval alchemists.

There is an unusual number of manuscripts of the early English alchemists in the libraries of Cambridge. It may be that there was some continuous esoteric tradition within the University which sprang into activity again in the twenty years from 1650 to 1670. At any rate, Newton was clearly an unbridled addict. It is this with which he was occupied ‘about 6 weeks at spring and 6 at the fall when the fire in the elaboratory scarcely went out’ at the very years when he was composing the Principia - and about this he told Humphrey Newton not a word. Moreover, he was almost entirely concerned, not in serious experiment, but in trying to read the riddle of tradition, to find meaning in cryptic verses, to imitate the alleged but largely imaginary experiments of the initiates of past centuries. Newton has left behind him a vast mass of records of these studies. I believe that the greater part are translations and copies made by him of existing books and manuscripts. But there are also extensive records of experiments. I have glanced through a great quantity of this at least 100,000 words, I should say. It is utterly impossible to deny that it is wholly magical and wholly devoid of scientific value; and also impossible not to admit that Newton devoted years of work to it. Some time it might be interesting, but not useful, for some student better equipped and more idle than I to work out Newton’s exact relationship to the tradition and MSS. of his time.

In these mixed and extraordinary studies, with one foot in the Middle Ages and one foot treading a path for modern science, Newton spent the first phase of his life, the period of life in Trinity when he did all his real work. Now let me pass to the second phase.

After the publication of the Principia there is a complete change in his habit and way of life. I believe that his friends, above all Halifax, came to the conclusion that he must be rooted out of the life he was leading at Trinity which must soon lead to decay of mind and health. Broadly speaking, of his own motion or under persuasion, he abandons his studies. He takes up University business, represents the University in Parliament; his friends are busy trying to get a dignified and remunerative job for him - the Provostship of King’s, the Mastership of Charterhouse, the Controllership of the Mint.

Newton could not be Master of Trinity because he was a Unitarian and so not in Holy Orders. He was rejected as Provost of King’s for the more prosaic reason that he was not an Etonian. Newton took this rejection very ill and prepared a long legalistic brief, which I possess, giving reasons why it was not unlawful for him to be accepted as Provost. But, as ill-luck had it, Newton’s nomination for the Provostship came at the moment when King’s had decided to fight against the right of Crown nomination, a struggle in which the College was successful.

Newton was well qualified for any of these offices. It must not be inferred from his introspection, his absent-mindedness, his secrecy and his solitude that he lacked aptitude for affairs when he chose to exercise it. There are many records to prove his very great capacity. Read, for example, his correspondence with Dr Covell, the Vice-Chancellor when, as the University’s representative in Parliament, he had to deal with the delicate question of the oaths after the revolution of 1688. With Pepys and Lowndes he became one of the greatest and most efficient of our civil servants. He was a very successful investor of funds, surmounting the crisis of the South Sea Bubble, and died a rich man. He possessed in exceptional degree almost every kind of intellectual aptitude - lawyer, historian, theologian, not less than mathematician, physicist, astronomer.

And when the turn of his life came and he put his books of magic back into the box, it was easy for him to drop the seventeenth century behind him and to evolve into the eighteenth-century figure which is the traditional Newton.

Nevertheless, the move on the part of his friends to change his life came almost too late. In 1689 his mother, to whom he was deeply attached, died. Somewhere about his fiftieth birthday on Christmas Day 1692, he suffered what we should now term a severe nervous breakdown. Melancholia, sleeplessness, fears of persecution - he writes to Pepys and to Locke and no doubt to others letters which lead them to think that his mind is deranged. He lost, in his own words, the ‘former consistency of his mind’. He never again concentrated after the old fashion or did any fresh work. The breakdown probably lasted nearly two years, and from it emerged, slightly ‘gaga’, but still, no doubt, with one of the most powerful minds of England, the Sir Isaac Newton of tradition.

In 1696 his friends were finally successful in digging him out of Cambridge, and for more than another twenty years he reigned in London as the most famous man of his age, of Europe, and - as his powers gradually waned and his affability increased - perhaps of all time, so it seemed to his contemporaries.

He set up house with his niece Catharine Barton, who was beyond reasonable doubt the mistress of his old and loyal friend Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax and Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had been one of Newton’s intimate friends when he was an undergraduate at Trinity. Catharine was reputed to be one of the most brilliant and charming women in the London of Congreve, Swift and Pope. She is celebrated, not least for the broadness of her stories, in Swift’s Journal to Stella. Newton puts on rather too much weight for his moderate height. ‘When he rode in his coach one arm would be out of his coach on one side and the other on the other.’ His pink face, beneath a mass of snow-white hair, which ‘when his peruke was off was a venerable sight’, is increasingly both benevolent and majestic. One night in Trinity after Hall he is knighted by Queen Anne. For nearly twenty-four years he reigns as President of the Royal Society. He becomes one of the principal sights of London for all visiting intellectual foreigners, whom he entertains handsomely. He liked to have clever young men about him to edit new editions of the Principia - and sometimes merely plausible ones as in the case of Facio de Duillier.

Magic was quite forgotten. He has become the Sage and Monarch of the Age of Reason. The Sir Isaac Newton of orthodox tradition - the eighteenth-century Sir Isaac, so remote from the child magician born in the first half of the seventeenth century - was being built up. Voltaire returning from his trip to London was able to report of Sir Isaac - ‘twas his peculiar felicity, not only to be born in a country of liberty, but in an Age when all scholastic impertinences were banished from the World. Reason alone was cultivated and Mankind could only be his Pupil, not his Enemy.’ Newton, whose secret heresies and scholastic superstitions it had been the study of a lifetime to conceal!

But he never concentrated, never recovered ‘the former consistency of his mind’. ‘He spoke very little in company.’ ‘He had something rather languid in his look and manner.’

And he looked very seldom, I expect, into the chest where, when he left Cambridge, he had packed all the evidences of what had occupied and so absorbed his intense and flaming spirit in his rooms and his garden and his elaboratory between the Great Gate and Chapel.

But he did not destroy them. They remained in the box to shock profoundly any eighteenth- or nineteenth-century prying eyes. They became the possession of Catharine Barton and then of her daughter, the Countess of Portsmouth. So Newton’s chest, with many hundreds of thousands of words of his unpublished writings, came to contain the ‘Portsmouth Papers’.

In 1888 the mathematical portion was given to the University Library at Cambridge. They have been indexed, but they have never been edited. The rest, a very large collection, were dispersed in the auction room in 1936 by Catharine Barton’s descendant, the present Lord Lymington. Disturbed by this impiety, I managed gradually to reassemble about half of them, including nearly the whole of the biographical portion, that is, the ‘Conduitt Papers’, in order to bring them to Cambridge which I hope they will never leave. The greater part of the rest were snatched out of my reach by a syndicate which hoped to sell them at a high price, probably in America, on the occasion of the recent tercentenary.

As one broods over these queer collections, it seems easier to understand - with an understanding which is not, I hope, distorted in the other direction - this strange spirit, who was tempted by the Devil to believe at the time when within these walls he. was solving so much, that he could reach all the secrets of God and Nature by the pure power of mind Copernicus and Faustus in one.


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Against Hankins: You Can't Use Moral Relativism to Claim a Warrior Is "Great" in Any Sense Connoting Admirability

I woke up in a bad mood this morning. Thus I want to circle around again—like a dog to its vomit—and set out the two things that really piss me off about James Hankins’s excerpt from his The Golden Thread that he chose to publish in First Things: one that is full-blown fascist, and the other that is profoundly anti-Christian:

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The full-blown fascist—not neofascist, merely—is this:

James Hankins: The Greatness of Alexander <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>: ‘Alexander’s ancient biographers seem unconcerned with… [his] atrocities…. It hardly excuses Alexander that such actions were normal practices in ancient warfare, and that execution and enslavement of defeated enemies was permitted under some ancient laws. However excused, such actions were surely not those of a philosopher-king.

We are shocked by these things, and by the failure of the ancients to condemn them, forgetting that our grandfathers saw no crime in the fire-bombing of German cities from the air or the nuclear incineration of two Japanese cities filled with innocent civilians….

It can be puzzling that the moral assessments of ancients and moderns differ so much from each other. We are inclined to think of these differences as stemming from the moral blindness of the ancients. Such condescension towards the past is an odious modern habit of mind…

World War II was a just war fought by the allies in ways that were—sometimes—unjust. It is simply a lie to claim that “our grandfathers saw no crime in the fire-bombing of German cities from the air” or that “our grandfathers saw no crime in the… nuclear incineration of two Japanese cities filled with innocent civilians”. There were great efforts made to grapple with the moral dilemmas of how to fight World War II to minimize the total amount of atrocity. And there was great concern over what we were doing, inside and outside the military. We did not ignore then, and we do not forget now.

More important, the only purpose of “forgetting” in Hankins’s passage here is to slide into full-blown moral relativism: because the West did not always live up to its high ideals about how to fight a just war justly, we have no standing to judge Aleksander for fighting unjust wars systematically unjustly—and that it is an “odious modern habit of mind” if we attempt to do so.

Hankins has now wedged himself into the fully fascist position that large-scale war-crimes are just hunky-dory. And that really does piss me off.

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The profoundly anti-Christian one is this:

James Hankins: The Greatness of Alexander <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>: ‘If we fail to see the greatness of a man like Alexander, perhaps the reason is that we ourselves are too petty, too stunted in our outlook to appreciate it. As the Chinese poet Han Yu wrote, “A man living at the bottom of a well will think the sky is small.” We can’t accept greatness in part because we find it difficult to take ancient religion seriously; we moderns overlook the divine element in human nature, and the ability of the divine to transform us. For us, Alexander’s wish to be recognized as a god can only be evidence of insanity or, at best, a cynical ploy to win support among superstitious men. The ancients excused Alexander’s pretensions to superhuman status on the grounds that he did in fact have a great soul; his opinion of himself was justified. It was not hubris, because the gods did not punish but rewarded him with unbroken success. The ancients saw what we fail to see, or what we prefer not to see: that human beings can, exceptionally, achieve greatness, and this can only come through divine help…

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Let’s set out the argument:

  • We are too petty and stunted to understand Aleksander’s greatness

  • Because we overlook what ancient religion knew:

  • That the divine can transform us

  • And make us great through divine help

Yes, Hankins claims that divine favor rested upon Alexander. Yes, Hankins claims that the favor of God Almighty, the Α & Ω, The One Who Is, rested upon him. For “[when] human beings… exceptionally, achieve greatness… this can only come through divine help”. And “the ancients saw [this but]… we fail to see, or… prefer not to see” it.

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Now people are situational. I am sure James Hankins is a good guy in the Senior Common Room. I would love to learn from him about Francesco Petrarcha, Leonardo Bruni, and Marcello Ficino.

But this public presentation of himself that he has taken on—no thanks. Yuck!

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References:

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CROSSPOST: BRET DEVEREAUX: Once You Imagine Aleksander the Great’s Victims as People…

A pushback from two-and-a-half years ago about one of the weirdest emanations of neofascism I have seen in this past truly weird decade: no, Aleksander III Argeados of Makedon was not “Great” in any senes carrying strong connotations of being in some way worthy of admiration; superbly skilled at the deeply unfortunate and disturbing human social practice of war yes, with very large amounts of the virtues useful in that social practice, yes; but a murderous psychopath too, as a very large part of the package…

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Why am I cross-posting this today? Because I was whipsawed by first seeing:

James W. Hankins: <https://x.com/g_shullenberger/status/2005644591060656193> <https://www.compactmag.com/article/why-im-leaving-harvard/>: ‘Whether through hostility or neglect, Western history is being phased out or allowed to die on the vine at Harvard…

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Followed by a, “no, my colleagues are just teaching it differently” backpedal:

James W. Hankins: ‘People teaching in Western fields… almost all of these people regard the language of “western civilization” as minimally outmoded and maximally “white supremacist”. I am an outlier because I think that the civilizations of the West should be taught as a tradition, and preferentially at the undergrad level. Most of my colleagues disagree and make some sort of obeisance to global history and assume the equality of all “cultures”…

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And then by what I can only read as a frantic attempt at full clawback, as his colleagues are all of a sudden not deluded fools making “obeisance to global history and… the equality of all ‘cultures’”, but are rather truly outstanding learned scholars:

James W. Hankins: ‘I keep reading people who say that no one is teaching Western civilization any more at Harvard, citing my Compact article. It’s not what I said. Harvard (where I’m still on the faculty till 30 June) has 17 outstanding people teaching in Western fields, ancient, medieval and modern…

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So I began chasing links. And got to:

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CROSSPOST: BRET DEVEREAUX: Once You Imagine Alexander’s Victims as People…

Bret Devereaux (2023): <https://x.com/BretDevereaux/status/1657932006984933377>: ‘So, @Vermeullarmine unfollowed me for this tweet (about this excerpt: <firstthings.com/web-exclu…>) (which prevents me from replying to his reply to his reply to me), but the idea that Arrian’s history in particular was influenced by his context isn’t particularly new.

Replying to @Vermeullarmine: [James] Hankins’ assumption that Plutarch and Arrian lived “beyond fear or favor” is a blinkered one given that, for instance, Arrian was in the court, as it were, of Hadrian and an excessively negative work on Alexander might well have been read as a critique of the emperor…

Indeed, it is basic enough to be acknowledged as a matter of course in the third paragraph of Elizabeth Bynam’s chapter in the Landmark (2010, ed. James Romm). Likewise, there’s a reason Antony is the last of Plutarch’s parallel lives; no Augustus.

But while I’m discussing it, I suppose I might note a few other things. First, I must assume that, as an excerpt, the parts that dealt with the third major account, by Q. Curtius Rufus, will have gone elsewhere. Surely he could not be left out entirely. Odd also in a treatment of Arrian’s view of Alexander there’s no mention of the fairly clear theme of Arrian’s sketch of Alexanders character: that imperial power corrupted and degraded his once admirable character (explicit, framed in anti-Persian rhetoric in Bk7, e.g. 7.8.3). But more broadly the ‘I can’t imagine why they don’t like Alexander, it must be because they overlook the divine element in human nature’ tone is odd to me given that the evolution of Alexander scholarship is.. like… comps-topic level basic historiography. As in, I literally had a PhD comps question on this, the shift to viewing Alexander through the lens of his victims (esp. Badian, Bosworth) or scholars finding Philip II more interesting (Borza).

James W. Hankins doesn’t engage with those arguments meaningfully. He does engage with the notion that Alexander at times may have transgressed the limits of war, but not that Alexander in fact launched a series of unprovoked wars, for what seems to be the glory and fun of it. The Greeks and Romans found that admirable, but we don’t need to. Once you imagine Alexander’s victims as people against whom Alexander is launching an unprovoked invasion, it becomes really hard to like Alexander, because as a society we no longer measure greatness by who is the best at killing.

That isn’t ‘standing in a well, unable to see the sky is wide’ but rather, standing at the foot of a giant pile of corpses and, at long last, refusing to declare it a great work of art. One might argue with that position, but it is hard to accuse it of smallness of mind…

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And here is the piece Bret is commenting hammering on:

James Hankins (2023): The Greatness of Alexander <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>: ‘King Alexander III of Macedon is beyond doubt among the greatest figures in world history. But was he a great man, the finest kind of human being? His extraordinary success, in combination with his moral weaknesses, must have been frustrating for some ancient moralists since, according to the philosophers, a man’s worth and his ability to lead other men was dependent on the excellence of his moral character. Good moral character, they believed, could be acquired by the study of philosophy. According to the great educator Isocrates, in the finest leaders, good moral character was strengthened by wide-ranging study of the best literature, arts, and sciences.

Alexander studied for years with Aristotle, the fountainhead of Western scientific thought, whom some would say was the greatest moral philosopher who ever lived. Aristotle even wrote a number of works, now lost, intended to instruct his pupil in the arts of kingship. According to Plutarch the young king was “by nature a lover of learning and a lover of reading.” He was an admirer of the great lyric poets and Athens’ fifth-century tragedians as well as a voracious reader of history. He was steeped in Homer, author of the two great epics that formed the Bible of the Greeks. According to multiple sources the young conqueror always carried his Homer with him on campaign, keeping it under his pillow, along with a dagger. He modelled his own behavior on Achilles, Homer’s supreme, flawed hero.

Alexander, in other words, according to ancient ideas had the perfect formation to be a philosopher-king. There were some authorities—chiefly Plutarch—who insisted that he met the conditions to deserve such a title. Another biographer, Arrian, while stopping short of that assessment, praised his many virtues of leadership and his extraordinary accomplishments, while excusing his faults as those of a hot-blooded young man misled by scheming advisors. He points to one admirable quality ignored by modern writers on Alexander, a character trait rare among men of supreme power: The great conqueror was capable of remorse for his own faults and made no effort to conceal them. These admissions of bad behavior had good effects on his own character and gave some kind of solace to those he had injured.

Both Plutarch and Arrian, though living long after Alexander’s time, beyond fear or favor, had access to far more information about him than anyone possesses today. Yet their assessment of the conqueror is strikingly different from that of his modern biographers. For in modern times Alexander’s reputation has suffered a disastrous fall. Since the Second World War it has become common for historians to compare Alexander casually to Adolf Hitler or Genghis Khan, or to dismiss him as a “Homeric pirate,” or to psychoanalyze him as suffering from extreme paranoia and megalomania. Modern writers, as though determined to cut him down to size, focus on Alexander’s vices, which (rightly) seem appalling to us: his ruthless elimination of rivals for the throne, and his towering, drunken rages, leading to rash acts of violence against some of his most loyal companions. These included his trusted commander Cleitus, who had saved his life at the battle of Granicus, and the Persian expedition’s official historian, Callisthenes, Aristotle’s nephew, who died in jail after refusing to kneel before the monarch-god. Moderns find it difficult not to interpret Alexander’s obsession with his own image as the mark of a deranged narcissist, or to see his insatiable thirst for victory as anything other than a mental disorder.

Alexander’s ancient biographers seem unconcerned with what modern readers (rightly) find most abhorrent: the atrocities for which he was responsible. These include the annihilation of Thebes, the slaughter and enslavement of enemies who had surrendered to him, the wolfish plundering of conquered cities. It hardly excuses Alexander that such actions were normal practices in ancient warfare, and that execution and enslavement of defeated enemies was permitted under some ancient laws. However excused, such actions were surely not those of a philosopher-king. We are shocked by these things, and by the failure of the ancients to condemn them, forgetting that our grandfathers saw no crime in the fire-bombing of German cities from the air or the nuclear incineration of two Japanese cities filled with innocent civilians.

Since all the information we moderns have about Alexander’s deeds comes from the same ancient writers who profess to admire him, it can be puzzling that the moral assessments of ancients and moderns differ so much from each other. We are inclined to think of these differences as stemming from the moral blindness of the ancients. Such condescension towards the past is an odious modern habit of mind. But perhaps we should also take stock of the moral myopias of our own time, the deficiencies in our own era’s ways of assessing a person’s worth.

In our age of science and materialism, we tend to look past the high ideals expressed by men in the past, to think that all their achievements must be the product of historical forces beyond their control, that all their heroism is a mere cover for self-interest. We prefer to cut great historical figures down to our own modest size. Arrian, who was a Stoic philosopher as well as a historian, warns against this attitude, writing,

“any one who reproaches Alexander should not do so merely by citing actions that merit reproach, but should collect all his actions together, and then carefully reflect who he himself is and what kind of fortune he enjoys, that he can condemn Alexander, given what Alexander became and the height of human good fortune he attained, the unquestioned king of both continents whose name reached every part of the world, whereas he is himself a lesser man, whose energies are spent on petty things and who does not even get these things right (Loeb translation)…”

If we fail to see the greatness of a man like Alexander, perhaps the reason is that we ourselves are too petty, too stunted in our outlook to appreciate it. As the Chinese poet Han Yu wrote, “A man living at the bottom of a well will think the sky is small.”

We can’t accept greatness in part because we find it difficult to take ancient religion seriously; we moderns overlook the divine element in human nature, and the ability of the divine to transform us. For us, Alexander’s wish to be recognized as a god can only be evidence of insanity or, at best, a cynical ploy to win support among superstitious men. The ancients excused Alexander’s pretensions to superhuman status on the grounds that he did in fact have a great soul; his opinion of himself was justified. It was not hubris, because the gods did not punish but rewarded him with unbroken success. The ancients saw what we fail to see, or what we prefer not to see: that human beings can, exceptionally, achieve greatness, and this can only come through divine help. As the Theban poet Pindar wrote in his eighth Pythian Ode,

Creatures for a day! What is a man?
What is he not? A dream of a shadow
Is our mortal being. But when there comes to men
A gleam of splendour given of heaven,
Then rests on them a light of glory
And blessed are their days (Tr. C. M. Bowra)…

[Hankins, James. 2023. “The Greatness of Alexander”. First Things. May 12. <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>.]

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First Things’s note to the excerpt is:

This biographical essay is excerpted from The Golden Thread: A History of the Western Tradition, by Allen C. Guelzo & James Hankins, forthcoming from Encounter Books in 2024.

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And Adrian Vermeule’s endorsement of the greatness of Aleksander III Argeados of Makedon is here:

Adrian Vermeule: ‘“If we fail to see the greatness of a man like Alexander, perhaps the reason is that we ourselves are too petty, too stunted in our outlook to appreciate it. As the Chinese poet Han Yu wrote, “A man living at the bottom of a well will think the sky is small”.

Excellent piece from @JamesWHankins1…

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It’s too bad the right-wing neofascist brain-eater ate James W. Hankins’s brain. His Virtue Politics book was interesting—largely wrong-headed, IMHO, but interesting.

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One more note. Put me down as somebody who views the language of “western civilization” as always outmoded and, regrettably often, a destructive rhetorical flame thrower deployed by white supremacists. My preference is to talk about the “Dover Circle” as of 1500—the civilizations then in a circle of roughly 400 miles’ radius around Dover, England, and those cultures that have descended from them by direct inheritance and cultural adoption.

Why? I make my argument here: <https://braddelong.substack.com/p/west-north-atlantic-or-dover-circle>:

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What Stanford’s Ian Morris <https://archive.org/details/whywestrulesforn00morr_1/mode/1up> thinks are the economic and civilizational “core areas” of “Western” and “Eastern” civilization since the year -9600.

For nearly all the time since the invention of agriculture, the Eastern core is the Yellow River and Yangtze Valleys, shifting a little. There is continuity here: political continuity, cultural continuity, unbroken chains of influence, even substantial continuity of genetic descent. This is in great contrast to the “Western core”:

  • Fom -9600 to 1400, from Basra on the Persian Gulf to Tbilisi in the Caucasus to Ithaka off the northwest corner of Greece to Thebes in Egypt.

  • From -250 to 250, Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

  • After 250 it reverted back to the original Basra-Tbilisi-Ithaka-Thebes quadrangle.

  • For 1400 to 1800, it picked up stakes and moved to Western Europe.

  • By 1900 the Western “core area” has extended a pseudopod across the Atlantic to the American northeast and contracted in Europe

  • And come 2000, Morris’s “Western core” is the continental United States plus the more-settled parts of Canada.

I feel a great lack of continuity here. What has the civilization of Uruk in -3000 have to do with the civilization of Silicon Valley today? In what sense are they both “the West”, save that there are some people at Stanford who read The Story of the Man Who Saw the Deep, the Epic of Gilgamesh <https://archive.org/details/gilgameshnewrend00ferr>?


And do subscribe to Bret Devereaux’s Patreon <https://www.patreon.com/c/u20122096/posts>. It is very much worth it. He is that good.

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CROSSPOST: BRET DEVEREAUX: Bret vs. the Hax of Sol III—in This Case, James Hankins & Adrian Vermeulle (with an introduction from me)

A pushback from two-and-a-half years ago about one of the weirdest emanations of neofascism I have seen in this past truly weird decade…

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Introduction

I do confess that I was shocked when I got to the end of James Hankins’s <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/> biographical sketch of Aleksander III Argeados of Makedon. Why? Because I learned that Hankins believes that Aleksander was indeed great in a largely positive and admirable sense. Moreover, Hawkins believes that his greatness was the result of something the ancients recognized but that we cannot.

So what is that something?

And what was the cause of his greatness (and utter barbarity) at the very disturbing human social practice of war?

That something and that cause is the exceptional fact that divine favor rested upon Alexander.

Yes, the favor of God Almighty, the Α & Ω, The One Who Is, rested upon him. For, to quote Hawkins, “[when] human beings… exceptionally, achieve greatness… this can only come through divine help”, as Hawkins says “the ancients saw [but]… we fail to see, or… prefer not to see”.

At this point my reaction was that somebody should tell Hawkins to put down the keyboard, back up away from the internet, and not return.

So why is this on my screen? Because I was whipsawed by first seeing:

James W. Hankins: <https://x.com/g_shullenberger/status/2005644591060656193> <https://www.compactmag.com/article/why-im-leaving-harvard/>: ‘Whether through hostility or neglect, Western history is being phased out or allowed to die on the vine at Harvard…

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Followed by a, “no, my colleagues are just teaching it differently” backpedal:

James W. Hankins: ‘People teaching in Western fields… almost all of these people regard the language of “western civilization” as minimally outmoded and maximally “white supremacist”. I am an outlier because I think that the civilizations of the West should be taught as a tradition, and preferentially at the undergrad level. Most of my colleagues disagree and make some sort of obeisance to global history and assume the equality of all “cultures”…

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And then by what I can only read as a frantic attempt at full clawback, as his colleagues are all of a sudden not deluded fools making “obeisance to global history and… the equality of all ‘cultures’”, but are rather truly outstanding learned scholars:

James W. Hankins: ‘I keep reading people who say that no one is teaching Western civilization any more at Harvard, citing my Compact article. It’s not what I said. Harvard (where I’m still on the faculty till 30 June) has 17 outstanding people teaching in Western fields, ancient, medieval and modern…

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So I began chasing links. And got to:

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CROSSPOST: BRET DEVEREAUX: Once You Imagine Alexander’s Victims as People…

Bret Devereaux (2023): <https://x.com/BretDevereaux/status/1657932006984933377>: ‘So, @Vermeullarmine unfollowed me for this tweet (about this excerpt: <firstthings.com/web-exclu…>) (which prevents me from replying to his reply to his reply to me), but the idea that Arrian’s history in particular was influenced by his context isn’t particularly new.

Replying to @Vermeullarmine: [James] Hankins’ assumption that Plutarch and Arrian lived “beyond fear or favor” is a blinkered one given that, for instance, Arrian was in the court, as it were, of Hadrian and an excessively negative work on Alexander might well have been read as a critique of the emperor…

Indeed, it is basic enough to be acknowledged as a matter of course in the third paragraph of Elizabeth Bynam’s chapter in the Landmark (2010, ed. James Romm). Likewise, there’s a reason Antony is the last of Plutarch’s parallel lives; no Augustus.

But while I’m discussing it, I suppose I might note a few other things. First, I must assume that, as an excerpt, the parts that dealt with the third major account, by Q. Curtius Rufus, will have gone elsewhere. Surely he could not be left out entirely. Odd also in a treatment of Arrian’s view of Alexander there’s no mention of the fairly clear theme of Arrian’s sketch of Alexanders character: that imperial power corrupted and degraded his once admirable character (explicit, framed in anti-Persian rhetoric in Bk7, e.g. 7.8.3). But more broadly the ‘I can’t imagine why they don’t like Alexander, it must be because they overlook the divine element in human nature’ tone is odd to me given that the evolution of Alexander scholarship is.. like… comps-topic level basic historiography. As in, I literally had a PhD comps question on this, the shift to viewing Alexander through the lens of his victims (esp. Badian, Bosworth) or scholars finding Philip II more interesting (Borza).

James W. Hankins doesn’t engage with those arguments meaningfully. He does engage with the notion that Alexander at times may have transgressed the limits of war, but not that Alexander in fact launched a series of unprovoked wars, for what seems to be the glory and fun of it. The Greeks and Romans found that admirable, but we don’t need to. Once you imagine Alexander’s victims as people against whom Alexander is launching an unprovoked invasion, it becomes really hard to like Alexander, because as a society we no longer measure greatness by who is the best at killing.

That isn’t ‘standing in a well, unable to see the sky is wide’ but rather, standing at the foot of a giant pile of corpses and, at long last, refusing to declare it a great work of art. One might argue with that position, but it is hard to accuse it of smallness of mind…

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And here is the piece Bret is commenting hammering on:

James Hankins (2023): The Greatness of Alexander <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>: ‘King Alexander III of Macedon is beyond doubt among the greatest figures in world history. But was he a great man, the finest kind of human being? His extraordinary success, in combination with his moral weaknesses, must have been frustrating for some ancient moralists since, according to the philosophers, a man’s worth and his ability to lead other men was dependent on the excellence of his moral character. Good moral character, they believed, could be acquired by the study of philosophy. According to the great educator Isocrates, in the finest leaders, good moral character was strengthened by wide-ranging study of the best literature, arts, and sciences.

Alexander studied for years with Aristotle, the fountainhead of Western scientific thought, whom some would say was the greatest moral philosopher who ever lived. Aristotle even wrote a number of works, now lost, intended to instruct his pupil in the arts of kingship. According to Plutarch the young king was “by nature a lover of learning and a lover of reading.” He was an admirer of the great lyric poets and Athens’ fifth-century tragedians as well as a voracious reader of history. He was steeped in Homer, author of the two great epics that formed the Bible of the Greeks. According to multiple sources the young conqueror always carried his Homer with him on campaign, keeping it under his pillow, along with a dagger. He modelled his own behavior on Achilles, Homer’s supreme, flawed hero.

Alexander, in other words, according to ancient ideas had the perfect formation to be a philosopher-king. There were some authorities—chiefly Plutarch—who insisted that he met the conditions to deserve such a title. Another biographer, Arrian, while stopping short of that assessment, praised his many virtues of leadership and his extraordinary accomplishments, while excusing his faults as those of a hot-blooded young man misled by scheming advisors. He points to one admirable quality ignored by modern writers on Alexander, a character trait rare among men of supreme power: The great conqueror was capable of remorse for his own faults and made no effort to conceal them. These admissions of bad behavior had good effects on his own character and gave some kind of solace to those he had injured.

Both Plutarch and Arrian, though living long after Alexander’s time, beyond fear or favor, had access to far more information about him than anyone possesses today. Yet their assessment of the conqueror is strikingly different from that of his modern biographers. For in modern times Alexander’s reputation has suffered a disastrous fall. Since the Second World War it has become common for historians to compare Alexander casually to Adolf Hitler or Genghis Khan, or to dismiss him as a “Homeric pirate,” or to psychoanalyze him as suffering from extreme paranoia and megalomania. Modern writers, as though determined to cut him down to size, focus on Alexander’s vices, which (rightly) seem appalling to us: his ruthless elimination of rivals for the throne, and his towering, drunken rages, leading to rash acts of violence against some of his most loyal companions. These included his trusted commander Cleitus, who had saved his life at the battle of Granicus, and the Persian expedition’s official historian, Callisthenes, Aristotle’s nephew, who died in jail after refusing to kneel before the monarch-god. Moderns find it difficult not to interpret Alexander’s obsession with his own image as the mark of a deranged narcissist, or to see his insatiable thirst for victory as anything other than a mental disorder.

Alexander’s ancient biographers seem unconcerned with what modern readers (rightly) find most abhorrent: the atrocities for which he was responsible. These include the annihilation of Thebes, the slaughter and enslavement of enemies who had surrendered to him, the wolfish plundering of conquered cities. It hardly excuses Alexander that such actions were normal practices in ancient warfare, and that execution and enslavement of defeated enemies was permitted under some ancient laws. However excused, such actions were surely not those of a philosopher-king. We are shocked by these things, and by the failure of the ancients to condemn them, forgetting that our grandfathers saw no crime in the fire-bombing of German cities from the air or the nuclear incineration of two Japanese cities filled with innocent civilians.

Since all the information we moderns have about Alexander’s deeds comes from the same ancient writers who profess to admire him, it can be puzzling that the moral assessments of ancients and moderns differ so much from each other. We are inclined to think of these differences as stemming from the moral blindness of the ancients. Such condescension towards the past is an odious modern habit of mind. But perhaps we should also take stock of the moral myopias of our own time, the deficiencies in our own era’s ways of assessing a person’s worth.

In our age of science and materialism, we tend to look past the high ideals expressed by men in the past, to think that all their achievements must be the product of historical forces beyond their control, that all their heroism is a mere cover for self-interest. We prefer to cut great historical figures down to our own modest size. Arrian, who was a Stoic philosopher as well as a historian, warns against this attitude, writing,

“any one who reproaches Alexander should not do so merely by citing actions that merit reproach, but should collect all his actions together, and then carefully reflect who he himself is and what kind of fortune he enjoys, that he can condemn Alexander, given what Alexander became and the height of human good fortune he attained, the unquestioned king of both continents whose name reached every part of the world, whereas he is himself a lesser man, whose energies are spent on petty things and who does not even get these things right (Loeb translation)…”

If we fail to see the greatness of a man like Alexander, perhaps the reason is that we ourselves are too petty, too stunted in our outlook to appreciate it. As the Chinese poet Han Yu wrote, “A man living at the bottom of a well will think the sky is small.”

We can’t accept greatness in part because we find it difficult to take ancient religion seriously; we moderns overlook the divine element in human nature, and the ability of the divine to transform us. For us, Alexander’s wish to be recognized as a god can only be evidence of insanity or, at best, a cynical ploy to win support among superstitious men. The ancients excused Alexander’s pretensions to superhuman status on the grounds that he did in fact have a great soul; his opinion of himself was justified. It was not hubris, because the gods did not punish but rewarded him with unbroken success. The ancients saw what we fail to see, or what we prefer not to see: that human beings can, exceptionally, achieve greatness, and this can only come through divine help. As the Theban poet Pindar wrote in his eighth Pythian Ode,

Creatures for a day! What is a man?
What is he not? A dream of a shadow
Is our mortal being. But when there comes to men
A gleam of splendour given of heaven,
Then rests on them a light of glory
And blessed are their days (Tr. C. M. Bowra)…

[Hankins, James. 2023. “The Greatness of Alexander”. First Things. May 12. <https://firstthings.com/the-greatness-of-alexander/>.]

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First Things’s note to the excerpt is:

This biographical essay is excerpted from The Golden Thread: A History of the Western Tradition, by Allen C. Guelzo & James Hankins, forthcoming from Encounter Books in 2024.

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And Adrian Vermeule’s endorsement of the greatness of Aleksander III Argeados of Makedon is here:

Adrian Vermeule: ‘“If we fail to see the greatness of a man like Alexander, perhaps the reason is that we ourselves are too petty, too stunted in our outlook to appreciate it. As the Chinese poet Han Yu wrote, “A man living at the bottom of a well will think the sky is small”.

Excellent piece from @JamesWHankins1…

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It’s too bad the right-wing neofascist brain-eater ate James W. Hankins’s brain. His Virtue Politics book was interesting—largely wrong-headed, IMHO, but interesting.

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One more note. Put me down as somebody who views the language of “western civilization” as always outmoded and regrettably option a destructive rhetorical flame thrower deployed by white supremacists. My preference is to talk about the “Dover Circle” as of 1500—the civilizations then in a circle of roughly 400 miles’ radius around Dover, England, and those cultures that have descended from them by direct inheritance and cultural adoption.

Why? Briefly, look at this:

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It is a map showing what Stanford’s Ian Morris <https://archive.org/details/whywestrulesforn00morr_1/mode/1up> thinks are the economic and civilizational “core areas” of “Western” and “Eastern” civilization since the year -9600.

For nearly all the time since the invention of agriculture, the Eastern core is the Yellow River and Yangtze Valleys, shifting a little. There is continuity here: political continuity, cultural continuity, unbroken chains of influence, even substantial continuity of genetic descent.

This is in great contrast to the “Western core”:

  • Fom -9600 to 1400, from Basra on the Persian Gulf to Tbilisi in the Caucasus to Ithaka off the northwest corner of Greece to Thebes in Egypt.

  • From -250 to 250, Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

  • After 250 it reverted back to the original Basra-Tbilisi-Ithaka-Thebes quadrangle.

  • For 1400 to 1800, it picked up stakes and moved to Western Europe.

  • By 1900 the Western “core area” has extended a pseudopod across the Atlantic to the American northeast and contracted in Europe

  • And come 2000, Morris’s “Western core” is the continental United States plus the more-settled parts of Canada.

I feel a great lack of continuity here. What has the civilization of Uruk in -3000 have to do with the civilization of Silicon Valley today? In what sense are they both “the West”, save that there are some people at Stanford who read The Story of the Man Who Saw the Deep, the Epic of Gilgamesh <https://archive.org/details/gilgameshnewrend00ferr>?

Certainly there was a time in the 1800s when people wanted to tell the Story of Civilization as something like an Olympic-torch relay race. But this is like picking out pictures of things you like in a photograph and claiming that they are “yours”. There was no single torch. There were no hand-offs. And if there had been a single torch, it would come with all kinds of things that we do not like at all.Earlier peoples ascribed the rôles of torch-bearers in this relay would have been very surprised to learn that the inhabitants of the Thames Valley were in any way them or their heirs. In the -50s, Roman Senator and Proconsul Marcus Tullius Cicero snidely snarked argued that the Britons had no silver and were too stupid and uneducated to make good slaves—hence they were not worth imperializing. Athens had very little tolerance for Jerusalem. And Jerusalem had even less tolerance for Athens.


And do subscribe to Bret Devereaux’s Patreon <https://www.patreon.com/c/u20122096/posts>. It is very much worth it. He is that good.

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Lessons for Debt Control from Clinton's Success in the 1990s

Time to fly my left-neoliberal freak flag! For a failure to get the history right may well lead us to inaccurate conclusions about what our government-debt outlook really is, & mistake how resulting economic & political-economic problems should be dealt with:

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Credible fiscal anchors crowd in private investment when the central bank leans against demand shortfalls and technology makes capital cheaper. Clinton’s OBRA 93 deficit-reduction Reconciliation package accelerated the economy, because macro reality beats tribal signaling. Fiscal credibility, pro-work redistribution, and a supportive Fed plus falling ICT prices crowded in investment, the 1994 yield-curve shift move reflected growth strength and MBS mechanics, not fears of “austerity gone wrong.” The Clinton 1990s really were a fabulous decade that delivered rising employment, low inflation, and real wage gains, with the EITC expansion the single biggest pro–working-poor social-insurance expansion. Labeling this “austerity” misses how structure + demand + technology produced more capital, higher productivity, and a richer America.

And taking claims that Clinton’s OBRA 93 would tank the economy as real fears by credible macroeconomic analysts is to mistake political bullshit for real analytical judgements and warranted fears.

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I write because I think the very sharp Marcus Nunes gets this one wrong here.

He is reviewing the the fiscal adjustment that was the Clinton 1993 Reconciliation deficit-reduction bill—OBRA 93 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Budget_Reconciliation_Act_of_1993>

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It crowded-in a truly extraordinary boost to investment in America, which was further amplified by the secular fall in the relative price of information-communications capital goods that was the internet boom. And American economic growth was, thereafter, stronger by perhaps 0.5%-points per year. Figure that America today is 15% richer because of Bill Clinton and those of us who worked for and supported him.

OBRA 93 was viewed by us left-neoliberals—us Rubin Democrats—who pushed this in 1993 as very much a second installment of what had been OBRA 90: the George H.W. Bush-Mitchell-Foley deficit-reduction package of three years before. OBRA 93 did have more tax increases and fewer spending cuts in the mix, but by a narrow margin. OBRA 93 was more progressive than OBRA 90, but again by a narrow margin. But both combined revenue increases with spending restraint rather than relying on one side of the ledger alone, both raised top‑bracket income tax liabilities and closed loopholes/preferences to broaden the base and increase progressivity, both tightened discretionary spending caps and enforced them with sequestration/PayGo‑style budget rules to deter backsliding, both protected core social insurance pillars while trimming growth rates in selected programs rather than cutting benefits outright, both sought business‑confidence effects by committing to predictable multi‑year deficit paths to “crowd‑in” private investment, and both were sold as responsible long‑run policy over short‑run optics.

Indeed, the theses of us left-neoliberals—us Rubin Democrats—who pushed this, and convinced Clinton to throw his weight and his administration 100% behind it, was that:

  1. it would indeed crowd-in investment and boost economic growth,

  2. we had a commitment from Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve that he would do his damnedest to adjust monetary policy so that recovery from the 1990-1991 recession was not interrupted by any shortfall in aggregate demand,

  3. neglecting the urgent need for deficit reduction might well wind us with much higher interest-rate risk premiums that would disrupt economic recovery,

  4. because there were signs in financial- and exchange-market reactions to news that the U.S. debt was rising high enough to endanger the dollar’s safe-haven status,

  5. we would get votes from sensible deficit-hawk Republicans and so it would become a “bring us together” bipartisan initiative,

  6. success at boosting the pace of American economic growth would mean that, after a 1990s of the first rapid real wage increases in a generation, those who had become Reagan Democrats in the 1980s would be much more willing to support equity policies as they would no longer feel under as much family financial stress.

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(6) was 100% wrong.

(5) was 200% wrong—it turned out that there were ZERO sensible deficit-hawk Republicans: none were willing to accept balanced deficit reduction hitting both spending cuts and tax increases, even though they would talk a good game in the abstract.

(4) was something I was 100% certain of at the time—and maybe it was true then that the safe-haven exorbitant-privilege debt capacity of the U.S. was then not that much more than 70% of annual GDP. But, if so, debt capacity rapidly and extraordinarily expanded once the 2007-8 GFC hit the world economy:

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(3), thus, has to be put in doubt. It was an argument I very strongly believed back then. I recall a cold December 1992 night I spent carrying (a) simulation runs projecting interest rates implicit in the then-current yield curve under fiscal business-as-usual and (b) assessments of how the Bush 41 administration had begun to see “bad news” about the deficit not strengthen but weaken the dollar over to Bob Reich’s house, so he could carry them down to DC for Transition-Planning meetings. I still believe it was a risk. But I cannot believe it was an overwhelming risk.

However, (1) and (2) still look very very good indeed. And those by themselves are enough to place us, all of us who worked on and supported OBRA 93 public benefactors, among those whose names are written brilliantly and boldly in the Book of Life—especially as Gene Sperling managed to get and keep in OBRA 93 the EITC expansion that was then and is now the biggest pro-working poor expansion of the American social insurance system ever.

But we got zero Republican votes for OBRA 93. OBRA 90 had passed the House 227-203 (Democrats 217-40, Republicans 10-163, but with an unknown number of Republican “yeas’‘ in reserve if needed) and the Senate 54-46 (Democrats 44-10, Republicans 10-35). OBRA 93 passed the House 218-217, and the Senate 51-50, all Democrats both times.

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So here is Marcus:

Marcus Nunes: The Transition to Fiscal Dominance <https://marcusnunes.substack.com/p/the-transition-to-fiscal-dominance>: ‘In the 1990s… a rising debt ratio since 1980 was reduced… by Bill Clinton and the congressional Democrats]… through significant “austerity”, with both goverment spending falling and government revenues rising…. Monetary policy was appropriate, managing to keep NGDP on a stable level growth path, while inflation was low and stable. Throughout the adjustment unemployment was falling and reached 3.9% by the time Clinton left office…. However, there was significant economic debate—and widespread professional concern—that Clinton’s fiscal consolidation would damage growth. Many prominent economists predicted the 1993 deficit reduction package would cause recession or stall the recovery from the 90/91 recession. Just to give a few examples of ‘big names’ that were skeptical:

1. Republican Economists’ Consensus View: The Republican economic establishment was nearly unanimous: this would damage growth. Herbert Stein (Nixon/Ford CEA Chairman): Warned the tax increases would slow recovery. Martin Feldstein (Reagan CEA Chairman): Argued higher taxes would reduce investment and employment. Predicted the package would “significantly reduce economic growth.” Robert Barro (Harvard): Concerned about growth effects of higher marginal tax rates on labor supply and investment. Michael Boskin (Bush CEA Chairman): Predicted negative growth effects, particularly from top rate increases affecting entrepreneurs and small business.

2. Wall Street Consensus: Major investment banks and forecasters predicted slower growth: Goldman Sachs economists initially forecast the deficit reduction would subtract ~0.5 percentage points from GDP growth. Many Wall Street economists worried the fiscal tightening would abort the fragile early-1990s recovery. Bond market initially sold off on fears that fiscal consolidation would hurt growth, reducing tax revenues and making deficit reduction self-defeating.

3. Political Predictions: Every single Republican in Congress voted against the package, many citing economic harm: - Senate: 0 Republican votes (50-50, VP Gore broke tie). - House: 0 Republican votes (218-216). Newt Gingrich predicted: “The tax increase will kill the recovery… This is the Democrat machine’s recession, and each one of them will be held personally accountable.” Dick Armey (House Majority Leader): “The impact on job creation is going to be devastating.” Phil Gramm (Senator): “I believe hundreds of thousands of people are going to lose their jobs… I believe Bill Clinton will be one of those people.” (In 1996, Clinton was reelected!)…

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(Parenthetically, not mentioned by Marcus: John Kasich of Ohio, back on July 28, 1993: “This plan will not work. If it was to work, then I’d have to become a Democrat and believe that more taxes and bigger government is the answer…” <https://crywolfproject.org/quotes/quote-%E2%80%93-rep-john-kasich-r-oh-cnn-1>. John Kasich lied. He never became a Democrat.)

Now let me pick my bones:

First, damned if I know why Marcus writes “Bond market initially sold off on fears that fiscal consolidation would hurt growth, reducing tax revenues and making deficit reduction self-defeating.” Look at the 10-Year Treasury:

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Damned if I can see any bond-market selloff as George H.W. Bush went from clear favorite to win reëlection to loser, and as Clinton shifted to his left-neoliberal deficit-reducer incarnation, as OBRA 93 moved through the congress with only Democratic votes and with only one-vote victories in either chamber, and as it then began to take effect.

Zooming in, adding in the dates that Alan Greenspan raised the Federal Funds rate:

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The bond-market selloff came starting only half a year after the passage of OBRA 93, and was a reaction to two things: (A) The first was the extraordinary strength of the U.S. economy, as high-tech emerged as a leading sector and as investment in information and communications technology roared ahead greatly in excess of our expectations. (B) The second was the endogenous duration of mortgage-backed securities, which were then a new thing: as interest rates rose, people stopped refinancing mortgages, holders of MBS found themselves holding assets of much longer duration than they had counted on, and so they dumped long-duration Treasuries into the market; the consequences was that instead of a 1-to-4 gearing of 10-Year to 3-Month interest rate increases, we were surprised by a 3-to-4 gearing.

Both (A) and (B) struck us by surprise, and they made my life working for the Treasury in 1994 extremely interesting—very stressful—and never dull.

But the bond-market selloff did NOT, REPEAT NOT, reflect any fear that “fiscal consolidation would hurt growth, reducing tax revenues and making deficit reduction self-defeating”. The deficit was, by then, falling much faster than according to the benchmarks our initial 1993 forecasts had set.

And the Wall Street economist fears—well, Greenspan was 100% on board with deficit reduction and OBRA 93, and so we interpreted those worries (and the Goldman-Sachs forecasts) as coming from people who were not so much making forecasts of the consequences of a combination of fiscal austerity and monetary ease, but rather people making noises to put themselves into ideological alignment with their largely-Republican client base, by parroting what the Republican politicians were saying.

And the Republican politicians? The Doles had been powerful drivers and advocates of the Bush 41 deficit-reduction package, OBRA 90, three years before OBRA 93. Had OBRA 93 been proposed under a second-term Bush 41 presidency, they would have been strong advocates as well. It was, in their view, good policy. But because the person at the head of the government was not Republican George H.W. Bush 41 but Democrat Bill Clinton 42, root-and-branch opposition to it was good politics. As for the Gramms, the Gingriches, and the Armeys, they were not making forecasts but rather one-way bets: if the economy went into recession for any reason, their predictions that OBRA 93 would be useful; if the economy did not, they knew that the supine press corps would never hold them to account. And it did not.

And now we come to the Republican economists. Were Stein, Feldstein, Barro, and Boskin serious in their fears that OBRA 93 would damage economic growth? Barro, yes. But Stein and Feldstein had been big OBRA 90 boosters, and Boskin had been an OBRA 90 designers. By far the most significant difference between OBRA 90 and OBRA 93 was the partisan identity of the President who would sign it into law. Now I suppose it is possible that Stein, Feldstein, Boskin thought that OBRA 90 was bad policy, and only went along with it because they were team players—professional Republicans. It could be. I never asked any of them. But my hunch is that it is overwhelmingly more likely that the polarity is reversed: that it was their opposition to OBRA 93 rather than their support of OBRA 90 that was subservience to their political masters.

Thus I think Marcus has it more-or-less completely wrong when he says that “there was significant economic debate—and widespread professional concern—that Clinton’s fiscal consolidation would damage growth. Many prominent economists predicted the 1993 deficit reduction package would cause recession or stall the recovery from the 90/91 recession…” The “professional” concern was—Barro aside (and Barro, recall, is the person unhinged enough to claim that the Trump-Ryan-McConnell tax cut of 2017 would raise investment in America by as much as it increased from 1993 to 2000 and increase America’s steady-state capital-output ratio by 40%) a professional Republican, not a professional economist concern.

There had been, recall, no significant economic debate over OBRA 90.

But the rest of what Marcus has to say about fears that we may be undergoing a transition to “fiscal dominance” is good!

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From DEI to DSI: Handling the Neofascist Trumpist Turn to “Discourse Safety Initiatives”

We need a guide to how to deal with the new rounds of escalating weaponized cancel-culture to the max. But only a fool would trust the New York TImes to help think these things through, as here it is once again dealing from the middle of the deck…

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Wait!

Alex Bronzini-Vender says he is writing about what is wrong with Harvard.

And yet his two concrete examples are from Northwestern and Texas A&M?

The most concrete thing he says about Harvard as an institution is that Harvard does bad by (a) pointing to IHRA and (b) saying that the university “considers the examples that accompany the IHRA definition [of anti-semitism] to the extent that those examples might be useful in determining discriminatory intent”?

You see the problem here?: NU. TA&M. might. If all ya got is that Harvard said something you object to “might” be useful, something from TA&M, and something from NU, then ya got nuthin:

Alex Bronzini-Vender: At Harvard and Elsewhere, the New Campus Orthodoxy Is Even More Stifling <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/29/opinion/harvards-campus-speech-trump.html>: ‘That’s not how it’s playing out. Under federal pressure, Harvard and other universities around the country now police academic inquiry according to murkier standards of fairness. The goal, it seems, is to avoid offending anyone, anywhere, across an ever-expanding matrix of identities and standpoints. Rather than dismantling the excesses of the woke era, the new Trump-friendly programs and policies simply repurposed them to serve a different ideological agenda. The result is a new orthodoxy even more stifling than the last…

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Now I would be eager to hear from Ryan Enos and from Steve Levitsky—who are quoted in seeing significant problems with Harvard’s current institutional position. But I want to hear from them in full context. Not what we have here.

And so, once again, I find myself in the same position I find myself with respect to, say, The Free Press. I very hard to see the New York Times editors as working in good faith here.

(Alex himself is, of course, young and a student—and so the appropriate attitude to take to him is to urge him to sharpen and stress-test his arguments.)

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OK. What, then, you ask, should we in universities be doing?

We should be doing our jobs. We should not be entering into any transactional “compacts”, but simply do our jobs. And we are deserving of support to the extent that we do our jobs well.

As my brother-in-law Paul Mahoney, still Interim President of the University of Virginia for one more day, wrote in the letter that—in my reading, which could be wrong—made the MAGA Regents of UVA bounce him out of the job tomorrow:

October 17, 2025

The United States Department of Education
Washington, DC 20202

Dear Secretary McMahon, Ms. Mailman, and Mr. Haley,

Thank you for your letter inviting comment on the proposed Compact for Academic Excellence in Higher Education. We wholeheartedly agree that “American higher education is the envy of the world.” We also agree with many of the principles outlined in the Compact, including a fair and unbiased admissions process, an affordable and academically rigorous education, a thriving marketplace of ideas, institutional neutrality, and equal treatment of students, faculty, and staff in all aspects of university operations. Indeed, the University of Virginia leads in several of these areas and is committed to continuous improvement in all of them.

We seek no special treatment in exchange for our pursuit of those foundational goals. The integrity of science and other academic work requires merit-based assessment of research and scholarship. A contractual arrangement predicating assessment on anything other than merit will undermine the integrity of vital, sometimes lifesaving, research and further erode confidence in American higher education.

Higher education faces significant challenges and has not always lived up to its highest ideals. We believe that the best path toward real and durable progress lies in an open and collaborative conversation. We look forward to working together to develop alternative, lasting approaches to improving higher education.

Sincerely yours,

Paul Mahoney
Interim President
University of Virginia <https://news.virginia.edu/content/community-message-interim-president-paul-mahoney>

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“Academic work requires merit-based assessment of research and scholarship”, and so any “contractual arrangement predicating assessment on anything other than merit will undermine the integrity of vital, sometimes lifesaving, research and further erode confidence in American higher education”.

But what is our job? It is complicated. A university is different from the public square. A university is a place in which its members have duties:

  1. to speak,

  2. to listen,

  3. to think,

  4. to learn,

  5. to support one another in those first four duties.

That means that members of a university have academic freedom, not public-square 1st-Amendment free-speech freedom. The idea is to generate, improve, and evaluate ideas; and then to disseminate those ideas; and to create and maintain a community that those who want to take on those duties find a safe, welcoming, and supporting place to do so.

How to arrange an institution and a community that does that best is, as I said, complicated.

The key dilemma is how to support those who are here to listen and to learn, and to weed out those who are not here to listen and to learn (and to encourage them to their proper place(s) go) without discouraging the speaking and the thinking. And here my go-to guru is the most learned Jacob Levy:

Jacob Levy (2016): Safe spaces, academic freedom, and the university as a complex association <https://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2016/03/safe-spaces-academic-freedom-and-the-university-as-a-complex-association/>: ‘“Academic freedom”… is not… freedom of speech… not the freedom to lie, to commit research fraud, to submit plagiarized work…. It’s not the freedom of a professor to stand in front of a class and say “have you heard the word of God as I best understand it? Let me preach to you for an hour”. Or “you all really need to vote for Bernie Sanders, his is the one true way for politics.”…

The scope that a professor has… [is] constrained by the subject matter of the… class… the… institution… [and the] identity… [of the] discipline…. [It] is the freedom of both professors and students (researchers and those pursing knowledge), to be judged only according to what they do in the classroom or as researchers and only according to the standards of the discipline…. [That] excludes… evaluat[ing] students, or for the university to evaluate us at all for our political or religious opinions expressed off campus…

Refer a friend

And:

Jacob Levy (2024): Campus culture wars are a teachable moment in how freedom of speech and academic freedom differ <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-campus-culture-wars-are-a-teachable-moment-in-how-freedom-of-speech/>: ‘Academic freedom… [is] the freedom to follow arguments and evidence where they lead, according to scholarly methods… the freedom to teach, within the confines of the scholarly mission of the class… and, finally, freedom from evaluation on non-academic grounds, of which the traditionally most important are political and religious grounds….

The university has to protect not only the safety of its other members but also the security of its academic functions. It can’t rule against the language on a sign, but it must intervene to prevent violence between students, or occupations and blockades that would prevent a class from meeting, or an invited speaker from speaking…. Escalation, overreach and the chilling of legitimate protest are all constant dangers…. Police helicopters and billy clubs on campus are always a sign of failure…. These are genuine problems… but many universities have probably erred too far in the direction of the shrug, letting the belief grow that classes may be disrupted or speakers blockaded without consequence….

In the autumn of 2023… members of university… conspicuously did not all sympathize with the same cause…. [So] universities often fell back on… institutional neutrality. But critics… said the institution had shown that it didn’t take it seriously either…. [Plus] the rule that the university shouldn’t take any interest in the rhetoric that’s used in a protest or on social media was harder to take seriously in an era of hate-speech rules, restrictions on exclusionary speech, and a discourse around “safety” that treated hostile language as violence….

The best time to have started to do the right thing was yesterday, but the second-best time is today…. Recommit to academic freedom, freedom of extramural speech, and institutional neutrality, starting now…. A firm defence of the right of pro-Palestinian students to protest non-disruptively; a clear stand against professors using their classrooms as political platforms; a refusal to adjudicate and police the meaning and intent of extramural political slogans or social-media posts; and the discipline to avoid adopting institutional political platforms on foreign, political or social policy. With those rules in place, they can provide the site and space for students and faculty alike to study, explore, discuss and debate, to celebrate, mourn and protest, even the most divisive questions in political life…

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Plus MOAR, for example: <https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9789633866542-003/html> ; and <https://digressionsimpressions.substack.com/p/on-academic-freedom-and-institutional>.

As I put it in the past:

Brad DeLong (2017): “Any Community… Flourishes only When Our Members Feel Welcome & Safe…” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170926230940/https://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/09/any-community-flourishes-only-when-our-members-feel-welcome-and-safe.html>: ‘A university has three goals: 1. A university is a safe space where ideas can be set forth and developed. 2. A university is a safe space where ideas can be evaluated and assessed. 3. A university is a safe space where scholars can develop, and gain intelligence and confidence. Speech whose primary goal is to undermine and defeat one or more of those three goals does not belong on a university campus. If you come to Berkeley, and if your speech is primarily intended to—or even, through your failure to think through what you are doing, has the primary effect of (1) keeping us from developing ideas that may be great ones, (2) keeping us from properly evaluating and assessing ideas, or (3) driving members of the university away, your speech does not belong here. There are lots of people who want to take advantage of free speech week to neither: 1. develop ideas that may be great ones, 2. thoughtfully and rationally evaluate and assess ideas, nor 3/ make the university a welcoming place for young scholars. Some will want blood in the streets. Some will hope to take advantage of blood in the streets. Somebody may wind up dead, or maimed, as part of a game of political-cultural dingbat kabuki largely orthogonal to the three proper missions of the university. It is a serious concern.

This is still, today, a hill I will defend—but I will listen to reasoned arguments against it, and try to think and learn. For others disagree. Noah Smith for example:

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