CROSSPOST: JAMES MILLER: Judith Shklar: A Thinker for Our Times?
A reading of Judith Shklar as a searcher, a “Pyrrhonist”. That tradition flowed through the 100s-author Sextus Empiricus through Montaigne to Shklar, with Sextus being the source of Montaigne’s “Que sais-je?” (“What do I know?”). Miller’s main point is that Montaigne’s discovery of Pyrrho led him to drop his youthful hope of becoming a consistent Stoic, and Shklar went through the same change when she discovered Montaigne:
As I understand it, Sextus Empiricus sorted thinkers into three groups:
“Dogmatists” claim to have found the truth.
“Skeptics” claim the truth can’t be found.
Pyrrhonists “continue to search”.
Assigning her to the last category is, I think, a very nice way to characterize Judith Shklar.
Confronted with anyone who claimed to know what was going on, her first instinct was always to dismantle their claims, usually with black humor and references to all the horrible things that people claiming to follow that particular doctrine of thought had done to other people, either because of that doctrine, because it made them a little money or gained them a little advantage, or for no comprehensible reason at all. Hence one does not aim at justice or a Just City. Recent history, she believed as strongly as she could, had demonstrated very powerfully and yet again that “to speak of justice has become hazardous” to your clarity of thought but, more important, to the people around you. Hence the proper aim was to attempt the diminishing of injustice, while recognizing that it is and always will be pervasive. True liberals who want to be effective in the world should worry not about promoting virtues but “worry more about vices”, with “the deliberate infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group by stronger ones” as a truly great and central evil.
And, in short: that the task is Sisyphean does not mean that we should not keep attempting it:
CROSSPOST: JAMES MILLER: Judith Shklar: A Thinker for Our Times?
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An appreciation of Judith Shklar, a connoisseur of political puzzles: “INJUSTICE LURKS IN THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE FOR ALL.”
James Miller
Nov 10, 2026
Note: This is a revised version of a text that originally appeared as a book review-essay (with footnotes) in the journal Political Theory in 2000, eight years after the Harvard professor Judith Shklar’s untimely death of a heart attack at the age of 63.
I have chosen to revise and reprint it now (without the footnotes) because of the renewed recent interest in Shklar’s work; because my understanding of her achievement sharply contradicts that offered recently by my friend Samuel Moyn in his important study of Liberalism Against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times; and finally because the piece grew out of my own firsthand, if brief, acquaintance with that rarest of creatures, in my experience — a learned scholar who was also a great-souled philosopher.
The two of us by chance spent two weeks together in March 1987 as scholars in residence at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy.
At the time, I had closely read and admired several of her books; I had studied political theory with two of her former students, George Armstrong Kelly and Mark Hulliung; and I had also seen Shklar a couple of times at public events, where she had taken apart the ostensible arguments of a distinguished scholar with brisk precision. Stinging in her criticism and keen to stir up debate, she was an unrelenting gadfly of sublime intelligence.
Because what I regard as my first mature work, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (1984) had been inspired in large part by the combined pleasure and disagreement I experienced while reading Shklar’s 1979 study of Rousseau’s social theory, Men and Citizens, I was mortified to learn that I would be spending two weeks with her at Bellagio. If she had read my book, I feared that she would certainly have noticed all of its defects.
To my surprise, Shklar was magnanimous: she had closely read, and received, my book as I had intended it -- as an earnest response to her keen appreciation of Rousseau as a uniquely provocative and paradoxical thinker (in that regard, someone very much like herself).
From the start of our time together, she was generous in her companionship, ardent in discussing ideas, but also reticent whenever I asked her about herself: she didn’t think her personal experiences merited much attention. (It was only years later, in response to an invitation from the American Council of Learned Societies, that she produced a short autobiography.)
At Bellagio, we went on several long walks together. She spoke of how profoundly we both had been touched by the work of Rousseau — it was, she promised me, an intellectual and moral adventure that both of us would never get over. (She was right.) At the same time, I kept pressing her for more information about her life and, among other things, how the idiosyncratic convictions she had expressed in her 1984 magnum opus, Ordinary Vices, squared with her own political conduct.
In the years that followed, we met annually to catch up, either in her small study room in Widener Library, surrounded by one of the richest collections of books in the world, or at a cafe for coffee in Harvard Square. At our last meeting, in 1990, she was serving her term as the first woman to be elected President of the American Political Association. It was moving to see how proud she was of finally achieving the public recognition of her peers.
The work of Judith N. Shklar began, and ended, in paradox: she was a political theorist—but one who remained forever uncertain about what positive results, if any, theorizing about politics might produce.
In 1957, in her first book, After Utopia, a prodigiously learned survey of modern European social thought from Helvetius to Simone de Beauvoir (a project begun when she was just twenty-two years old), Shklar exposed her readers to a barrage of typically unequivocal opinions: “It is next to impossible to believe strongly that the power of human reason expressing itself in political action is capable of achieving its ends.”’ The results of political action in our own century must give us pause: “To speak of justice has become hazardous. The inhibitions bred by our historical experience and by analytical honesty are overpowering.” Yet, without at least a “grain of baseless optimism,” we cannot imagine “an end beyond what is known to exist”— the basis of any strong theory of politics.
A decade later, her convictions remained unchanged. The disappearance of the kind of “classical imagery and values” once expressed by philosophers from Plato to Rousseau had left “political theory without any clear orientation and so with a sense of uneasiness.” A great tradition was dead: “No one was writing anything comparable to Leviathan,” Shklar later recalled, “and no-one ever would. Only political chatter and the vestiges of ideology were around. No Social Contract, no Rousseau, no political theory!”
Not long before her sudden and unexpected death in 1992, Shklar admitted the obvious. The publication in 1971 of A Theory of Justice by her Harvard colleague John Rawls had changed everything. As a matter of plain empirical fact--and empirical facts mattered to her a great deal--she had been mistaken about the postwar prospects for constructive political thought: the lively academic interest in the work of Rawls and, later, Charles Taylor, proved it.
Still, as Nancy Rosenblum justly remarks in an essay in Liberalism without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar, an invaluable posthumous festschrift edited by Bernard Yack, “Shklar consistently declined to engage in the business of systematic normative theory, where notions of social justice and responsibility are given solid ground.”
Try as she might—and she did seem to try, especially in her late essays on American political science—Shklar could never surmount her skeptical queasiness about even the most modestly liberal of political hopes.
Thus, readers of The Faces of Injustice, published near the end of Shklar’s life, are flatly told that “there is no just way to overcome many of the realms of injustice.” And again: “injustice lurks in the pursuit of justice for all.” Even in 1988—when these lines were first delivered at Yale as the Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence—to speak of justice was, for Shklar, evidently still “hazardous.”
Shklar was a moral psychologist of brutal candor and an intellectual historian of great rigor: many of her essays bear comparing, in their elegance of style and acuity of insight, to the best short works of Isaiah Berlin. Her range of reading and growing mastery of narrative style recall another unusual thinker, whom she knew and in certain respects admired, Hannah Arendt; but she never composed an edifying political just-so story to match that recounted by Arendt in On Revolution (a book that Shklar told me that she detested).
She cherished her friendship with Michael Walzer, another gifted writer of great erudition and intelligence, but never hid her profound antipathy toward his emphasis on “shared intuitions and sensibilities” as the communal ground of political judgment: “To confuse a common culture with a harmony of political interests amounts to little but a sleight of hand. What cultures share as a rule is language, which makes it possible for us to express, among other things, our hatred and contempt for each other.”
Was Shklar essentially a misanthrope? Can one consistently pursue a strictly negative way of thinking about politics? Or rather, as Walzer gently suggests in his festschrift essay “On Negative Politics,” must her via negativa produce the ultimate paradox, a tacit affirmation, mirabile dictu, of nothing other than “an American version of social democracy”?
Reviewing Shklar’s work for the Times Literary Supplement, Mark Lilla, a former student, remarked that her “vision of political life was deeply, perhaps too deeply, marked by the catastrophes of modem history.” I find Lilla’s gloss on Shklar here and elsewhere strange: it is not clear how an accurate awareness of catastrophic possibilities could shape anyone’s vision of political life “too deeply.” Still, Lilla is surely correct to stress the impact of her biography on her paradoxical sensibility.
Shklar was born to a life of comfort and learning, the child of an enlightened and prosperous Jewish family that called Riga home. Her mother was a pediatrician. In 1928, the year that Shklar was born, Riga was the capital of Latvia, a newly formed nation that had declared its independence after World War I from both Russia and Germany, two imperial states that enviously eyed its strategic location at the Eastern edge of the Baltic Sea.
“I am a bookworm,” she begins her brief and vivid memoir, “A Life of Learning,” first published as an Occasional Paper by the American Council of Learned Societies in 1989. “Since the age of eleven I have read and read, and enjoyed almost every moment of it.”
Shklar’s eager entry into the Republic of Letters happened in 1939, the same year, not coincidentally, that World War II broke out— and Latvia found itself, once again, a target of conquest.
Airlifted out of Riga by a politically perspicacious uncle shortly before Russia invaded Latvia, the family stayed for some months in Sweden before escaping, via the Trans-Siberian railroad, to Japan. There, a timely payment of cash secured a visa to Canada. Leaving Japan not long before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Shklar family took a boat to Seattle, where American authorities promptly put them behind bars in a detention center for illegal Oriental immigrants.
In his essay for the Times Literary Supplement, Mark Lilla implies that these trials and tribulations had marked Shklar with an unfortunately grim political vision: “She practiced what Leo Strauss in another context called the ‘reductio ad Hitlerum,’ and of this she was master.”
In my own conversations with her, Hitler never came up. And Shklar’s own verdict on her childhood and early youth was characteristically mordant: “If I were asked what effect these adventures had on my character, I would say that they left me with an abiding taste for black humor.”
They also left her with a permanently damaged sense of belonging—although this was an aspect of her experience she was in fact quite reluctant to discuss. It nevertheless linked her to older emigre scholars, such as Hannah Arendt, whose experience of exile she described in these terms: “Their homesickness, aggravated by worry about friends who did not get out, was overwhelming. It is something that has to be experienced to be understood.”
Even in later years, comfortably settled in her office deep in the heart of Harvard’s Widener Library, the bookworm preferred to keep her distance: “I have participated happily enough in what goes on around me,” she confessed in her memoir, “but with no wish to be deeply involved.”
During World War II, the Shklar family settled in Montreal. Judith attended McGill, where she met her husband (a doctor, like her mother) and discovered her calling in a course on the history of political thought taught by Frederick Watkins, an American scholar who also introduced her to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the first crucial interlocutor in the life of her mind: “To read Rousseau is to acquire a political imagination,” she remarked years later—and Rousseau’s was just the kind of wildly utopian political imagination that was bound to challenge and provoke her own well-earned skepticism about the good will of those who rule.
Entering the graduate program in political science at Harvard in I951, she was quickly adopted by Carl Joachim Friedrich, an old-fashioned German-trained specialist in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, who taught her “how to behave, how to be professional, how to give and prepare lectures, how to deal with colleagues and how to act in public.” Despite Shklar’s professed commitment to the values of a democratic citizen, she never shed the Prussian manner—imperious, blunt, intolerant of perceived ignorance--that she had learned in part from Friedrich.
Still, in private, she was surprisingly self-effacing. She thought of herself, not without reason, as the recipient of great good fortune. Friedrich chose her as his successor, an extraordinary honor to bestow on a young woman, and one regarded with uncomprehending jealousy by most of her colleagues, the genteel and clubby kind of men who always dressed in oxford gray Brooks Brothers suits.
“She was a perfect blend of polar opposites,” Stanley Hoffman, perhaps her oldest Harvard friend, recalled: “She combined an ebullient fondness for intellectual combat with a passionate desire to avoid conflict in human relations, as was shown by her initiating a pseudo half-time permanent lectureship when my colleagues were still too full of male prejudice to grant her the tenured professorship she so obviously deserved.”
Shklar neither ignored this indignity nor chose to dwell on it. In American Citizenship (1991), she does not mince words about the injustice of excluding women from the franchise and the workplace. But, as she confessed in her memoir, she could never be a “real feminist,” since “the idea of joining a movement and submitting to a collective belief system strikes me as a betrayal of intellectual values.” (To the best of my knowledge, the only political organization she expressed any loyalty toward was Amnesty International, contributing not just money but also her literary talent, writing uncredited pieces for its newsletter in the 1980s.)
A self-avowed liberal and—as one might predict—a staunch anticommunist throughout her life, Shklar began her intellectual odyssey with an admiration, bordering on envy, for a brand of “radicalism” she associated with the visionaries of the French Enlightenment, and Rousseau above all, thinkers who were buoyed by the belief “that man can do with himself and with his society whatever he wishes.” She never ceased reading the philosophes, browsing through their works in quest of opportunities for textual commentary and emblematic praise, for example, of the ironic liberalism that Jean D’ Alembert thought flowed from skepticism: “As long as no one knows, everyone has a right to enjoy the most ‘extreme liberty’ of expressing his own opinions.”
Unlike Isaiah Berlin, whose turn of mind is often compared to her own, Shklar was repelled by any whiff of romantic political enthusiasm, recoiling in horror from figures such as de Maistre and Charles Peguy: “Peguy wanted an inspiration and a religion, and it never occurred to him that political life was not a suitable place for such emotions.” Unlike Arendt, Shklar had not a trace of polis envy, worrying instead that “exaggerated notions about Greek and Roman liberty” were liable to produce only cruelty and intolerance. The revival of interest in Machiavelli’s thought in those years left her equally bemused: the Greek and Italian city-states were incubators for the most potentially murderous of martial virtues.
After completing her first truly original piece of work, Legalism, published in 1964, Shklar turned to the close reading of key thinkers. She completed studies of Rousseau (Men and Citizens, published in 1969) and of Hegel (Freedom and Independence, 1976--a topic, for once, in tune with academic trends, and perhaps for that reason the least interesting of her books).
She next appeared between hard covers with a set of moral essays titled Ordinary Vices (1984). Examining, in turn, cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, betrayal, and misanthropy, the essays elaborated on a bleak premise familiar in Shklar’s previous work (”we live in a world of pervasive suffering, moral and physical,”she had written in 1972); but they were composed in a strikingly new literary style, inspired by the vinegary Pyrrhonism of Montaigne—the second crucial interlocutor in the life of her mind.
At the time, few scholars regarded the great Renaissance essayist as a key figure in the history of political thought. But Montaigne now became Shklar’s alter ego, a literary model who also reinforced and deepened her native skepticism. She reacted to her discovery much as Montaigne himself had reacted, midway through his intellectual career, to his discovery of Pyrhho, the classical figure who persuaded him to abjure his youthful yearning for a radical and consistent philosophy of life (in his case, he had tried, and failed, to become a virtuous Stoic).
Convinced by Montaigne to cast off her own youthful yearning for a consistently enlightened way of life, she felt liberated—free at last to explore her own deepest, and bleakest, intuitions.
Here was someone, after all, who truly understood the black humor of the human comedy. Montaigne, Shklar told the readers of Ordinary Vices, “is the hero of this book. In spirit he is on every one of its pages.”
With Montaigne by her side, her voice lit up. At last, Shklar found the right words to sum up the peculiar character of what had become her political point of view. She called it “the liberalism of fear” in her introduction to Ordinary Vices. And it was a formula she made her own in an essay under the same title, first published in 1989, and perhaps her best known piece of writing today.
In this essay, Shklar insists that genuine “liberalism has been very rare in both theory and practice.” A great many ostensibly liberal regimes, such as the United States before the Civil War, were cruel and murderous regimes that simply excluded vast segments of the population. Following in the footsteps of Montaigne, contemporary liberals, she argues, ought to worry more about vices than virtues, and treat cruelty as the greatest evil of all, seeking whenever possible to avoid “the deliberate infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group by stronger ones.” The “most reliable test” for discovering what “cruelties are to be endured at any place and any time is to ask the likeliest victims, the least powerful persons, at any given moment and under controlled conditions.”
This is an implicit, historically grounded alternative to the “original position” imagined by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice as a criterion for creating a good society. So long as subjects cower in fear that is needless by this demanding criterion, liberalism remains a goal to be achieved. As John Dunn has remarked, Shklar’s mature work represents a sustained attempt to “think (and feel) from the victim’s point of view.”
The greatest of her last works, The Faces of Injustice (1990), is less tentative and even more emphatic in its critique of Rawls and its use of skeptical tropes, employing with sovereign self-assurance “a style of thought that is less abstract than formal ethics but more analytical than history.” Shorter and edgier than any of her previous books, the text pulls the reader in many directions at once, conveying outrage at ignorance; horror at injustice; and uncertainty over what, if any, hopes for a better world to entertain.
On the evidence of history to date, the idea of perfect justice is a perfect fantasy. Feelings of injustice arise from manifold sources that are impossible to regulate or control. For the foreseeable future, human beings are going to suffer such feelings, not least because of the prevailing political arrangements. It is a plain fact (although one ignored by most liberal political theorists): “We live under rules and laws not of our making or in our interest.” Even in the United States, after all, “there is no substitute”--just as Rousseau had insisted-- ”for consent under conditions that make it genuine.” Those conditions, alas, are nowhere fulfilled. At least in the United States, one may expect that “punishment and reward will be administered punctiliously” according to fixed norms. But even here, “the valid sense of injustice belongs to those who can prevail.”
Like Rousseau, Shklar was a master of the diatribe, carefully using exaggeration to wake readers from their dogmatic slumbers. “What she truly wanted of people,” as John Dunn has mischievously put it, “was what the Chinese Communist Party used to affect to want of its peasant clients: that they should stand up.”
Of course, sometimes, for one reason or another, the victim of injustice can do no such thing. It may be wiser to suffer silently. To struggle may be futile. Conflict can embitter: Shklar hated the tumult of the late 1960s, not just because student radicals were sometimes vainglorious but, more important, because their protests were polarizing, turning old friends into foes, and forcing hard choices.
Still, temperamentally averse though she was to political confrontation, Shklar was not prepared, in theory at least, simply to paper over disagreements in the name of political harmony and compromise.
To endure feelings of injustice in silence was as mistaken as impassioned protest. What passes for “common sense” may be wrong. Slavery was common sense for thousands of years. So was the subordination of women. Our beliefs and practices are not natural facts. They can be challenged, and sometimes changed for the better. And this requires not a quest for consensus but a readiness to credit feelings of injustice--even when prudence dictates a display of outward conformity.
Some of these precepts, especially taken out of context, certainly support claims that Shklar was an essentially “negative” thinker. But how negative was she, really?
In a typically subtle short essay, Michael Walzer argues that his old friend’s vaunted negativism constitutes only half, and not necessarily the better half, of her political vision. “The liberalism of fear,” on Walzer’s interpretation, invites us to build a “bulwark,” against Nazism in particular, “and the secret police in general.” He reminds us that a bulwark is, literally, a defensive wall, a fortification; it has no function or real meaning apart from what it defends. So what, if anything, was Shklar so concerned to defend? Walzer supplies an answer perfectly consonant with his own brand of pluralism: “Outside the bulwarks, there are tyrants and bullies and thieves. On the other side,” Walzer imagines, “are men and women, complexly related, with their personal status and sense of themselves; families and their varied holdings; customary rights and privileges; established communities of many sorts; different institutional arrangements; different moralities and religions. We oppose the tyrants in the name of all these: negative politics always has a substantive subject--a certain necessary positivity.”
At first glance, this seems fair enough. Shklar in practice was doubtless enmeshed in, and more or less explicitly committed to upholding, a set of positive political arrangements not so dramatically different from those imagined by Walzer or, for that matter, those defended in the abstract by Rawls or, again, those defended in quite different though equally abstract terms by Richard Rorty (who understandably professed admiration for Shklar’s way of thinking).
Still, Walzer’s reconstruction of a kindler, gentler form of”negative politics” bears scant resemblance to what Shklar actually said and, equally important, how she chose to say it.
“I mean to be unsettling,” Shklar once declared. And so she was.
Reading her is—just as she hoped—not unlike reading Montaigne. Like him, she refined “an experimental style” (her words) that “weaves in and out of the subject rather than hitting the reader over the head.” But the style is more disturbing still: like Montaigne, she piled up apercus and learned comments, unafraid of the non sequitur--and unwilling to reconcile and tidy up after herself. With Emerson (another of her literary models in later life), she obviously assumed that “a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”
The public religion of Shklar’s America was the faith in justice. Democracy depended on it. Shklar could not dismiss that faith; indeed, she was grateful that Rawls had risen to its defense. Yet, Shklar herself was in no position to uphold a theory of justice against which her psychological insight rebelled. To have rejected it out of honesty might, however, have removed her from her community to an intolerable degree. So, like Montaigne, she outwardly respected the prevailing religion.
But Shklar never subscribed to key aspects of its catechism.
Compare Walzer’s cozy picture of “men and women, complexly related” with two of Shklar’s acid epigrams in The Faces of Injustice: “We are intuitively evasive.” “We are strangers to one another and we are too ignorant to judge each other.” Perhaps because the hyperbole and vehemence of her literary style could not be further from the carefully modulated periods of his own prose, Walzer underestimates the depth of Shklar’s mature Pyrrhonism and its consistently corrosive implications for any positive theorizing about politics: “To speak of justice has become hazardous.”
But it is also true that the skeptical tone in Shklar’s voice moderated when she turned her attention to American politics. Asked in the 1980s to teach American political theory to Harvard undergraduates, she accepted the assignment with typical energy and earnestness, immersing herself in a vast and, to her, previously unfamiliar literature. She saw in Article I, section 2 of the federal constitution of 1787, which stipulates that a national census be published every decade, a warrant for a new kind of political science, broadly in tune with her own political sympathies: “How to assess the behavior and attitudes of the anonymous many who compose the electorate was a wholly novel intellectual task.”
Several years later, in 1990, on the occasion of her installation as the first female president of the American Political Science Association, she went even further, declaring that “all the social sciences are submerged biographies of the silent majority of humanity: the peasant, the artisan, the immigrant, the slave, women, and (in our case) that basic irreducible unit of representative politics, the voter.”
Because one cannot help but recall counterexamples—for example, that intrepid social scientist, Dick Morris, delivering the daily profile of the “silent majority” to Bill Clinton to help the president manipulate the public by telling uninformed citizens what they wanted to hear--one wonders whether Shklar’s rare outburst of transparently unfounded optimism was provoked by the etiquette of the occasion.
Her presidential address is nevertheless a moving document. After suffering silently the injustice of allowing herself to be named an untenured half-time lecturer at Harvard, Shklar faced her overwhelmingly male peers as the first woman elected to her chosen profession’s highest office.
If she was generous in her assessment of the social sciences and their potential to help men and women of imagination “to project a plausibly better future,” she was adamant in rejecting the views of her distinguished Harvard predecessor, Louis Hartz. American political thought was not, as Hartz had suggested, in the grip of “an obsessive and unconscious commitment to a liberal faith that prevents it from asking profound and critical questions.” The consensus view of American history was as mistaken as consensus theories of law and ethics.
The words of this address radiate a quiet pride. At the end of her life, the exile, the one who could never comfortably belong, nevertheless knew that, in the eyes of others, she did, after all, belong. She had lived long enough to enjoy the respect and admiration of her professional peers.
In an essay titled “Judith Shklar’s Dystopic Liberalism,” Seyla Benhabib, like Walzer, stresses the most congenially social-democratic aspects of Shklar’s political vision, going so far as to associate her with Antonio Gramsci and one of his most famous slogans: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.”
This seems to me a mistake. Shklar was too immersed in the life of her mind to worry like a Marxist militant about “the will.” And her intellect, if one is to trust the ebullience with which she entered into intellectual combat, was a source not of pessimism but of deep satisfaction, even joy.
Shklar’s skepticism, after all, was more than skin deep. This made her an odd duck in an academic setting where professors crave the power that “positive thinking” confers.
Instead of posthumously recruiting her to a social-democratic version of liberalism, I suggest cherishing her as a classical kind of Pyrrhonist. Outwardly engaged, inwardly detached, Shklar was a thinker in whom the deliberate “suspension of judgement” had brought with it--just as Pyrrho had promised that it would--”tranquility like its shadow.”
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Brad DeLong here: The interesting claim here is that Judith Shklar’s fundamental political-philosophical stance was neither a social-democratic nor a “liberalism of fear” one, but rather a harsh judgment of all who believed that they knew the truth about human affairs: that we could know and turn away—and we should turn away—from things going wrong, from gross cruelty and injustice; but that we had, so far, been unsuccessful in weaving together our ideas of what would be just without leaving very great rips and holes in our fabric.
Those willing to go to great extremes to establish their vision of a Just City are, in her view, engaged in political fantasy and a source of immense danger.
I have always learned a lot from her whenever I have dipped into Judith Shklar’s writings. And I now find myself wondering to what degree my Slouching Towards Utopia is much more indebted to her than I had realized. I have always learned a lot from her whenever I have dipped into Judith Shklar’s writings. And I now find myself wondering to what degree my Slouching Towards Utopia is much more indebted to her than I had realized. Start with the first word of my title. “Slouching” is, I now think, a Shklarian word.













































