What To Do with the Trump-Scrubbing Sanewashers?
Not weak tea, but no tea at all: attempts to scrub chaos into “strategy” in Trumpworld are really not helpful…
Think of things like this like a CDOS attack on your brain—making you stupider by making you think about some parallel universe that does not exist, and that does not gain you information by contemplating it in a “what if…” mode.
The very sharp Bill Emmott is the most recent person I have seen who really ought to know better, but who succumbs.
Here it is:
Bill Emmott: Trying to discern a strategy from Trump’s global adventuring <https://billemmott.substack.com/p/trying-to-discern-a-strategy-from>: ‘Trump has no intention of retreating from global affairs… regal tour of Malaysia… resum[ing] testing of nuclear weapons… frantic efforts to prove that the “historic” ceasefire… between Israel and Hamas is still holding…. The true question for America’s long-time but now disenchanted allies in Europe and Asia concerns what Trump’s foreign policy goals really are. If he is not an isolationist, then what is he?… The outcome of his bilateral negotiations… [on] his Asian trip… suggested… a strategy… [focused on] the competition for global influence between America and China.
Admittedly, some of the headlines were for his domestic audience… that his bullying… [has brought] supposed “wins” for America[. But these] are likely to prove either illusory or exaggerated….
However, several other announcements look more novel and more meaningful…. The agreement to make joint investments in shipbuilding, both in the US and in Japan and South Korea, could represent a strategic acknowledgement that allies have value…. Trump’s short meeting with Xi represented… that… China… has as much negotiating leverage as America… declared a kind of a truce in their trade war…. Actions… America is taking in Latin America… alongside Trump’s Asian diplomacy… seems to… [show a] Trump is keen to prevent China from becoming too influential in that continent….
If this really turns out to be a long-term strategy for the Trump administration, and if Trump really understands that confronting China and Russia just through trade threats and now nuclear tests is not productive, then perhaps old allies in Europe and Asia can take heart. Perhaps… he and his team may be coming to realise that having allies makes America stronger…. It would be premature to draw a firm conclusion about that, but the past week’s diplomacy provides some reason for hope…
Suggested… admittedly… could… kind of a truce… seems… perhaps… perhaps… premature to draw a firm conclusion… some reason for hope…
This is not weak tea: this is no tea at all:
For Emmott to say that there is any sense that the Trump team believes that the U.S. is stronger with allies than with without, and that it is in any sense has some strategic concept that the U.S. is in a race for global influence with China—how does that fit Trump’s hissy fit with Canada over a commercial pointing out that Ronald Reagan was a free trader?
For Emmott to see small moves toward maybe making joint investments with Japan and Korea in shipbuilding as in any sense neutralizing the random chaotic damage Trump’s stochastic tariffs are inflicting on manufacturing production value chains outside of China—well, words really do fail me.
And for Emmott to see Bessent’s commitment of $40 billion to an Argentina (an Argentina that is not making the policy changes it needs for that $40 billion to have real effect) as seeming to show that Trump is keen to prevent China from becoming too influential in Latin America—well, that simply leaves me scratching my head. How does that seem to show that? Was China going to spend its money supporting an overvalued and out-of-equilibrium peso had Bessent not stepped in? And how does that get you influence, anyway?
I do see this over and over again.
I should not have to say: Somebody got to Trump so he obsesses about how important it is to do good things for his friend Milei in Argentina. Somebody got to Bessent and convinced him that it would be a political disaster for Milei if the peso were to collapse before the current election. Possibly Bessent really cares that some of his friends had money in Argentina they wanted to pull out at a high valuation—everyone else in the Trump administration is corrupt as f***, so why not Bessent too? The Treasury’s experts pointing out that money spent defending an incredible exchange rate peg is money wasted unless policies change to make the peg credible—they were told to sit down and shut up. And so you have a policy. It has next to nothing to do with a struggle for influence in Latin America between China and the U.S,
I should not have to say: Somebody got to Trump and convinced him—correctly—that building ships needed to be done in Japan and Korea. How they managed to do this is a mystery. But it is a one-off: it has nothing to do with any recognition that any manufacturing superpower capable to going toe-to-toe with China over the next generation has to have production- and value-chains that reach far outside the United States, spanning two if not three oceans.
I should not have to say: A Trump who was genuinely interested in making the later “20..” years an American- rather than a Chinese-dominated epoch would be able to remember for more than a week that we are stronger the closer are our ties and alliances with Canada and Mexico.
And yet, because Bill Emmott and a legion of other people who know better write things like this, I do.
One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy. One must consider Sisyphus happy.