READING: JOHN HOLBO: Vavilovian Philosophical Mimicry
Often we do not really want to take a set of ideas & scrub & steelman it to make it an “ideal” theory. Often what we need to do is to strawman it. Then we can see what the stakes truly are—how the doctrines are embraced primarily because they assist some élite in running the “fraud” part of its force-&-fraud society-of-domination game. For one of the most powerful societal rôles of intellectual argument is to serve as a form of protective coloration that clothes the will to power and domination… From 2019…
Thanks to John Holbo <https://crookedtimber.org/2019/12/03/vavilovian-philosophical-mimicry/>, I now finally understand what I liked about C.B. MacPherson’s Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Yes, it is hopelessly jejune and unfair to each of the liberal thinkers he analyzes. But it is dead-on with respect to their vector sum.
The question is, then, is there more to “liberalism” (or conservativism, or socialism, or fascism) than those vector sums, which are, respectively, possessive individualism, the degradation of the subordinate, the victory of the envious, and the exaltation of the leader?
John Holbo (2019): Vavilovian Philosophical Mimicry <https://crookedtimber.org/2019/12/03/vavilovian-philosophical-mimicry/>: ‘I propose a new term in political theory. Vavilovian philosophical mimicry! It denotes a type of relation between ideal and non-ideal theories. It posits that the former evolves as protective concealment for the latter…. Weeds evolve, under selective pressure, to resemble crops. If you didn’t know that happens, you might deduce it, back of the envelope. (But now you know its name – you’re welcome.) You might also think: congrats, Holbo, you’ve invented a new, longer word for ideology! Maybe, but maybe there’s more.
To fix ideas, an example. The famous Southern Strategy – Atwater’s infamous statement. Let’s be blunt: you are a racist neo-Confederate. You can’t sell that, as such. But you can emphasize parts of it that sound kinda sorta more libertarian. Under Vavilovian pressure, white supremacy evolves, rhetorically, to outwardly resemble libertarianism – a philosophical crop plant – to ‘pass’ in environments in which outright expression of white supremacy would be weeded ruthlessly. You may even get into a situation in which most outward expressions of libertarianism are, as it were, mere mimics. (Because the real deal is a delicate, seminar room varietal. Whereas Vavilovian fake strains are heartland rugged.)
So what thought does ‘Vavilovian’ allow me to express, about relations between ideal and non-ideal political philosophies, that I couldn’t get at with ‘propaganda’ or ‘bullshit’ or ‘spin’ or any of that? (Hell, if I like Russian, what’s wrong with ‘Potemkin’?) Let me reference an old post, in which I tried (as always!) to defend our Corey from his mistaken critics. Basically, the perennial knock on Robin on the reactionary mind is that his account is not ‘ideal’ enough. He is thus guilty of uncharity towards conservatives. But the proper defense, as I explain in that post, is that Robin’s theory is not just (moderately) realistic, as opposed to idealistic. But also more unified. Theoretical unity is, after all, an ‘ideal’ value. So Robin is doing ‘ideal theory’ but of a different sort.
We have all these philosophical things we may call politically ‘conservative’, at least in certain lights. Why call them all that, from Ayn Rand to Zarathustra, from Friedman’s “Free To Choose” to Scalia’s Catholicism? Burke, Kirk, Oakeshott, Nozick, Maistre? If you construct the ‘best’ each can be (most ingenious, most seminar room coherent, most intensely true to their ‘better’ angels, most tightly wound around their axiomatic mainsprings) they fly apart. The best version of Nietzsche won’t have anything to do with the best version of Antonin Scalia.
But actual Nietzsche and actual Scalia? Those two have a bit more in common. There are plenty of possible Nietzsches and possible Scalias who have interesting things in common. So, while it is fine to do ‘ideal’ theory by being as charitable as you can to Nietzsche, then Scalia, individually – retail; there is a different sort of ‘ideal’ theory, equally valid, that aims at outlining, as it were, the-best-Nietzsche-that-is-also-related-to-Scalia. The best coherent philosophical conservatism in the wholesale aggregate.
What Robin suggests to fit the bill is, basically, this (I quote this in the other post as well): “Conservatism is the theoretical voice of this animus against the agency of the subordinate classes. It provides the most consistent and profound argument as to why the lower orders should not be allowed to exercise their independent will, why they should not be allowed to govern themselves or the polity. Submission is their first duty, and agency the prerogative of the elite. Though it is often claimed that the left stands for equality while the right stands for freedom, this notion misstates the actual disagreement between right and left. Historically, the conservative has favored liberty for the higher orders and constraint for the lower orders. What the conservative sees and dislikes in equality, in other words, is not a threat to freedom but its extension. For in that extension, he sees a loss of his own freedom…”
I think this is basically right. If you read all the things we may call ‘conservative’, in a political philosophy sense, you see something of the sort in ALL of them. And there isn’t anything else we see in ALL of them. Hence this ‘theoretical voice’ is the unifying undertone. Ergo conservatism’s ‘ideal’ voice, in a sense. To this I am adding: let’s posit, on top, more superficial, Vavilovian harmonics as well.
In a liberal democratic society – one based on egalitarian principles – animus against that is attacked as a kind of alien weed.
So expressions of such animus will survive and thrive better if they mimic something that looks consistent with liberal democracy.
So: the logic of philosophical conservatism is as follows:
A variety of distinct, basically anti-liberal impulses…
[They] come to resemble each other, philosophically…
But superficially!…
Due to a selection process through which they individually learn to express themselves so as to ‘pass’ as liberal….
So philosophical conservatism should be theorized in terms of the following four factors:
An element of aristocratic anti-liberalism (animus against the agency of the subordinate classes.) Cf. Robin.
An element of Vavilovian, pseudo-liberal mimicry. Anti-liberalisms that survive in a liberal environment will tend to look like each other because they are all, as it were, trying to look enough like liberalism to not get weeded out as too anti-liberal. But these resemblances, because they are protective mimicry, are actually misleading. At least superficial.
Considerable liberal democratic DNA. It’s rare to run into a real, dyed-in-the-wool Joseph de Maistre-type.
(2) may result in (3), over time, via ‘fake it until you make it’, if you see what I mean.
I would say more – about Trump – but I promised myself: keep it under 1000 words…
References:
Holbo, John. 2019. “Vavilovian Philosophical Mimicry”. Crooked Timber. December 3. <https://crookedtimber.org/2019/12/03/vavilovian-philosophical-mimicry/>
Holbo, John. 2018. “Kabaservice Contra Corey – Thoughts About How To Think About Conservatism.” Crooked Timber. September 13.<https://crookedtimber.org/2018/09/13/kabaservice-contra-corey-thoughts-about-how-to-think-about-conservatism/>.
MacPherson, C.B. 1962. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<https://archive.org/details/politicaltheoryo0000macp>.
Wikipedia. 2024. “Southern Strategy.” Last modified March 25. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_strategy>.